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ABSTRACT !!
Mt. Balabag in the province of Zamboanga del Sur (Mindanao, Philippines) was the site of lucrative 
small-scale mining (SSM) from 1994 to 2012.  This research inquires into the effect of SSM on the 
production of class and on capital accumulation during its operational period and beyond.  The miners 
were a mix of indigenous Subanen and Filipino migrants who all came from rural agricultural 
backgrounds.  There has been research implying the economic benefits of SSM to rural peoples of the 
Global South, and on Mt. Balabag too miners did see a significant increase in earnings relative to their 
previous agricultural livelihoods.  However, in the long term the influx of economic capital did not 
translate into widespread socioeconomic mobility for the majority, or even a significant minority.  When 
SSM came to an end in late 2012, so too did the improvements it provided to most involved. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !
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Figure 1.1: The Philippine regions.  My research site was in the area around the former small-scale 
mining community on Mt. Balabag in Zamboanga Peninsula (Region IX) in Mindanao.  Also noted on 
the map is Mt. Canatuan, the site of the first TVIRD large-scale mine in the Philippines. 
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Chapter One: 
INTRODUCTION !!
“Nearly two years after the dismantling of illegal mining operations in the area – an initiative 
spearheaded by Provincial Governor Antonio Cerilles – the [local peoples, including the 
indigenous Subanen] now [have] clear reason to hope for the remediation of prior environmental 
destruction from exploitive artisanal mining and a transparent roadmap for mutual development 
with TVIRD.” - TVIRD statement in August 2014  (interaksyon.com) !
 Mining (both large-scale and small-scale) and its relationship with the local people is a difficult 
terrain to traverse.  The above quote refers to a new mining site for TVIRD (Canadian TVI-Pacific’s 
Philippine subsidiary) in Balabag, Zamboanga del Sur, which was cleared of ‘illegal’ small-scale miners in 
the fall of 2012.  In 2007, as a freelance journalist, I visited the site of TVIRDs first large scale mine in the 
Philippines on Mt. Canatuan, Zamboanga del Norte.  There I learned first hand of the hardships faced by 
the local peoples in the years since small-scale mining operations were demolished in 1995 (Felipe 2008, 
Tuhan et al1995:148).  I learned that before the arrival of TVIRD the mountain was mined by thousands of 
small scale miners.  I remember asking timuay Boy Anoy (“timuay” being the title of a Subanon leader) 
about the relationship between the small-scale miners and the Subanon.  He told me that at first they were 
unhappy with them, that they felt that mining disrespected their culture and damaged the environment on 
their holy mountain.  Yet after this he told me that because of the threat of TVIRD’s entry, and because 
small-scale mining provided livelihoods, they eventually came to an understanding.  It was then that a 
partnership of sorts emerged between them and the local miners against what they saw as the bigger 
problem: the transnational Canadian company. The rationale given to me was that at least small-scale 
mining (SSM) provided a livelihood to the local people (including the Subanon), where large-scale mining 
(LSM) threatened to take this away while still desecrating their sacred mountain. I did not delve any 
further into this at the time as my focus then was to investigate the situation of the locals living in the 
shadow of the Canadian mine for the purpose of a story I was writing, but in the back of my mind I was 
curious about that state of affairs between the local peoples (indigenous and non-indigenous alike) and the 
SSM. I wondered if the people would have seen a better future if SSM had continued. !
 Seven years later I had the opportunity to return to the region and do my masters thesis fieldwork 
around the future site of TVIRD’s   next operation on nearby Mt. Balabag, in the province of Zamboanga 1
!2
!  TVI-Pacific, in my interviews with them, actively pushed to distance themselves from the issues of Balabag—1
insisting that it was now mostly a Philippine-owned operation under their local affiliate TVIRD.
del Sur.  As with Canatuan this too was the former site of a small-scale mining community who were 
displaced, and it too was claimed as the ancestral domain of the indigenous Subanen people  .  Sitio 2
Balabag   in Bayog lies just within the 4,779 hectares claimed by TVIRD, there the community of small 3
scale miners experienced forced displacement in the fall of 2012.  Small-scale mining began there in 1994 
and in the years since the population exploded to a community with an estimated 5000 involved directly or 
indirectly with mining operations, according to the Monte de Oro Small Scale Miners Association 
(MOSSMA)—the organization created by the miners in the community.    !
 It should be noted again that though my initial interest in this situation came via the plight of the 
indigenous population, in this research project I focused on the aggregate population that included the 
indigenous and non-indigenous peoples formerly involved in small scale mining.  My research questions 
inquired into the impact of SSM on socioeconomic mobility and its lasting long-term impacts after 
operations came to an end with their displacement by TVIRD.  What effect did SSM have on the 
production of class and capital accumulation?  As the risk of a LSM takeover was always present (as the 
threat was there from the beginning of the SSM’s existence and the events at Canatuan were well known), 
how did individuals strategize and implement plans for life post-Balabag?  Were they able to make long 
term decisions to translate their socioeconomic gains from mining into post-mining socioeconomic 
mobility?  Why or why not? !
 If I were to be honest, in entering this work I expected the answer to be that local control of 
development was resulting in at least modest advances in three types of capital (financial, social, and 
cultural) for the majority.  I expected to see some development of industrial and social infrastructure: the 
creation of road and utility networks, the creation of downstream industries, educational systems that 
helped prepare young people for participation in economic networks, and the development of improved 
housing conditions.  Post-SSM I expected to see youth, who having had greater access to education, had 
increased cultural capital that allowed greater participation in the regional, national, and even global 
economies.  Speaking honestly, I wanted to see this.  I wanted my research to be able to proclaim that left 
to their own means the masses were able to take command of development.   !
!3
!  The Subanon and Subanen are the same tribe, but spell their names differently depending on their geographical 2
location (there are other variations as well).  This tribe makes up the majority of the population of the Zamboanga 
peninsula of the island of Mindanao.  One major difference between the Canatuan and Balabag groups was that 
unlike in Canatuan the the Subanen did not have a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) from the 
government.
!  “Sitio” are the smallest community unit, they are hamlets that are satellites of barangays.3
 This generally positive outcome was one that was forwarded by Nancy Lee Peluso (2015) in her 
work on currently operating SSM in Indonesian Borneo  .  In an article for the online publication New 4
Mandala  , she wrote that “Small-scale illegal mining in West Kalimantan is… a shot at economic 5
independence for marginalised rural people.”  My work in many ways recognizes similar economic 
benefits during mining operations, but also recognizes the shadows SSM casts.  Peluso clearly outlined the 
negative effects on human and environmental health as a direct result of artisanal mining. My work adds 
that there were also impacts on family and gender relations, indigenous rights, and social life.  My work 
also inquires as to life after mining, as all extractive industries have a limited lifespan. My research 
highlights the much more ambiguous nature of the ‘economic benefits’ when seen in the long term. !!
THESIS OVERVIEW !
 Within a mixed theoretical framework that draws on different schools of Marxian and post-
Marxian thought, this thesis will examine the long lasting impacts of small-scale mining in Balabag 
(positive and negative) for the peoples involved.  Economic capital did increase for the majority and some 
were able to see upward mobility (including in class positions), but in the long term the end of SSM also 
ended this upward trajectory for the majority, with the notable exception of the elite.  I will argue that in 
Balabag SSM did not prove itself to be a road to modernization and development.  In this research I will 
explore the temporal and socioeconomic factors that enabled the development of new capitalist relations 
within “gold rush” SSM in a semi-feudal agrarian context.  Whilst doing so I will examine how the 
capitalist system prioritized the accumulation of profit, how the form capitalism took was modelled after 
the semi-feudal agrarian capitalism of the countryside, and how like a Ponzi scheme the only clear long 
term benefits went to those who came aboard early with enough capital to establish themselves as the 
mining elite.  The reality of SSM created limitations to the accumulation of social, cultural, and economic 
capital.    !
 This created a sense of frustration that helped shape the type of culture produced.  Space here is 
viewed as a social activity, as Lefebvre wrote, “social space is a social product” (Elden 2007:108) and the 
way spaces are actually lived often clash with conceptions of how life ‘should be’.  Thus when increased 
economic wealth did not bring the opportunities many expected, it found new outlets through the 
projection of luxury and ‘the good life’ (as they saw it).  Moving beyond the base-superstructure binary of 
!4
!  More literature on SSM worldwide will be discussed in chapter two.4
!  http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2015/07/17/the-gold-farmers/5
Althusser, my research sees culture reshaped by the changes brought in by SSM.  As Stuart Elden writes 
regarding Lefebvre’s ideas on the production of space, “'a social space is not a socialised space’, that is, it 
did not exist beforehand as a non-social space, as a natural space, but is produced by social forces” (Elden, 
2007:184). !
 In chapter two I delve into the theoretical underpinnings of the research and elaborate on key 
concepts (such as ‘class’ and ‘capital’) as well as discuss the two different general types of small-scale 
mining found in the Philippines. In chapter three I will discuss the methodology of my research.  Chapter 
four will provide context for my research site within the regional, national, and global economy.  Within 
the regional context I will discuss the opportunities for socioeconomic mobility through a exploration of 
regional demographics and access to educational and employment opportunities.  Here too I will discuss 
how these issues intersect with indigenous rights.  Chapter five will chronologically examine how SSM in 
Balabag developed, was organized, and the class dynamics found therein.  Chapter six will slightly shift 
gears,.Where the previous chapter focused on class dynamics, in this chapter class mobility will be 
examined more in the vernacular sense of general well-being as perceived by the former miners (though 
there will be overlap of approaches in both chapters).  I will ask: How did post-SSM life differ for those 
arriving from different class positions?  How stable were the socioeconomic gains made during the SSM 
era?  And how did various aspects of life change relative to how they lived before their involvement with 
mining?  I will discuss livelihoods, education, home-life, and health. And finally I will provide a synthesis 
and conclusion in chapter seven. !!
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE LITERATURE !
This work will build on the vast literature around extractive industries and the spatial nature of capitalist 
growth.  It inquires into class formations, class dynamics, and class mobility as produced in the transition 
from an agrarian, to an extractive, then back to an agrarian economy. I hope to show that the problems of 
social and economic underdevelopment that are usually attached to large-scale mining are also issues with 
mining in the smaller scale.  It has become common to criticize the destructive effects  of large-scale 
mining in the global south, and while I do not dispute this, I do believe that too often activists and even 
academics, forget that the problem is not necessarily restricted to large-scale mining. These transnational 
corporations are beholden to capitalist logic, and even on the local scale of SSM, negative effects can be 
an outgrowth.  In this understanding I hope we will be better able to consider alternatives. !!
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Chapter Two: 
CONCEPTS AND THEORY !!
 This research did not begin with theory. Instead theoretical approaches emerged through the 
process of conducting the research.  In a very real sense my approach evolved both through the course of 
conducting fieldwork, and through the process of writing. For example, in conducting fieldwork I realized 
that the information I previously had was not complete.  I was under the assumption (based on the little 
information available) that the small-scale mining (SSM) community on Mt. Balabag was similar to those 
found in other indigenous sites in the country where the indigenous peoples had long had a tradition of 
gold mining.  Thus initially I was operating primarily under the mining-induced displacement literature. 
This changed when I learned that the SSM site was relatively new, and that most of the miners were not 
originally from Mt. Balabag.  I learned on site that the situation was more complex and thus I became 
interested in the processes that produced SSM there.  It is from this that I began my inquiry into the global 
economy and the different scales of influence that shape it.  And as my learning about Balabag SSM 
progressed, I began to further delve into questions regarding socioeconomic mobility. !
 In this chapter I will provide an overview of the different theoretical influences found in this 
thesis.  Beginning with an exploration of the global, state, and local economies, I will then contextualize 
these within the small-scale mining industry. SSM in the Philippines exists in two main forms, 
“traditional” and “gold rush”, the two are differentiated mostly by their social and cultural underpinnings. 
In Balabag the latter form took hold and that, in conjunction with the semi-feudal agrarian economy of the 
region, helped shape class formations, class dynamics, and capital flows.  And as SSM on Mt. Balabag 
was eventually displaced by large-scale mining (LSM), the literature on mining-induced displacement 
shall be summarized as elements from that body of work have relevance, especially for the small group of 
indigenous peoples that lived on the site previous to mining, and were permanently displaced after the 
TVIRD takeover. !!
MINING, THE PHILIPPINES, & THE GLOBAL ECONOMY !
 It is not only in the Philippines where this relationship between mineral wealth and 
underdevelopment is found.  This is a common story for many nations across the global south (as well as 
in places within the global north as well).  A wealth of natural resources has long been seen as having a 
seemingly inverse relationship with development.  From the earliest days of theorizing on capitalism 
!6
Adam Smith warned that economies dependent on mineral rents faced perils.  Rents promoted imports and 
led to unproductive activities, “the income of men who love to reap what they never sowed” (Karl 1999: 
43).  This led to an unbalanced, export based, economy which promoted the growth of a local bourgeoisie 
at the expense of growing other industrial sectors, resulting in long term economic weakness.  This has 
been termed as ‘resource curse’ theory, and has been applied to a wide variety of natural resources, from 
the perils felt by petrol-states (Karl 1999, Watts 2009), to the Atlantic cod fishery (Rogers, 1998), to the 
forestry sectors in the Philippines and Borneo (Broad, 1995), to the mining of minerals, and more.  !
 The histories of extractive economies in the West, like those in Canada (fisheries, timber, 
minerals) or gold-rush California, show that development is possible through the exploitation of natural 
resources (Walker 2010) —but only if the state is able to diversify so that it doesn’t rely on this single 
industry.  Without this diversification the threat of ‘Dutch Disease’ looms in that the threat of inflation 
results from an over reliance on extractive rents without the creation of productive industries that are able 
to absorb surplus profit. Here the distinct geographical differences in the form ‘scapitalism takes plays a 
role in shaping class formations, class dynamics, and capital flows. As Michael Watts (2009) writes, the 
“danger is that the [resource] curse substitutes the commodity for the larger truths of capitalism, markets, 
and politics”.  It is not simply that extraction is the cause of developmental difficulties, but that these 
difficulties are a manifestation of the interplay between multiscalar capitalisms. !
 At the global scale capitalism has created a system dependent on uneven development. It divides 
the economic world into what Wallerstein (2004) called core, semi-peripheral, and peripheral nations, with 
the Philippines (and its mining industry) firmly within the latter status.  At the state scale the Philippines’ 
unique colonial and post-colonial history has created a dominant semi-feudal form of capitalism in which 
an elite landowning class, who also make up the political elite, derives value primarily from rent and thus 
has little incentive to reinvest.  And at the local scale, rural agricultural peoples find themselves at odds 
with state and global interests, while at the same time trying to find openings created within those scales to 
chart an independent path. !
 In this work I focus on the actions at the local level, on how class is produced in the 
transformation from an agrarian to an artisanal mining economy.  Though I see it as highly influenced by 
the global and state level scales, the local scale is not viewed as the direct result of a top down scalar 
hierarchy but is instead a fundamental mechanism and process that connects all scales.  As Erik 
Swyngedouw (1992) writes, “space is about social relations, and… spatial properties are constructed in 
and through a myriad of social processes unfolding at various social levels and geographical scales” (417). 
Swyngedouw’s work on scale helps inform the ways in which nature and society interpenetrate and “are 
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constituted as networks of interwoven processes”, and shows “how the social and physical transformation 
of the world is inserted in a series of scalar spatialities.”  The resulting networks are seen as “deeply 
localized” and at the same time expansive in how it interconnects global and local configurations (Marston 
et al, 2005:418). !!
THE GLOBAL SCALE !
 Neil Smith defines uneven development as “the systematic geographical expression of the 
contradictions inherent in the very constitution and structure of capital” (Smith 2008:3).  Capitalism is a 
system perennially at risk (Harvey 1985:315) and survival is dependent on the maximization of surplus 
value from living labour through production, thus requiring a steady influx of the cheapest possible raw 
materials formed into products by the cheapest possible labour.  This creates a value chain that over the 
course of history created a divide of ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ between states.  This global divide results 
from capital’s internal contradictions that create a cyclical pattern of boom and bust.  Internal 
contradictions are inescapable elements of capitalist accumulation which eventually lead to what Harvey 
(1985, 1989) calls a crisis of overaccumulation.  This occurs when the surpluses in labour and capital that 
capitalism relies on can no longer be absorbed by the economy.   !
Surplus capital and surplus labor power exist side by side with apparently no way to bring the 
two together to accomplish socially useful tasks. The irrationality that lurks at the heart of a 
supposedly rational mode of production comes to the surface for all to see (Harvey, 1985: 
315-316).     !
The Marxist argument is, then, that the tendency toward overaccumulation can never be 
eliminated under capitalism. It is a never-ending and eternal problem for any capitalist mode 
of production. The only question, therefore is how the overaccumulation tendency can be 
expressed, contained, absorbed or managed in ways that do not threaten the capitalist social 
order (Harvey 1989: 181). !
The system cannot ever overcome this problem, it can merely postpone its emergence.  This is 
accomplished by moving the risk around geographically—techniques known as spatial fixes. 
Corresponding to the above, they take these basic forms (Das, 2009: 378): !
1) The ecological problems can be geographically relocated away from the centres of global capital. 
!8
2) Those outside the capitalist economy can be brought in through a variant of primitive accumulation. 
3) Like with the environment, labour from a different geographical location can help alleviate costs and 
boost profits. 
4) Overaccumulation can also be temporarily alleviated through movement in space, this is what Harvey 
calls a “spatial fix.”   !
This ‘spatial fix’ is at the heart of the Philippines’ role in the global economy: that of being primarily a 
supplier of raw goods (historically organic goods like timber and agriculture, but more and more turning 
towards minerals), and a raw supplier of cheap labour   (Rodriguez 2011). 6!!
THE STATE SCALE !
 On the scale of the Philippine state, capitalism inherits elements of the feudal system imposed by          
the Spanish colonizers   and entrenched into political networks during the American colonial period. 7
Philippine capitalism in the countryside takes on what Philippine activists call a “semi-feudal” nature 
(Aguilar 1989, Putzel 1995).  Large landowners make up the dominant elite and control both political and 
economic interests subordinated to foreign capital.  In this form of agricultural production the vast 
majority of arable land is owned by a small number of landlords and is tilled primarily by peasants. 
“Semi-feudal” production is marked by its reliance on manual labour over the use of modern technologies. 
Elite power is based on their serving as rent extracting middle-men between foreign capital and the 
exploited Filipino classes (Guerrero 1970), and a system of patronage that ties the elite and their clients in 
vertical ties of reciprocity.  The Philippine state tends to lean towards supporting LSM over SSM towards 
this end. !
 As with how on a global scale the Philippines is a peripheral nation, on a national scale the          
archipelago itself is broken up into urban cores (centred on Manila) and rural peripheries (like my research 
site on Zamboanga peninsula).  Mining interests tend to be located in the peripheries, often in areas once 
considered undesirable, which by no coincidence are often areas populated by indigenous peoples.  By 
entering these lands mining interests (whether large or small-scale) tend to reenact forms of Marx’s 
!9
!  Global labour is not a major interest in this thesis, but it can be seen in some interviews with parent of former 6
miners who hope their college educated children can find work overseas as an alternative to the poor work 
opportunities found in the region.
!  Technically, feudalism first entered the archipelago a century previous to the Spanish with the arrival of the Muslim 7
sultanates, but their reach was far more limited (Guererro, 1970: 81).   
primitive accumulation through the privatization of indigenous common lands.  The original primitive 
accumulation was part of Marx’s theory of historical materialism which sought to explain the early days of 
capitalism when the commons were occupied by capitalist interests.  This released the labour power of 
peasants into the work force creating the proletariat class (Marx, Capital, Part VIII, Chapter XXVI). In 
today’s economic climate Harvey builds on the concept with his theory of accumulation by dispossession. 
“This occurs as capitalism (seeking new sources of raw materials and new markets for manufactured 
products) opens up new fields for capital accumulation in domains hitherto regarded [as] off-limits to the 
calculus of profitability” (Harvey 2006: 153).  Unlike primitive accumulation, this process is not limited to 
capitalism’s historical beginnings, but is a continuous process where the system continuously finds ways 
to privatize what was once part of the commons (with a reach that extends beyond common land to areas 
including culture).  Zamboanga peninsula (and other places like it) have been known to be mineral rich for 
some time now, but it was only after a series of economic crises in the late twentieth century that 
extraction in such a remote and underdeveloped area shifted towards profitability.   However, before LSM 
could enter, local capitalists were the first to act. !!
THE LOCAL SCALE !
 While the global and state-level scales clearly have powerful effects on the local scale, no one of 
those scales can be privileged as determining the shape of economic spaces.  David Harvey wrote, 
“concepts of space and time and the practices associated with them are far from socially neutral in human 
affairs” (Harvey 1990: 424).  Drawing on the idea that space is produced (Lefebvre 1991), space here is 
seen as relative, and as a component of the relations of production, space as both social and spatial.  As 
Philip Kelly writes, “space is assumed to be fixed and neutral… But embodied as it is in ideas of private 
property, precise boundaries, colonial settlement and legal control over the body, this concept of absolute 
space has become historically established as “the premise of hegemonic social practices” (1997:153).  !
 Following ideas discussed in Kelly’s 1997 paper “Globalization, Power and the Politics of Scale 
in the Philippines” issues of scale, from the global, to the national, and the local, will be seen as nested—
with each scale being influenced and influencing each other.  Steven Bunker (2003), in his study on the 
Amazon, proposes that local level actions “particularly as manifest in the materio-spatial features of 
production” help shape and organize the world system. Gold mining in Zamboanga Peninsula is a modern 
practice with no pre-twentieth century indigenous precedent unlike in the Cordillera region in the north of 
the country.  What happened with SSM on Mt. Balabag was the result of this nested interplay between 
scales.  On the global scale, the renewed global profitability of the extractive industries in the neoliberal 
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period opened up opportunities for transnational companies through what Harveycalls the ‘spatial fix.’ 
However this also opened up opportunities on the local scale where people on the margins of capitalism 
made an attempt to try to improve their socioeconomic situation through the establishment of SSM.  On 
the national scale the Philippine state, a peripheral state within the discourse of globalization, acts as a 
node in the global capitalist network—thus providing preferential treatment to LSM.  And as shall be 
discussed in the body of this work, the impact of SSM in local areas were showing hints of changes in the 
way global capital will conduct extractive operations in the Philippines in the future. !!
SMALL-SCALE MINING IN THE PHILIPPINES !
 Where then does small-scale mining (SSM) fit into this bigger picture?  And what is considered 
SSM in the Philippine context?  As my research interests revolve around how mining helps or hinders 
community level socioeconomic development I am interested in how a small scale mine is organized: how 
the relationship between the extraction process, the wealth it generates, and the community intersects with 
the mining community that springs up around it.  Using the mine site typology of the Cordillera People’s 
Alliance (CPA) I will contrast the “traditional” mining of other Philippine indigenous communities, with 
that of “gold rush” sites like that found in Balabag before its demolition by TVIRD.  Whereas the 
government’s classifications are based on the types of mining technologies, this distinction between 
“traditional” and “gold rush” is more economic, social and cultural in nature.  As such, it is important to 
recognize that these “traditional” characteristics are generalized and in a constant process of evolution as 
they now operate within an overall economic system different from their origins.  !
 The CPA is the Philippines’ largest grassroots organization of indigenous peoples. Founded in 
1984, they focus on the “igorot  ” tribes of the Cordillera mountains of Luzon but also speak out on 8
national issues affecting indigenous communities.  I spoke with their representatives in Baguio City in 
August 2014. !
 Gold mining has a long history in some parts of the Philippines (mostly in the Cordillera 
mountains of Luzon) which pre-date Spanish colonialism (Canilao 2011; Rovillos et al. 2003).  As Holden 
and Jacobson note, “by the third century AD Chinese traders were referring to the island of Luzon as 
Lusong Dao (the island of gold) and by the 14th century AD the Chinese were trading with Filipinos for 
crudely smelted copper (Holden & Jacobson 2007: 159).”  However, in my particular research site, gold 
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!  “Igorot” is the collective term used to group the different tribes found in this region.  This is in contrast to the term 8
“lumad” which is the collective term for all indigenous tribes found on the island of Mindanao.
mining is a modern phenomenon that only began in the post-independence years after the Second World 
War.  It is useful to briefly compare the differences between what the CPA calls “traditional”  and “gold 
rush” sites as even in areas with a long history of mining, changes have been occurring and new SSM sites 
are not necessity following the traditional methods.   !
[What we call “traditional” SSM] needs to be part of the community and its traditional 
systems, this has been [our] way for thousands of years… Today it is under threat as 
financiers are ruining the role of indigenous systems and the elders there.  The traditional 
[profit] sharing system is being eroded, for example if a big discovery of ore is discovered, 
traditional SSM is obligated to share this with the entire community… if it’s a very very big 
find then they have to kill animal, usually a cow, as thanksgiving for all.  Now this is 
disappearing and being replaced by a profit driven concept (CPA interview, Aug 2014). !
This notion is further elaborated in a paper by the grass-roots organization Samahan ng Nagtataguyod ng 
Agham at Teknolohiya para sa Sambayanan   (AGHAM): 9!
Traditional mining is evident in mining communities of some of our indigenous peoples, like 
the Kankana-ey and Ibaloy communities of Benguet who have been mining for the past 400 
years. Their mining methods are unique and have been handed down for generations. 
Traditional communities also have their own intra- and inter-community sharing mechanisms 
ensuring the subsistence of all community members. This acts as a coping mechanism for the 
inherent uncertainties and risks of mining. It allows miners who found minimal gold or elders 
who are unable to work, to have a share of ore, concentrate or tailings, on the condition that 
they will do the same once luck turns to their side. Mostly, the elderly and other community 
members with high esteem are prioritized in this sharing. This practice is so ingrained in their 
culture, that they have already built spiritual justifications for it, which at the same time, 
fosters this practice (Rey and Saturay 2005:10).  !
Traditional SSM is defined as sites that maintain links not only to pre-colonial methods, but also to pre-
colonial (pre-capitalist) relations of production.  Now of course all mining in the Philippines exists within 
the greater capitalist economy so it cannot be argued to exist wholly out of that mode of production. 
However elements of community “ownership” and control remain and these are thus a part of the profit 
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!  “Advocates of Science and Technology for the People” is an organization… of patriotic, pro-people science and 9
technology advocates, bonded together by a common interest of promoting science and technology that genuinely 
serve the interest of the Filipino people, especially the poor” (www.agham.org/cms/content/about-agham).
redistributed to community members in need, and are not monopolized by a specific group of ‘owners’. 
Further, who is allowed to mine in productive tunnels and for what amount of time is controlled by 
community elders, as is the size of the mine operation and its waste management.  In these sites the 
community tends to have come first (historically) before the advent of profit driven mining. !
 The CPA and AGHAM contrasts this with “gold rush” sites that are popping up in the Cordillera.   !
For example if in one area a gold deposit is discovered then people from everywhere come, 
there they set up a new culture, they set up drinking houses, karaoke, an individualist 
mentality… They put up a hole here, a hole there [mining tunnels].  There is no more 
solidarity, only individual interest.  …a gold rush is an area with a mix of different people 
from different tribes, there is a loss of the original culture (CPA interview, Aug 2014). !
The gold-rush type of mining is done by individuals who surged to a mineral-rich area to 
mine, after being attracted by the lucrative character of gold and stories of quick wealth. Such 
individuals are usually without capital and common ethnicities or cultures. …the “get-rich 
quick” mentality of miners and their cultural diversity, unbound by traditional thinking and 
superstitions may explain why this type of mining appears to be more disorganized and less 
environmentally sound than traditional small-scale methods (Rey and Saturay 2005:12). !
In these sites the mine came before the community, like in gold rush sites in the Americas, and the 
discovery of gold was what prompted the relocation of people to build mining towns.  Here the profit 
motive is the prime mover, and the spaces produced facilitate this goal.  I am representing “space” in this 
sense as the series of connections (flows) through which the social and natural world interact (Thrift 
2003),.This includes how commodity chains and capital flows shape societies and (at a smaller scale) local 
communities.   !
 “Gold rush” mining in the Philippines (and specifically in my site on Mt. Balabag) will be 
explored through the lens of being a product of historical conditions—not only the coming of capitalism, 
but also the specific ebbs and flows of global capital’s needs in the Philippines that opened up the 
possibility for SSM profits in the period when LSM declined in the country. The present period of 
increased mineral value in the market has led to a scramble from both LSM and SSM to profit from 
extraction.  Both types of SSM are embedded within the capitalist mode of production, but they represent 
two different ways capitalism can be be enacted.  In this thesis I will explore how the ‘gold rush’ type, 
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influenced by rural semi-feudalism, can affect local level class formations, motivations, and capital flows 
within the transformation of Balabag from agrarian-based production to extraction. !!
SMALL-SCALE MINING WORLDWIDE !
 Small-scale mining (SSM), or artisanal mining  , exists in at least 80 countries and is an 10
increasingly important form of livelihood especially for the peoples of the Global South (Villegas et al 
2012:9).  Estimates for those involved in this industry have more than doubled since the beginning of the 
millennium, from approximately 10 million (as per the International Labour Organization in 1999), to 
between 20 and 30 million   in 2013 (Buxton 2013:3).  Much of the literature I reviewed for this thesis 11
tended to have a positive outlook regarding the links between SSM and development (Jennings 1999; 
Hentschel et al 2002; Peluso 2015, Villegas et al 2012).   !
ASM is pivotal in alleviating poverty, increasing community capital and diversifying the 
local economy in many rural regions of the developing world, primarily because it is viable 
in areas with minimal infrastructure where other industries could not function (Villegas et al 
2012:20). !
Yet there was also a seemingly minority view that SSM often led to what Gavin M. Hilson called a 
“poverty trap” (Hilson 2012).  “The Socio-Economic Impacts of Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining in 
Developing Countries” (2005), a book edited by Hilson, collected essays that described different facets of 
this ‘trap’.  His thesis (and the general theme of the book) was that “despite providing higher wages than 
comparative rural sectors of industry, artisanal and small-scale mining is generally associated with a 
deteriorated quality-of life” (Hilson 2005: xxii).   !
 These contrasting points of view both agree that in terms of earnings, SSM improved on what was 
otherwise generally available for the world’s rural poor.  However, for Hilson and his colleagues, that 
alone did not preclude a ‘deteriorated quality-of life’.  As Sergio Castro wrote in that same volume, !
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!  In this thesis I tend to use the term “small-scale mining” or its abbreviation “SSM” as that is the preferred term in 10
the Philippines.  When I do use “artisanal” mining I am using it as a direct synonym.
!  This figure is estimated to include up to 50 percent women and 10 percent children (Buxton 2013:3).11
From a socioeconomic point of view, SSM presents high indexes of poverty; few possibilities 
in the areas of education, health, and labor alternatives; and a cultural mining tradition in 
which movement to other activities is not auspicious in the short term (Castro 2005:703). !
Further, both camps also agreed that in general SSM has had significant social impacts, and a poor human 
and environmental health record.  The health, safety, and environmental practices (e.g. the use of mercury 
and other toxins, unsound waste disposal, etc.) were seen to have dire impacts for the “water, soil, air, the 
natural environment, and human life” (Castro 2005:702).  The World Wildlife Fund’s 2012 report added 
that SSM was “also a serious and growing threat to biodiversity and the integrity of protected areas”— 
while at the same time speaking of “the potential for SSM to help with development and 
education” (Villegas et al 2012:9). !
 The resulting contrasts regarding SSM and development highlight the need to be able to 
differentiate the mobility indicators used by theorists so as to understand how even when in general 
agreement regarding some base figures, their conclusions can still diverge. In this research I use Philip 
Kelly’s four dimensions of class (position, process, performance, and politics) as the starting point for this 
analysis (Kelly 2012a, 2012b, 2012c). This is complemented with an analysis of how class dynamics 
impacted class mobility during and after SSM.  In using this framework I will distinguish between 
improvements in financial earnings and/or capital investments, from social and cultural impacts.  !!
CLASS FORMATION, CLASS DYNAMICS, & CAPITAL FLOWS !
 Small scale mining on Mt. Balabag transformed the agrarian based economy of the region to one 
based on artisanal extraction.  It reshaped the landscape not just in the literal sense, but also socially. 
Tania Li (2014) in her recent book “Land’s End” discusses the production of class relations within an 
indigenous agrarian context.  Similarities can be found in my own research regarding mining capital 
within SSM.  Li applies a series of questions to her analysis “who owns what, who does what, who gets 
what, and what do they do with it—[these are] indispensable tools for making sense of rural livelihoods 
[2014:6].”  These questions outline the importance of economic flows in analyzing class mobility. The 
introduction of small-scale mining brought with it new livelihood opportunities that gave agricultural 
workers the possibility of upward class mobility and new forms of cultural, social, and economic capital 
accumulation.  The concept of ‘class’ in this thesis will be defined in a myriad of ways, from the 
conventional Marxian terms that relate it to the structure of land ownership and related productive assets 
(bourgeoisie, proletarian, peasant, landlord, etc.), to wider theorizations that incorporate its intersections 
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with various cultural, social, and financial flows as incorporated into Philip Kelly’s four dimensions of 
class (Kelly 2012a, 2012b, 2012c).  The ways in which these dimensions of class “position”, class 
“process”, class “performance” and class “politics” emerged within SSM will be employed to examine 
social mobility both during and after the lifespan of Balabag SSM. !!
CLASS AS POSITION !
 Class-as-position is closest to the common usage of the term and refers to where an individual (or 
household) is located within a stratified hierarchical order of unequal income, wealth, and access to 
resources.  Weberians use this hierarchy as a lens from which to understand future life chances for those 
within each group.  In the Marxian tradition one’s position relative to the means of economic production 
determines one’s role within capitalism’s abstract totality.  Both views see class as the objectively 
classifiable positions individuals occupy within the social structure (Kelly 2012c:156).  This dimension of 
class is employed to highlight differentials in living conditions, and though it implies the nature of class 
relationships, it does not on its own explain the social processes that put individuals into these categories 
or how class affects their economic lives (Kelly 2012a, 2012b, 2012c).  A further critique points to how 
this focus tends to ignore other axes of differentiation (e.g. race and gender) which can limit useful 
analysis. !
 In my work I will be employing aspects of both the Marxian and Weberian traditions in that I am 
interested both in the production and reproduction of one’s position within the means of production, as 
well as whether economic class can predict future life chances and quality of life.  I ask: who owned what; 
who controlled what; what kind of work the people did (previous to, during, and after SSM); and how 
were they able to transition from one era to the next? !!
CLASS AS PROCESS !
 Class-as-position implied class relationships, class-as-process tackles these relationships directly. 
It addresses the creation of value through the labour process, and how this value is then appropriated, 
distributed, and circulated between groups. !
Differentiation in this way is based on whether labour power is commodified and sold, what 
type of labour relation ensues, and the relative benefit to the buyer and seller of labour power 
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involved in the transaction.  Studies of the rural Philippines have generated a variety of class 
groupings by applying this conception of class, usually comprising landowners, tenant 
farmers, agricultural labourers, white collar workers and craftsmen/entrepreneurs (Kelly 
2012b:232). !
In Marxian theory class is derived from the labour process and the dynamics between the groupings, 
including the antagonisms based on labour struggle.  
 My research will analyze how class-as-process manifested in the relations between different 
groups within the SSM labour process—and if these different groups necessarily were the same as 
economic groupings within the means of production.  If other groupings existed, what other factors 
affected these class processes? !!
CLASS AS PERFORMANCE !
 Class-as-position and class-as-process both approach class on economic terms,  while class-as-
performance stresses the performative elements.  In this dimension, the subjective elements that may 
sometimes seem to be inconsistent with the abstractions of position and process are analyzed.  Here class 
is seen to be culturally embedded and thus is “expressed and performed in cultural terms, and new class 
processes now lead to new ways of articulating class distinctions” (Kelly 2012a:54).   Kelly broadly 
identifies two manifestations of this dimension, classed consumption and classed performances/class as 
embodiment.  The former may relate to the kinds of consumption that are seen to relate to a person’s class 
in the productive sphere (e.g. the clothes worn by the labouring class compared to those of a Filipino 
overseas worker in her return to the Philippines).  The type   of consumption marks an individual as 12
belonging to a particular class category.  Classed performances/class as embodiment, on the other hand, 
refers to how the performance of class is embodied corporeally.  For example, how race and gender are 
implicated and can limit one’s class potential (i.e. limitations to the access of class positions/processes).   !
 In my research racialization, especially as seen in the distinction between Filipino Christian 
settlers in Mindanao and indigenous peoples such as the Subanen, were a prominent example of how 
class-as-performance was embodied.  Another example was that of residential architecture and interior 
decorations, which often spoke to the achievements of the household.  Kelly also notes  spatial aspects, 
that there are geographical and historical contingencies to the intersections of class and other axes of 
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!  Kelly contrasts this with the level of consumption that is influenced by class seen as position (Kelly 2012a:57).12
differentiation (Kelly 2012c: 160-61).  In examining the story of SSM on Balabag I sought to understand 
not only how mining affected individuals economically, but also in how their performance of class (seen 
through consumption patterns and embodied forms of capital) changed over time.  And in going beyond 
position- and process-based approaches to class I incorporated Pierre Bourdieu’s insights that divided 
‘capital’ into three forms: economic, cultural, and social.   !
 Bourdieu wrote in his landmark analysis of the forms of capital (1986  ) that the “social world is 13
accumulated history… [and]  one must reintroduce into it the notion of capital and with it, accumulation 
and all its effects.”  By this he meant that capital is the result of accumulated labour, and that this goes 
beyond simply money or materials used in production.  The ownership and application of capital is what 
makes success or failure more than a game of chance or a question of individual merit.  He writes that it 
“is in fact impossible to account for the structure and functioning of the social world unless one 
reintroduces capital in all its forms and not solely in the one form recognized by economic theory”. To this 
he divides capital into three “guises”:  !
1) Economic capital: This is the form most commonly presented in economic theory.  Institutionalized 
in the form of property rights, it is capital as money or directly convertible to money. 
2) Cultural capital:  Often institutionalized in the form of educational qualifications, this may be 
converted to economic capital given the right conditions. 
3) Social capital: Institutionalized in the form of social titles, this is made up of one’s social ties 
(“connections”) to socially powerful or influential individuals or institutions and thus it too can be 
converted to economic capital given the right conditions. !
 Long term socioeconomic outcomes from SSM in Balabag will be seen to have strong ties to 
(though not determined by) an individual’s ownership of all three forms of capital. I shall explore how 
these few “successes” (in terms of rising above their previous socioeconomic station) had a certain mental 
disposition (an “embodied state”), understanding and ownership of cultural goods that signified a level of 
bourgeois class standing (an “objectified state”), and the formal educational qualifications (an 
“institutionalized state”) that make up cultural capital.  Their pre-SSM financial capital also provided a 
cushion for the economic risks required for success.  Though all of this would be for nought if not for the 
networks their social capital gave them access to not only for loans, but for insider knowledge and access. 
Those less one or more of these capitals, were seen to struggle—even considering the increase in 
economic capital that SSM provided.   
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!  No page number is provided as this document was accessed from the internet: https://www.marxists.org/reference/13
subject/philosophy/works/fr/bourdieu-forms-capital.htm  
!
 Though of course these alone were not enough, as Bourdieu fastidiously repeats “certain 
conditions” are necessary to convert social and cultural capital into greater economic capital, as the few 
small business owners did who eventually rose up to join the regional bourgeois elite.  I will argue that 
one of these conditions, is temporal.  When a potential new bourgeois player entered the scene in Balabag 
was one of the keys to long term success.  In this research I will explore these temporal and social factors 
that enabled the development of new capitalist relations within “gold rush” SSM in a semi-feudal agrarian 
context. !!
CLASS AS POLITICS !
 Class-as-politics rounds out the forth dimension of Kelly’s conception of class.  It refers to how 
individuals may come to forge collective interests and in so doing become political entities.  These may 
“respond to, and articulate, the experiences of class, whether positional, processual or performative” and 
may result with or without personal common experiences  (Kelly 2012a:58).  Where a traditional Marxian 
analysis posits a politics based on labour struggles, in this multi-dimensional view class politics may have 
different (and even conflicting) directions—even within a single individual.  For example, one’s positional 
class may lead to a class consciousness as a reaction to class positioning, whereas one’s performative class 
may not imply class politics at all.   In my work I inquire as to the ways Balabag SSM created political 
forms of struggle, and on what basis did they find their unity. !!
IMPORTANT FEATURES IN THESE CONCEPTIONS OF CLASS !
 In this multi-dimensional typology the structural nature of class is understood as constitutive and 
as enabling/limiting factors that shape a subject’s personal understanding of the world.  Individuals are 
viewed as an interplay between multiple factors which can manifest in multiple class experiences.  And 
how these individuals understand and navigate class will thus be given more importance in their formation 
of meaning and their agency within the world. Further, spatial and temporal contingencies will be seen to 
play a role in the formation of class dynamics.  As Kelly notes, space can also be seen as “problematizing 
class and acting as a constitutive element in its construction” (Kelly 2012c:163). !
 By breaking up the concept of class into multiple dimensions Kelly posits four analytically 
beneficial implications (Kelly 2012a:56).  Firstly, by freeing analysis from the need to aggregate class 
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groupings we no longer have to assume a “commonality of interests, processes, and outcomes”.  Secondly, 
individual interests can be seen to be multi-dimensional, “a person may simultaneously participate in 
several class processes, holding multiple and contradictory class interests”.  Thirdly, through the emphasis 
on the process, axes of difference play a role in differentiating competing interests.  In an example 
provided by Kelly that will be seen to be influential in my field site, where “individuals from a particular 
ethnic group… find themselves disproportionately represented in deeply exploitative employment 
relationships, then a class process is being constituted through the construction of another form of 
difference”.  And finally, ‘class’ in this conception “need not be limited to capitalist processes” as the 
process of class is concerned with the nature of the labour relationship itself.  !!
MINING-INDUCED DISPLACEMENT !
 My research also explores the impact of the TVIRD takeover of Mt. Balabag which put an end to 
SSM. This resulted in the displacement and resettlement of indigenous and non-indigenous community 
members.  ‘Resettlement’ for most meant returning to their home communities, many never fully relocated 
to Balabag and only saw it as a place of work, leaving their families behind.  The exception here is the 
small population of original Subanen residents who were forced to find new homes after the TVIRD land 
claim took effect in the fall of 2012.  The framework of development-induced displacement (DID) and 
mining-induced displacement and resettlement (MIDR) elaborate on some of the commonalities 
experienced by communities after the entry of large-scale projects. Economic development of the type 
brought by foreign LSM companies come packaged with a fundamental dilemma: while claiming to 
improve the lives of local people (e.g. through better environmental standards, tax contributions, and 
corporate social responsibility), the displacement that results often exacts a socioeconomic and cultural/
psychological toll.  Displacement also affects the possible life choices of the affected (Hobbs & Bose, 
2004:5).  Further their need to relocate often has negative ramifications, known as the resettlement effect:   !
Fifty years of research has shown that development-induced displacement is likely to unleash 
widespread changes… [that] include multi-dimensional impoverishment, the loss of homes, 
communities, productive land, income-earning assets, subsistence, community-shared resources, 
and cultural sites. The non-material impacts may be even greater, including human rights 
violations, deep fractures in social structures, networks and ties; threats to cultural identity and 
health; and destruction of social capital. From the perspective of this conference, women, 
children and the elderly are particularly vulnerable to the resettlement effect. The loss of social 
capital is particularly serious, as it diminishes the society’s capacity to withstand non-project 
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related threats (Downing, 2007:1-2).  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Chapter Three: 
METHODOLOGY !!
 My research was conducted in the barangays and sitios of the municipalities of Diplahan and Bayog 
where most of the displaced Balabag miners returned after the end of small-scale mining in the autumn of 
2012.  Mt. Balabag lies near the boundaries of these two municipalities in Region IX, Zamboanga 
Peninsula, on the island of Mindanao (Philippines).  
Figure 1.2: Zamboanga Peninsula (Region IX) and its municipalities. !
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 My history with the issue of TVI mines in Zamboanga province as a freelance journalist covering 
Canadian mining in the Philippines, and my long association with Filipino social justice groups, provided 
the basis of my foothold in the field.  Months before my arrival to Zamboanga peninsula I reached out to 
people’s organizations working in the area as well as to MOSSMA.  Unfortunately, MOSSMA never 
returned my emails during that period, but this in part may be due to the formal dissolution of the 
organization.  My efforts to reach out to social justice groups did yield fruit and a local organization did 
accept my appeal for partnership in our mutual works.  Their assistance provided an entry point into the 
issues of former Balabag SSM residents and helped connect me to affected local peoples.  This initial 
contact was AdPeace, a chapter of InPeace Mindanao which focuses on Zamboanga peninsula.  InPeace 
Mindanao is a grassroots, inter-faith, and multi-sectoral peace movement.  Their main interests focus on 
human rights, specifically on extreme human rights violations especially in areas affected by foreign 
industry. !
 While our interests did not fully match, there was a significant intersection as AdPeace focused on 
large scale mining and the social justice issues found therein.  We had enough in common to be able to 
assist each other in our respective research.  They had contacts within the region and knew of the general 
issues caused by TVIRD’s entry into Balabag, and they also were able to assist with language issues (more 
on this will be discussed later).  As a local NGO, security was a key concern they brought to the table as 
violence remains an issue for many who were considered ‘activists’ in large-scale mining regions in the 
country (and for activists in general)  .  Their assistance in helping me secure local contacts was 14
invaluable in ensuring that I conduct my fieldwork safely.  Further we were in constant contact throughout 
the process which meant an outside party was always aware of my current whereabouts.  My presence, as 
international researcher, was also a boon to their work as it allowed them access to communities with less 
threat of harassment by local officials.   !
 My goal was to examine class dynamics during and after SSM operations in Balabag, and to trace 
their impacts on class mobility. The research was conducted primarily via the use of semi-structured 
interviews, but also through the collection of official documents and limited participant observation. There 
were methodological challenges that needed to be overcome: from issues of security, language, trust, 
positionality and power, to what could be understood as ontologically ‘real/true’ in their recollection of 
life within SSM, and the practical problem of locating the former miners who had been displaced from 
Balabag in the final months of 2012. !
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!  Human rights organization “Karapatan” in its 2014 year-end report claimed that the state was responsible for “the 14
persecution of many activists and non-activists alike” (Karapatan 2015).
NEGOTIATING ISSUES OF POSITIONALITY & POWER !
 My positioning in this research was of key importance to me.  I understand that the production of          
knowledge is truly a co-production between the researcher and the participants and thus the background 
of the researcher, my theoretical frame, my positionality, and my life experiences play a role in the kind of 
work that was produced.  There is no objective observer, there is no impartial viewpoint.  Who I was 
shaped who I am, and that shapes what I see.  So who am I? !
 I am a Philippine born Canadian who migrated to Canada with his parents at the age of two in          
1977.  While I have been politically interested for most of my youth, it was not until after my first return 
visit to the Philippines (after my undergrad years) that I began to involve myself in issues affecting 
Filipinos.  Like many I yearned for a sense of identity.  I wanted to understand what it meant to be 
‘Filipino.’  And so on that first return visit I wanted to experience the place as a Filipino would, which to 
me meant seeking out and living with family.  I chose to live with my mother’s cousin who still lived in 
Manila. This was a family whose socioeconomic status was equal to our own before we migrated to 
Canada.  I was shocked to learn that they lived as informal settlers (sometimes referred to as ‘squatters’) 
directly adjacent to active railway tracks.  It was a home of cinderblock and corrugated iron and built over 
a sewage canal.  The train would pass every half an hour and shake up the house, a train that passed 
literally less than a metre from the back wall of the home, a train that I was told took a life or two (usually 
a child) every year.  Rats and cockroaches were such common housemates that by the end of my four 
months living there I was used to brushing them aside to use the kitchen, or washroom, or sometimes just 
to sit down. !
 This was a critical period in my political development.  To personally experience the difference in          
the lives of my family in Canada and the Philippines, family that began at a similar socioeconomic level, 
led to many questions and led to a deep affectual disturbance to my personal sense of justice and morality. 
From here my journey led me to politically minded freelance journalism and to later to joining Filipino 
grassroots people’s organizations.  That journey eventually crossed paths with academics like Philip Kelly 
at York University which brings me to my present role as a graduate researcher.  My previous journalistic 
work on TVIRD’s Canatuan gold mine in the Zamboanga peninsula became the basis for my choice of 
field research at the site of new TVIRD mine in a neighbouring province in the same region.  However, 
what once seemed a straight forward analysis of the ills caused by large-scale foreign mining became 
more complicated when my initial ideas collided with what I discovered on-site. !
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 I entered into this research with an activist framework: that large-scale mining (LSM) was the          
problem, that it was LSM that helped drive down local initiatives towards self-development of their 
communities economically, politically, and socially.  Thus it came as a small surprise to discover that 
small-scale mining (SSM), at least for my field site, was in itself problematic. 
           
 Being of Filipino ethnicity, and one who spoke the national language, was a strong starting point 
in my gaining enough acceptance to conduct the research, but it was only a starting point.  Issues of power 
and positionality had to be very carefully negotiated in this research.  I remained “foreign” in upbringing 
and in elements of my culture.  Further I was without doubt more socioeconomically privileged.  While 
my parents came from working class backgrounds my education level and position as a researcher put me 
closer to petit bourgeois status in the eyes of Philippine activists, and for everyone else I was a 
“balikbayan  .”  This is a term which brings with it connotations of wealth, and is often assumed to make 15
one a little arrogant.  My work required the acceptance of my research subjects, at least to the level of 
being able to comfortably share personal and/or difficult life moments with me.   !
 Being a balikbayan researcher also provided me an automatic level of respect from many 
individuals, not only in the rural areas but also with private and public sector  leaders and employees.  For 
example with this latter group I employed a strategy of speaking in English and providing Canadian 
identification which allowed me to gain access that would have proved more difficult (and/or more time 
consuming) for a local individual.  For the rural individuals who made up the bulk of my interviewees my 
privilege equally allowed me to get my foot in the door, but my ability to converse with them in a 
Philippine tongue of my personal life experiences (which I shared both through conversation and through 
photographs that I carried with me) helped bridge that gap to a level of comfort.  With activists (including 
my local partner) it was my connection to other Filipino social justice organizations like BAYAN and 
Migrante which have chapters across the Philippines and abroad (including Toronto) that was the starting 
point of their acceptance.  For non-activists it was more my openness with my family and personal history.   !
 This “automatic respect” was something I asked Cory, one of my key local informants and guides, 
about.  Making conversation during lunch one day I told him that it was ok to just call me by my first 
name (instead of “sir”), especially when we’re alone.  He replied by telling me: “Well aren’t you a 
Canadian researcher from a Canadian university?  You have a higher education and a higher position 
than me, so that makes you a ‘sir’.”  This was a reminder to me of the responsibility I incur due to my 
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!  Literally balik = “to return”; bayan = “home/community/nation”.  It is the term given to Filipinos working abroad, 15
or those with foreign citizenship returning to the Philippines.
positionality.  I may have wanted to be seen as an equal, but they knew (and they wanted me to know) that 
I was not. !
 I worked closely with my local contacts who acted as local guides and ‘insiders.’  When 
conducting interviews with community members I would be introduced by my local guide, from there I 
would introduce myself while at the same time introducing my project.  For many the fear was that I was 
there as a researcher on behalf of large scale mining, and/or that I was too detached from the situation in 
the Philippines to understand them.  To help with this I would share not only my own story of how I came 
to try to reconnect with my “Filipino-ness” but also of my personal work in the past regarding issues 
around large scale mining.  I told them about how the experience of living with family as ‘squatters  ’ 16
opened my eyes to the problems in the Philippines, of how I couldn’t ignore Filipino issues in as much as I 
couldn’t ignore the fact that the face I saw in the mirror was Filipino, and of how my visit to the Canadian 
TVIRD mine in Canatuan made me realize how deep the problems were around mining. Through 
acknowledging that I am a man with privilege (having gained an education in Canada, and coming from 
an immigrant family that has been able to achieve a level of “middle class” comfort relative to most 
Filipinos), but with family in the Philippines that still suffer hardships, I hoped to ease their comfort levels 
with me.  Combined with the introduction and statement of trust coming from my local ‘insider’ I do 
believe that the vast majority were able to get past initial distrust.  Though there was a class dynamic to 
this trust.  I feel that those that still harboured suspicions tended to be those of higher class background, 
and/or those in relative positions of power—for example current community officials and those who had 
connections to TVI in Balabag. !!
RESEARCH TIMELINE !
 I arrived in the Philippines in late April, though I did not fly to Zamboanga Peninsula until mid-
May 2014, and I remained in the region until the end of July.  In early August I returned to Manila and in 
early September returned to Toronto.   !
 While awaiting official ethics clearance, I spent May and June doing preliminary discussions with 
my local NGO partner AdPeace, as well as conducting some interviews with organizers and members of 
NGOs, and government organizations.  I also took this opportunity to do online and library research, as 
well as speaking with other researchers at Ateneo University in Zamboanga City.  
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!  I used the term “squatters” (instead of “urban poor”) as that was the common term used by most individuals—even 16
by the poor themselves.
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 From late June to the end of July, I conducted semi-structured interviews with the people directly 
affected by the loss of small-scale mining (SSM). These interviews were conducted throughout the 
Zamboanga peninsula, but the majority took place in the communities surrounding the former SSM site in 
the municipalities of Diplahan and Bayog in the provinces of Zamboanga Sibugay and Zamboanga del 
Sur.  My initial interviewees were gathered through the help of AdPeace, but eventually expanded through 
snowball sampling based on those first contacts.  My first set of interviews were in June 2014 with a 
group of former miners, primarily indigenous Subanen, at a community hall (located outside of their 
communities).  It was here that I met timuay “Itim” who would become my first community contact and 
local guide, and it was he who helped introduce me to more former Balabag residents in their home 
communities.   !
 Where timuay “Itim” was instrumental in introducing me to more activist minded former mine 
labourers, a former MOSSMA   employee (whom I was introduced to via AdPeace) served as a go-17
between with the Balabag capitalist elite that ran that organization.  And it was through MOSSMA that I 
was introduced to my second major community contact and guide “Cory.”  Cory’s assistance allowed me 
access to a broader group of interview subjects from a broader spectrum of class backgrounds—some of 
whom were wary of social justice activists and had actually refused to be interviewed when I was 
accompanied by my local partner or by timuay Itim.   !
 In July I also conducted visits and interviews at government offices (including the provincial and 
local government offices of Zamboanga del Sur, Diplahan, and Bayog, the Mines and Geosciences office 
in Zamboanga City, the regional offices of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples in Zamboanga 
City and Pagadian City, and others), and Ateneo University and their affiliate agencies in Zambaonga City.  !
 In the last week of July I joined an international delegation led by Kairos-Canada investigating the 
human rights issues around the entry of TVIRD.  While I was able to gain a small number of new usable 
interviews with community members, the focus of this trip was more in line with AdPeace’s social justice 
mission and thus that portion of the fieldwork contributed little to my research.  In August I returned to 
Manila where I conducted interviews with more officials from the Canadian embassy, TVI-Pacific head 
office, the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), and others.  I also took a short trip up to 
the Cordillera region of Luzon which is the ancestral lands of the various ‘Igorot’ tribal groups.  There I 
spoke with officials from the Cordillera People’s Alliance (CPA) about small scale mining in their regions. 
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!  “MOSSMA” was the acronym for the former SSM association that controlled Balabag, the Monte de Oro Small 17
Scale Miners Association. 
This interview helps add a brief comparison of SSM in the country and helps provide greater context to 
the unique situation of mining I found in my field site. !!
RESEARCH METHODS EMPLOYED !
 My research employed primarily the qualitative methods of semi-structured interviews and, to a 
lesser extent, participant observation.  This was augmented by the collection of quantitative data from 
official documents obtained from government organizations, local government units (LGUs), MOSSMA, 
and academic sources.  Casual conversations also sometimes yielded interesting and usable information 
that I recorded in a field journal.  I recognize that a work based on the recollections of individuals entails a 
level of difficulty in that memory cannot be understood as ontologically “real.”  This was especially the 
case in this research where a traumatic event plays a critical role (the displacement from people from their 
livelihood).  Thus when I refer to their stories, it is understood within the context of their situation at the 
time of my fieldwork, as narratives that helped them make sense of their present in relation to their past. !
 My initial interviews were conducted off-site with community activists and some former miners. 
On-site I spent a total of approximately three weeks (not continuous) in the communities where the former 
Balabag miners returned.  During those visits I would live with a local contact and through this was able 
to observe the everyday life of the community.  With my local contact (and sometimes accompanied by an 
AdPeace member) we would visit different former miners and their families to conduct interviews in their 
homes. This again provided me not only information through interviews, but a glimpse into how they 
lived.  I also visited with four of the former MOSSMA leaders in their homes or offices, three in the 
municipal centres and one who still lived in a rural barangay with other former miners.  Beyond those 
directly associated with mining on Balabag I also conducted interviews with local politicians (past and 
present), with academics (from Ateneo-University in Zamboanga City, and with the University of the 
Philippines-Baguio), government officials (including with the Mines and Geosciences Bureau, the 
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, and with the Canadian Embassy in Manila), and I also 
spoke with top executives of TVI-Pacific and TVIRD (including the Canadian CEO Clifford James, 
Corporate Communications Director Kaycee Crisostomo, and TVIRD President Eugene Mateo).  !
 Virtually all official interviews were recorded on a small digital recorder.  “Official” interviews 
were those conversations that were explicitly introduced to the subject as an interview.  There were a 
couple official interview subjects that declined having their voices recorded (the Canadian embassy and 
the top TVI-Pacific officials), however they consented to my taking hand-made notes during the interview. 
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Permission was requested verbally for the majority of my interviews which was recorded on digital audio 
(the exception being TVI-Pacific’s Kaycee Crisostomo who signed a written consent form).  Information 
gained via casual conversation with interview subjects was also recorded in a personal field journal with 
the consent of interview subjects. !!
RECRUITING INTERVIEWEES !
 In order to recruit interview subjects I employed a variety of methods that developed organically 
from each other.  My earliest contacts came through my local partner AdPeace, these included an activist 
who lived in Bayog (the municipality under which Balabag officially falls in modern maps), an activist 
who was not directly involved with SSM but had contacts with the former miners, and a former employee 
of MOSSMA.  Two of these initial contacts helped gather groups groups of affected individuals over 
multiple days to a meeting off-site.  During these initial interviews the security situation in Bayog and 
Diplahan was still being assessed and so they were conducted in a neighbouring municipality.  The former 
miners were interviewed individually.  From the third contact I was able to establish connections with 
MOSSMA leaders. !
 In the group sessions I was able to make contact with a community leader who lived in 
communities where the former miners returned and was able to secure their assistance so as to be able to 
visit the communities themselves.  From there they became my local “insider” guides who further 
introduced me to more individuals, and through these individuals a snowball sampling method was 
employed.  A similar strategy was employed with MOSSMA.  Through these SSM leaders I was able to 
secure a local “insider” guide who helped introduce me to more individuals and a snowball sampling 
method developed.  This method was also augmented by chance encounters on site (for example, 
individuals I met while simply ‘hanging out’ in the community).  There were also individuals who sought 
me out specifically when news travelled that a researcher was present (though this was a very small 
number).  Over time the sample was focused through my explicit requests to be introduced to individuals 
who formerly performed different mining activities who were of different class statuses during the SSM 
era.  !!!!!
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TOTAL INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED !
 MOSSMA documents   state that the Balabag community had 200-250 local owners (operating 18
tunnels, rod mills, CIP plants, traders, etc.) at the height of their operations in 2011.  Approximately 60 to 
70 rod mills were in existence, along with hundreds of tunnels.  Over fifty sari-sari stores of different sizes 
operated in the community.  Along with their dependents (the majority of whom would have lived off-site 
in their home communities), the Balabag community claimed to have supported up to 5000 members. 
These documents claimed that the Subanen made up 70 percent of this number.   !
 In order to analyze class dynamics and class mobility, my goal in entering this work was to 
conduct interviews with at least 20 individuals directly involved with the different layers of SSM 
production.  This was to be augmented by additional interviews and/or data collection from related 
governments, government officials, activist organizations, and academics.  In actuality I was able to 
conduct a total of 83 interviews, with 48 of those coming from individuals affected by SSM on Mt. 
Balabag.  The increase in sample size resulted both from the enthusiasm shown by potential respondents, 
and my need for respondents that could elaborate upon complicated conceptual details.  The larger sample 
allowed me the opportunity to search for interviewees who were able to elaborate on difficult conceptual 
matters such as class dynamics and the hurdles to capital accumulation (as it relates to the means of 
production), as well as a balanced reflection on how capital accumulation affected social and cultural life, 
consumption, environmental and human health, and class reproduction.  The 35 non-Balabag affected 
interviews were the result of both a targeted approach   (i.e. there were certain individuals and 19
organizations that I felt that I required to speak with and/or collect data from), and chance opportunities  20
that presented themselves.  Not all the 35 interviews proved to be directly influential in the writing of this 
thesis, but they all helped me understand various aspects of economic, social, and cultural life in the 
region. !
 The following is a breakdown of the 48 individuals who were directly involved with mining in 
Balabag, or who were the direct dependents of miners (i.e. the spouse or adult children).  For those 
directly involved with mining I spoke with five financiers (including four of the top six financiers), 16 CIP 
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!  Written in English between 2010 to 2013.  These were never published in any official media outlets but were 18
distributed as letters or pamphlets, or were powerpoint presentations.  Their intended audience were the government 
and local, national, and international NGOs and activist groups.  I obtained them directly from MOSSMA officials.
!  This includes, for example, interviews/data collection from LGUs, government agencies, and with TVI-Pacific.19
!  This includes, for example, chance meetings with Subanen leaders from across the region. 20
plant owners, 16 rod mill owners, and 25 of various types of labourers  .  There were also MOSSMA 21
employees who served in a non-mining capacity (including one advisor and one teacher), housewives (2), 
a jewellery maker, and various vendors (4). Twenty-one of these 48 were of Subanen descent. My sample 
size was large enough to be able to analyze the general characteristics of the community, though I was not 
quite able to interview as many Subanen as I had wished.  The reality of their situation was that unlike the 
majority of the non-indigenous population, many of Subanen workers originally came from more 
disparate locations which included areas that were inaccessible by road   and without a local guide I was 22
unable to visit them. !
 Beyond the 48 directly involved with the Balabag mining community, I also spoke with 35 others 
(for a total interview sample of 83  ).  Of these 35, the largest groups were officials from government 23
agencies (7), followed by officials from local government units (LGU) (6), and Subanen timuays (6). 
These agencies   included: different branches of the National Commission on indigenous Peoples   (5), 24 25
the Department of Social Welfare and Development (1), and the Commission on Human Rights (1).  Six 
of the 35 were from LGUs   from the municipalities of Diplahan and Bayog, and from the province of 26
Zamboanga del Sur.  Three of the 35 were TVI and TVIRD officials (including Canadian CEO Clifford 
James, TVIRD president Eugene Mateo, and their public relations officer).  Of the 35, nine were Subanen 
(six of the nine were timuays) from across the Zamboanga Peninsula, including leaders from other areas 
affected by mining  . Other interviews of note were with the Canadian embassy (1), activist organizations 27
like the Cordillera People’s Alliance, and academics with research either on the Subanen (1) and on small-
scale mining (1). !
 My interviews with the 48 individuals related to Balabag SSM began with general demographic 
queries.  From there I asked questions to ascertain their class positions before, during, and after mining, 
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!  A further breakdown can be found in Chapter Five in the section titled “Division of Labour.”  Please note that there 21
is some overlap in these numbers as, for example, some labourers eventually became rod mill owners, and/or some 
rod mill owners eventually became CIP Plant owners, etc. 
!  More about the Subanen situation will be discussed in Chapter Four.22
!  Total interviews: 48 related to Balabag + 35 non-Balabag interviewees = 83 total.23
!  Documents were also collected from these agencies.  Further documents were collected from (though no 24
interviews were granted by) the Mines and Geosciences Bureau.
!  Including the National Executive Director. Marlea P. Muñez.25
!  Municipal profile documents were also collected from these LGUs.26
!  This included an interview with timuay Boy Anoy from Canatuan, the first TVIRD site and whose activism had 27
brought the issues of Canadian mining in the peninsula to worldwide attention.
and then followed up with questions to (1) provide details about the work they did, (2) the relationships 
within the community, (3) earnings, expenditures, savings and investments, (4) displacement, and (5) post-
SSM life.  Long term mobility and well-being were measured both via changes in class position, as well as 
by the perceived impacts of mining on their overall life chances (i.e. improved educational attainment, 
improved chances in acquiring stable above-subsistence livelihoods, etc.), and quality of life (i.e. cultural 
and health impacts).  For the 35 interviews with individuals not directly related to Balabag I crafted 
specific questions based on that respondent’s area of knowledge. !
 Interviews were conducted in a semi-structured manner in that there were specific themes of 
interest (listed above) that I wanted to address.  I would follow up on answers given and I would also 
sometimes share other responses given by respondents to elicit a further response.  A broad sample of the 
questions I used as a guide are provided in the appendix to this thesis.  It should be noted that not every 
question was asked of every interviewee. Limiting factors included the time we had together, their 
willingness to answer, and the relevancy of the question (e.g. I had questions that I felt more appropriate 
for mine owners over labourers, etc.). !!
MY KEY COMMUNITY CONTACTS & GUIDES !
 While in the field I stayed with a variety of local key informants and their families.  This 
arrangement proved to be a boon to my research as not only was I helped by their local knowledge and 
their ability to help introduce me to affected individuals, but I was also able to perform participant 
observation of everyday life in the community.  My two primary local guides and gatekeepers were both 
involved with mining in various ways:  !
(1) Timuay Itim  , a Subanen community leader, whose family was one of the original residents of Mt. 28
Balabag before SSM.  He initially worked as a tunnel miner and through his savings and loans from 
MOSSMA financiers was able to invest in a rod mill and CIP plant in the last year and a half before 
SSM was closed down by the government in support of the TVIRD claim.  At the time of my 
fieldwork he held no regular work, and did occasional agricultural day labour work, but personal 
illness was an obstacle.  His home was located in one of the barangays near to where many former 
Balabag residents now reside.  I stayed with him at the home of his daughter for approximately one 
!32
!  All names, except those representing official state and corporate bodies, have been changed to protect the identities 28
of respondents (as shall be explained in the following later section).
week to conduct interviews  .  Timuay Itim was a man in his mid-40s though he was very thin and 29
moved like a man many years older.  He was separated from his wife and had many children, most of 
whom lived in the various sitios and barangays of Bayog and Diplahan, though some lived with his 
in-laws a province away in a predominantly Subanen community.  I was joined by AdPeace members 
during my visit to the rural communities with timuay Itim.   !
(2) Cory was a younger man in his thirties with three children.  He was born Subanen in a barangay of 
Bayog though he was raised in a Visayan home by a Visayan family.  His educational achievements in 
high school earned him a scholarship and he graduated from college.  He was well known by many of 
the former miners as he had a prominent leadership role within one of MOSSMA’s public service 
initiatives in Balabag (and after the end of SSM was even employed by TVIRD for a short period).  I 
visited him alone multiple times, all in all totalling approximately two weeks.  My time with him 
provided me access to a wider spectrum of former Balabag residents from different classes and 
community roles.  Cory was financially more secure as he had not had the bad fortune to lose 
investments in Balabag as his work there was salary based.  Moreover his college education and close 
community ties provided him both cultural and social capital that helped him acquire one of the few 
administrative jobs in his barangay after the demolition of SSM in Balabag. !!
SECURITY & ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS !
 As mentioned earlier, my initial interviews also had the goal of inquiring as to the safety of my 
entering communities where the displaced Balabag miners returned.  I was assured by local peoples that 
except for a few heavily patrolled areas near the Bayog poblacion I was safe to enter as long as I was with 
a respected local official.  The area of Mt. Balabag itself I would not be able to enter due to it now being 
privately controlled by TVIRD who had their claim area blockaded.  I would eventually be able to enter 
Bayog poblacion and some of the surrounding barangays and sitios in the company of Cory who had 
spoken to local Bayog LGU officials to secure my safe entry.  Here too, the privilege of being a Canadian 
researcher helped open doors that local activists found difficult to breach.  This said, the safety of my 
interview subjects was less secure.  !
 The history of large scale mining’s (LSM’s) entry into rural areas in the Philippines has long 
brought with it increased danger of human rights violations up to and including extrajudicial killings. 
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!  He chose for us to stay at his daughter’s home as his own home was said to be frequently visited by the private 29
security forces of those supporting TVIRD.
Reports from human rights groups like AdPeace, Kairos-Canada, and MiningWatch-Canada claim that 
there were reports of up to one hundred killings in Bayog in the lead up and following the municipal 
elections in the spring of 2012.  Further there were also reports of threats to former miners and mine 
owners including the highly publicized (and contested) ‘leaked’ TVIRD emails (emails printed on TVIRD 
letterhead, dated 16 May 2012).  These listed MOSSMA leadership and advisors as “targets” bearing 
“Red” or “Blue” status which were actively being surveilled by TVIRD’s “special surveillance unit,” 
which were supposedly armed with “tasers” and/or “weapons for killing enemy combatants.”  Though I 
was not able to verify these threats, for the purpose of my work it was very important that the identities of 
those feeling threatened were protected.  !
 For those in danger of possible negative ramifications, no written details of their identity were 
recorded in my field notes and only oral permission as to their participation was requested. Further, names 
have been changed or omitted completely in my writing. In practice (as it was unclear whether an 
individual was safe from possible negative consequences) all identities have been made anonymous in this 
research except for official government, academic, and corporate representatives.  Outside of those key 
insiders that connected me to potential participants, no one else was privy to the identities of who I spoke 
to, or where specifically they resided.  For some high profile interviewees that expressed a feeling of 
direct danger to themselves I will implement other security measures as follows: !
- When gender was not a key component of the issues surrounding a specific person’s case, I may 
change the gender pronoun used. 
- As the top leadership of MOSSMA (given the name the “Magic Six” and their close associates) 
believe themselves to be in real threat I may mix and match some of their accounts so that no one 
MOSSMA representative can be traced to any particular statement. !
 As for my personal security, this was also a concern that necessitated certain precautions.  The risk 
to a Canadian researcher of a direct attack from those with mining interests was always very low.  The 
negative consequences to their financial interests that would result from such an international incident far 
outweighs any short term benefit to silencing my work.  The most likely dangers would have come from 
either outside interests (e.g. kidnap-for-ransom gangs operate in certain known areas of Zamboanga 
peninsula which were relatively near my field site and to the urban centres), or from accidental targeting if 
I were mistaken for a Filipino journalist or researcher, or if caught by chance in the area where violence 
occurred.  It was thus of importance to me that I avoid certain areas and I always carried identification and 
introduced myself as Canadian (not just to my interviewees, but to local government units). And as 
already discussed, before entering the communities that the former miners returned to, I first conducted 
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interviews off-site to determine safety levels and to secure local guides. !!
LANGUAGE CONSIDERATIONS !
Language did prove to be a minor hurdle for me in the field.  Though I speak the national language 
(Tagalog), not all in the region were fluent in this tongue.  More common was the use of Bisaya, the 
regional language, and for a minority, Subanen.  For those that could speak Tagalog (approximately 
twenty-five percent of my interviewees) I used that as the medium of communication as this removed an 
extra step in the translation process.  For those that did not, I had an interpreter act as an intermediary.  For 
the most part my interpreters were either a member of AdPeace, or my local guide.  There were also two 
sets of interviews conducted in English, one with the Canadian embassy, the other with my interviews 
with TVI-Pacific officials. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Chapter Four: 
BALABAG BEFORE SMALL-SCALE MINING !
The Philippines is a country rich in mineral resources that would be worth trillions of pesos if 
sold today (PhP47 trillion, according to a leader in the mining industry). These mineral 
resources are located within our lands or under our seas, both of which locations are also 
rich in other living or non-living resources that sustain economic activities such as farming, 
eco-tourism, and fishing. Mining operations necessarily involve the alteration of the land or 
seabed, such that people who use the land or sea for settlement and/or livelihood are likely to 
be displaced by mining operations. The lands where mineral resources are located may also 
have cultural or ecological values not easily measured in monetary terms (Ateneo School of 
Government Mining Policy Brief, 2011). 
!
 In order to understand the story of long term socioeconomic outcomes resulting from small-scale 
mining (SSM) in Balabag, it is necessary to first briefly contextualize the role of the Philippines in the 
global capitalist economy.  From there I will narrow the field to the state of mining in the Philippines and 
its impacts on agrarian life and indigenous peoples (IPs).  The semi-feudal form of production dominant in 
the nation and in Zamboanga peninsula, its class relations, class dynamics, and capital flows shall be 
discussed to provide context for the eventual forms they would take within SSM.  And finally to bring our 
discussion to Balabag I shall provide a brief history of the region, and the modern day challenges to 
socioeconomic mobility found therein. !!
GOLD MINING IN THE PHILIPPINES: 
THE CREATION OF A NEOLIBERAL MINING POLICY !
 The advent of the neoliberal era in the 1980s and 1990s reinvigorated interest in Philippine mining.          
In that period the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) began to put pressure on the 
Philippine state to liberalize its mining laws (Bonlinget, 2004; Colchester et al, 2005:189).  These 
institutions provided funds and encouraged large scale development projects (e.g. the Chico Dam project 
in the Cordillera which resulted in the death of indigenous leader Macliing Dulag in 1980) to help create 
the infrastructure to attract foreign investment.  Further pressure came via special government and inter-
government seminars which promoted the benefits of neoliberal reforms.  In one such seminar in 1989 
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organized by the United Nations Department of Technical Cooperation and Development, WB Senior 
Industrialist Specialist Felix Remy explained the Bank’s “problem” with current mining laws: !
The first set of sector-specific problems that we find in our mining sector work are the ‘mining 
law’ issues, that is, the constraints arising out of the existing mining legislation. The issues that 
we encounter most frequently in the mining legislation of our borrowers are: problems of 
inadequate or difficult access to land and mineral rights by the productive agents of the sector; 
restrictions to foreign investment which are specific to the mining sector; the existence of 
‘sector-specific taxes’ which can take the form of royalties, production, sales or exports, taxes; 
and legislation of a discretionary nature (Colchester et al, 2005: 190). !
 That resulted in the creation of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (Republic Act No. 7942).  The          
Act facilitated the entry of large foreign mining corporations to enter the mineral-rich territories, most 
often the ancestral domains of indigenous peoples. It opened up the mining sector to 100% foreign 
ownership, provided long renewable tax holidays, and relaxed environmental regulations (Molintas, 2004: 
294).  The law, called “one of the most modern in Southeast Asia” by the US Geological Survey, saw 
immediate interest from foreign investment.  Between 1994 and 1996 the number of foreign mining 
companies increased by 400 percent (Holden et al, 2011: 146). The pressure towards economic 
liberalization continues. As of 2013 the WB’s Philippine Economic Update still pointed out that the tax 
burden could be further streamlined, along with further “rationalization” of fiscal incentives (World Bank, 
2013: 19). !!
SMALL-SCALE MINING LAWS IN THE PHILIPPINES !
 In contrast to the Mining Act that governs LSM, there are two separate national laws for SSM, 
both predating the Mining Act of 1995: Presidential Decree 1899 and Republic Act No. 7076 (Ateneo 
2008).  The former (from 1982) legalized SSM during a period when foreign large scale mining was on on 
the decline in the country, and focused on traditional forms of non-industrial mining.  The latter (also 
called the “People’s Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991”) allows for minimal investment in mining 
equipment, but disqualifies the use of “sophisticated” mining equipment.  These two laws have been a 
source of confusion for both local legislators and miners as the application processes and criteria are 
vastly different. Moreover, according to academics at Ateneo university, it is unclear if the introduction of 
RA 7076 has repealed PD 1899.  Further, SSM permits are limited to two years (renewable for another 
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two), which, contrasted with the twenty-five years (renewable for another twenty-five) for LSM, is seen to 
be a discouraging factor (Gimenez 2011: 66). !!
THE STATE OF MINING IN THE PHILIPPINES !
 Situated on the Pacific “Ring of Fire,” the Philippine archipelago in Southeast Asia is one of the 
most mineral rich nations in the world.  More than $840 billion USD in yet untapped base (chromium, 
copper, lead, nickel, zinc) and precious (gold and silver) metals is estimated by the Mines and Geosciences 
Bureau, under the country’s Department of Energy and Natural Resources (Holden and Jacobson 2007, 
Pavlova and Hincks 2013).  Approximately 30 percent of the total land area of the country has been 
expropriated to foreign mining interests, and 482 mining applications filed with the government (Doyo, 
2011).  !
 Despite these numbers a report by Ateneo University (2011) argues that mining (both LSM and 
SSM) in the Philippines has contributed very little to overall economic growth, has not made a great 
impact to overall employment generation (relative to its potential), and shows poor linkages to industrial 
growth in other sectors.  Further the places where mining is a major industry have been associated with an 
increase in poverty.  Throughout the nation’s history, mining’s contribution to the gross domestic product 
(GDP) has remained in the single digits.  As of 2010 it has contributed only one percent to the GDP—
compared to the agricultural sector’s 12 percent (Bureau of Agricultural Statistics, 2011).  The sector 
makes up less than one percent of the national employment numbers (0.5 to 0.6% from between 2008 to 
2011)—compared to 33 percent for the agricultural sector.  Cielito Habito’s (2010) work on economic 
growth criticizes the poor spinoff employment generation resulting from mining.  In a 2011 study by 
Arsenio Balisacan individuals engaged in mining continued to show an increase in poverty   relative to 30
workers in other sectors, from 34.64 percent in 2006 to 48.71 percent in 2009 (Ateneo, 2011).  In the same 
study the income poverty within the mining sector was seen to be rising to the levels seen in the 
agricultural sector (where numbers were holding steady, from 47.84 in 2006 to 47.92 percent in 2009).   !
 Unfortunately for my research, which focused on a SSM site, the official mining sector data from 
the Philippines often lumps together large and small-scale mining.  Thus it was difficult to differentiate the 
relative socioeconomic impacts of one compared to the other.  Further even when these two scales are 
separated there still lies the problem of differentiating  between the ‘traditional’ and ‘gold rush’ forms. 
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!  Balisacan uses a multidimensional poverty index (MPI).30
That said there was some data that can be shared specific to SSM in general, however poor data collection 
due to most SSMs being labelled as “illegal” by the government adds a further level of difficulty to 
accurate reporting. The Mines and Geosciences Bureau estimated that there were at least 37 provinces in 
the country where SSMs operate (Rey and Saturay 2005:6).  In value terms, gold is the number one 
mineral produced by the Philippines (AFRIM 2012:4), and small-scale mining has been documented to 
contribute a significant percentage of total gold production, based on total gold sales to the Central Bank 
of the Philippines (BSP). Between 1990 to 1999 SSM contributed 40 to 50 percent of the Philippines total 
gold production, and by 2009 this number rose to almost 80 percent (AFRIM 2012:4, Ateneo 2011, Daniel 
2012). SSM sold 28,198 kg to the BSP in 2008 and 26,112 kg in 2009 (AFRIM 2012:4). And it provided 
direct and indirect employment and means of livelihood to nearly 200,000 people in the 90s and up to 
500,000 in the 2000s (Ateneo 2011, Mae 2013).  It was estimated that SSM economically supports at least 
one million of the country’s population of over 92 million (Ateneo 2011).  In 2012 the value produced by 
small-scale mining was estimated to be $1,515,600,000 USD (Daniel 2012).  
Table 1: Overall gold production in the Philippines (Daniel 2012). !!!!
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MINING ON INDIGENOUS LANDS !
 The vast majority of mining in the Philippines is within or adjacent to the ancestral lands of 
indigenous peoples (IPs).  Two-thirds of all the Philippine IPs are found on the southern-most Philippine 
island of Mindanao they are collectively referred to as “lumads” (Holden et al, 2011:146). While the 
indigenous peoples of the Cordillera mountains in Luzon have had a long history of gold mining pre-
dating Spanish colonization, the indigenous Subanen of Zamboanga peninsula did not have a pre-colonial 
mining history.  In this region extractive industry began in the post-WWII period with the arrival of 
foreign corporations. The presence of transnational corporations continue to have a noticeable effect on 
the socioeconomic well-being, the natural environment, and the culture of the lumad peoples. “Our 
aspirations to continue to care for the forest must not be lost, for as Lumad, once the forest is gone, so our 
being a Lumad go as well… The identity of the Lumad as a person is tied to ... ancestral domain,” says 
Dante Sinhayan, an emerging upland tribal leader [Sealza et al, 2013, p4]. !
 On paper the rights of IPs in the Philippines are protected by the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act 
(IPRA)  , which is recognized as one of the world’s most progressive laws to deal with indigenous 31
populations (Erni, 2008: 428). The IPRA has key provisions which seem to protect the rights of 
indigenous communities to self-determination and which require their free, prior, and informed consent 
(FPIC) before industry can enter upon their lands:  !
Chapter III, Rights to Ancestral Domains, SECTION 59: “…no certification shall be issued 
by the NCIP without the free and prior informed and written consent of ICCs/IPs [indigenous 
cultural communities/indigenous persons] concerned.” !
Chapter IV, Right to Self-Governance and Empowerment, SECTION 13:  “The State 
recognizes the inherent right of ICCs/IPs to self-governance and self-determination and 
respects the integrity of their values, practices and institutions. Consequently, the State shall 
guarantee the right of ICCs/IPs to freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.” !
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!  Passed two years after the Mining Act of 1995.31
However these protections are granted only to indigenous communities that have secured a Certificate of 
Ancestral Domain Titles (CADTs) from the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) and, as 
of this writing, the Subanen of Mt. Balabag have not yet received approval of their CADT  . 32!
 The entry of mining into indigenous communities in the Philippines has had serious 
consequences. Congress Representative Teddy B. Baguilat, an Igorot and a former executive assistant to 
the undersecretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), writes these 
reflections (2011):   !
In indigenous communities, the mining operations resulted in the following: 
1. Loss of ownership, control & management of land & resources (the material base of the peoples‘ 
identity, culture and survival), and denial of the peoples‘ resource management systems 
2. Massive loss of livelihood & destruction of local economies causing threats to food security 
3. Dislocation of settlements, villages and weakening of socio-cultural systems 
4. Destruction of bio-diversity, pollution, and degradation of the environment 
5. Loss of traditional knowledge & systems of resource management !
William Holden, Kathleen Nadeau and R. Daniel Jacobson, in writing about the accumulation by 
dispossession found in Philippine large scale mining, stress the first point, that loss of land also equals a 
loss of culture for indigenous people.  !
[T]he most serious threat mining poses to indigenous peoples is the threat of displacement 
from their lands… If an indigenous community is displaced… the culture of that community 
may be gravely threatened… the wealth that supports the sustainability of their culture is 
found in institutions, environmental knowledge, local resources, and especially in land 
embellished with cultural meaning (2011: 142-43). !
They further discuss accumulation by dispossession in indigenous Philippines as replacing “long-standing 
indigenous forms of production and consumption [with] new market based forms of production and 
consumption.” By transforming their traditional ways of life IPs are pushed into life as poor rural and 
urban migrants (2011: 157). For example, UN Special Rapporteur Rodolfo Stavenhagen (2003) noted that 
development managers of a dam project in the northern Philippines “are steering the households away 
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!  In the previous TVIRD mining site in Canatuan the Subanon had received a CADT, but it did not prevent an FPIC 32
between the LSM and the IP leaders from being signed.
from the peasant livelihood mix traditional to their indigenous communities, towards the monocultures 
that tend to define the production of vegetables, flowers, broom grass, and livestock for the market. 
Starting with their lending of capital for the new livelihood ventures, the watershed managers are 
introducing the households to new economic relations that may or may not be good for the 
communities” (Stavenhagen, 2003: 28).  Holden et al go on to cite examples of thirty lumad families 
living under a bridge displaced by a nickel mine in Mindanao, and the displaced indigenous peoples of the 
Cordillera mountains (on Luzon island) currently living as urban poor in the city of Baguio (Holden, 2011: 
152). !
 Holden et al (2011) were concerned with how LSMs are able to lay claim to indigenous lands 
through the process of accumulation by dispossession.  My research notes that SSM shares some basic 
similarities in terms of the economic drivers that push locals to claim mining lands—but adds that even 
within SSM where indigenous peoples make up the majority of the workforce, the embodied cultural 
capital of the Subanen place them at a disadvantage.  Mindanao’s history in the second half of the 
twentieth century created new antagonisms based on ethnicity when Filipino Christian (mostly from the 
Visayas) were encouraged to settle the resource rich island. !!
A BRIEF HISTORY OF ZAMBOANGA PENINSULA !
 Mindanao is the second largest island (containing 43 percent of the land area and 25 percent of the 
population) in the archipelago and lies on its southernmost boundary.  My research site can be found in the 
province of Zamboanga del Sur in Region IX of the Philippines, otherwise known as Zamboanga 
Peninsula (on the west side of the island).  Despite having never fully been conquered during the Spanish 
colonial period, the American invasion in the early twentieth century put Mindanao under US colonial 
control, and it thus was included as part of the nation with the granting of formal independence post World 
War II (Holden & Jacobson 2007).  Post-independence the Philippine government began encouraging 
settlement in Mindanao by Christians that lived in other parts of the Philippines (Tan, 2000).  This 
twentieth century act of accumulation by dispossession was in large part a policy to wrest control of the 
resource rich island from both its strongly independent Moro (muslim) population who did not fully 
recognize the Manila government, and from the numerous lumad (indigenous) peoples who were not yet 
integrated into the national economy.  As Peter Krinks writes in his examination of the history of 
economic inequality in the Philippines “the sparsely settled tracts of Mindanao “(outside of the Muslim 
areas) had no powerful, long-established families, so there were opportunities for accumulation by new 
people” (2002:135). 
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 Between 1948 and 1960 approximately 1.2 million people took advantage of government 
resettlement programmes, and in the 1960s and 1970s a further 360,000 people migrated to Mindanao 
(Tigno, 2006). Overall from the 1950s to the 1970s there were a total of forty-two government-assisted 
migration projects that moved over 50,000 families to three-fourth of a million hectares in Mindanao 
(Tigno, 2006).  By the end of the twentieth century 25 percent of the population of Mindanao was Muslim 
and 75 percent was non-Muslim (Tigno, 2006; Yegar, 2002).  One of the driving factors that encouraged 
families to migrate was the promise of land of their own to til, yet as time went on this became less and 
less likely.  Krinks writes that “the benefits were not evenly distributed. By the 1960s new arrivals could 
find land only as squatters in the forests or as tenants” (2002:135).  This relocation process fuelled a sense 
of injustice in the Moro and Lumad communities —and in time with the migrants themselves.  This 
helped inform the factors that led to the creation of, and/or support for, insurgency groups. These groups 
can be split into two main types: the various Moro independence movements that draw their support from 
disenfranchised muslims; and the communist movement which finds supporters in poor peasants and 
lumads seeking agrarian reform. !
 The Subanen are the largest   lumad tribe in Mindanao and number almost half a million persons 33
(from a total population of almost three million in the Zamboanga peninsula) (National Statistics Office, 
2010).  Their history has been one of continuous displacement.  There are two main variants to their story: 
one begins with their arrival to the peninsula thousands of years ago (based on archeological theories) and 
traces their movement eastwards, the other puts the origin of the Subanen more recently (in the late 1400s) 
with one family and focuses on oral histories of displacement.  The first traces their ancestry to Malay 
origins, arriving on the peninsula between 2,500 to 6000 years ago (Lopez-Bernal 2010:4).  In this version 
of history they were the first peoples of the peninsula and established what would become Zamboanga 
City before spreading east up to the Cotobato region.  The second version begins in Cotobato and comes 
from Subanen oral accounts which recount the entry of Muslim outsiders as the catalyst to four brothers 
and a sister being driven apart and spawning the different lumad tribes of Mindanao. !
 In my field interviews with Subanen leaders it was the oral history that was recounted.  These 
stories were corroborated by Subanen scholar, Dr. Vicente Imbing (2002). Imbing traces the origins of the 
tribe to the late fifteenth century in the Cotobato region of Mindanao (his account of Subanen history is 
used below).  The arrival of Islam to the region in the late 1400s resulted in a rift within the lumad ruling 
family, as one brother converted to Islam.  The siblings and their followers divided into three groups, with 
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!  “Largest” both in terms of population and in land distribution.33
one migrating north (on the westward edge of the peninsula) becoming the forebears to Mindanao’s 
indigenous Moro tribes, another moving south and eventually subdividing further to become other lumad 
tribes, and the third migrating west towards the peninsula and eventually becoming the Subanen. !
 The Malay muslim settlers were part of large sultanates and held greater technological and 
political power than the indigenous Subanen.  Their arrival, and the growing lumad Moro population, 
steadily increased the pressure on the technologically weaker Subanen peoples and with their arrival their 
history of regular displacement and migration began.  The oral accounts (Imbing 2002) report that the 
expansion of Moro tribes would result in intermittent warfare ensuring a constantly shifting Subanen 
territory.  The taking of Subanen for slaves during war and in slave raids continued throughout this period, 
and was a major point of contention up until the 19th century.  The arrival of the Spanish to establish a 
permanent presence in what would become Zamboanga City in the mid-seventieth century displaced yet 
further populations of Subanen and intensified conflict between the different peoples of the peninsula for 
the best lands and boosted the slave trade.  In this period there were also many Subanen communities 
which converted to Islam or Christianity to avoid conflict and migration.  The American invasion of the 
early twentieth century continued to divide communities as the Subanen peoples were forced to take sides, 
with many leaders siding with the Americans against the Moro.  In this post-fifteenth century period there 
were also many Subanen communities which converted to Islam or Christianity to avoid conflict and 
migration.  For those that sought to retain their indigenous identities many joined forces with the 
Americans during the colonial period as they saw them as a counterbalance to the Moro incursion into the 
peninsula  . 34!
 This history  , based on constant uncertainty and conflict left the Subanen peoples in a conflicted 35
state, both wary of outsiders and dependent on their benevolence.  The arrival of new settlers in the post-
independence period after WWII brought renewed push factors that threatened Subanen land security, and 
new economic regimes threatened an already precarious indigenous social, economic, and cultural system. 
Today, the Subanen are spread across the Zamboanga peninsula mostly residing in the rural countryside. 
Due to incursions by settlers (this will be discussed in a later section in this chapter) Subanen 
communities   tend to live in small communities in the highlands on less arable lands and subsist on a 36
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!  As of the beginning of the twentieth century, the Zamboanga peninsula was still primarily Subanen territory (in 34
terms of area) but with large scattered Moro settlements.
!  As shared in interviews with local timuays, and as more systematically recorded by Subanen scholar, Dr. Vicente 35
Imbing (2002).
!  Though Subanen families also live in lowland barangays and sitios with settlers (and some have even moved to 36
urban areas), communities that try to retain an indigenous identity tend to live in remote highland areas.
mixed economy heavily relying on “kaingin” (swidden) agriculture.  Mt. Balabag, the site of my research, 
was once one of these small communities before the arrival of SSM. !!
THE SEMI-FEUDAL AGRARIAN ECONOMY !
 One important historical contingency that needs to be briefly discussed was the state of, and 
nature of, the local economy before the arrival of SSM.  In my field site, as with most of rural Philippines, 
an agricultural based economy dominated to the extent that Philippine activists call the country’s mode of 
production “semi-feudal” (Aguilar 1989, Putzel 1995). The arrival of SSM to Balabag shifted sources of 
income and produced new bourgeois leaders out of former petit bourgeois middle peasant individuals. The 
form capitalism took there, being created by former agricultural workers, was derived from the semi-
feudal form that dominated the countryside. !
 Semi-feudalism combines global capitalism with local feudalistic forms in the production of 
agricultural products.  In this system a few large landlord families own the majority of agricultural land, 
while a large number of landless tenants do the tilling.  The landlord extracts profit through the imposition 
of high rents, with typically between 50 to 80 percent of harvest income given to the landlord (Guererro 
1970:93).  This form of production is dependent on human and animal labour with very little modern 
technological farming devices employed.  This labour heavy focus is the basis of the landlord’s wealth,  !
rather than reinvesting to raise farm productivity, most landlords behaved as ‘rent capitalists’. 
They merely acquired and planted more land or directed their accumulating capital into other 
sectors (including paying for tertiary education of their offspring) so there was a drain from 
rural areas (Krinks 2002:104). !
 While it was in the Spanish colonial period that feudalism spread across the Philippine 
archipelago it was the Muslim sultanates of Southeast Asia   that originally laid this foundation over a 37
century before the arrival of Spain (Guererro 1970:81).  The American colonial period introduced a 
limited form of democracy into the Philippines which helped entrench the feudal system as only members 
from rich landowning families were allowed to run for office and vote (Krinks 2002:51, Simbulan 
2012:27).  By the time formal independence was granted after WWII, the political and economic elite 
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!  In the Philippines these are typically referred to as “Malay” muslims.37
were almost entirely from this large landlord class.  And even by the time democracy was re-introduced 
after the fall of the dictator Ferdinand Marcos the political landscape remained dominated by this group: !
[I]n 1987 169 of the 200 “representatives belonged (by birth or marriage) to such groups 
[traditional political clans], with large landholdings or other major assets, although their 
numbers fell to 145 in the 1992 House. Even then, all but sixteen representatives were 
millionaires (Gutierrez 1994). !
In looking at the nation as a whole University of the Philippines professor Roland Simbulan states that 
there were “about 250 political dynasties (families) who have dominated Philippine politics at the national 
and local level and who have monopolized political power as families for the past 30 years and more 
(2012:11).”  In the province of Zamboanga del Sur where my research site is located the current governor, 
Antonio Cerrilles’   family, was cited by Simbulan as belonging to one of its four dynastic clans 38
(Simbulan 2012:38). !!
SOCIOECONOMIC MOBILITY IN ZAMBOANGA PENINSULA !
 Mt. Balabag is today located in the municipality of Bayog in the province of Zamboanga del Sur, 
on Zamboanga Peninsula (designated as Region IX in national government statistics).  However, I will 
add as a note that at the onset of SSM on Balabag the area was claimed by the municipality of Diplahan in 
the province of Zamboanga Sibugay.  There was ongoing debate (at the time of of my field research) as to 
which claim was official, so for the sake of simplicity and as most official documents from academics and 
TVIRD attach it to Bayog, I will be following suit in this thesis.  Zamboanga Peninsula, in western 
Mindanao was considered “one of the most promising areas for gold mineralization in the 
Philippines” (Jimenez et al, 2002) and according to Romie Valerio, Supervising Geologist of the Davao 
office of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) within the Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources (DENR), “Mindanao has the highest mineral   potential in the Philippines” (Holden & 39
Jacobson 2007:159). 
!
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!  Gov. Cerrilles was one of the big players in support of TVIRD against MOSSMA.38
!  “…particularly “nonferrous metals” (metals other than iron) or, as they are often called, “hardrock minerals” (the 39
minerals are often found in consolidated rock of igneous origin) such as copper, gold, lead, nickel, silver, and 
zinc” (Holden & Jacobson 2007:159). 
MUNICIPAL DEMOGRAPHICS & SOCIOECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES !
 In order to understand the material factors that drive the potentials for socioeconomic mobility we 
must first examine the demographic data for the communities most affected by small scale mining on Mt. 
Balabag.  The data presented here was gathered from the official municipal profiles   as tabulated by the 40
local government units (LGUs) of Diplahan and Bayog  .  According to my interviews the majority of the 41
population involved with Balabag SSM originated from these two municipalities.  It was also to these 
municipalities that most returned after the dismantling of the small scale mines.  Before examining 
socioeconomic mobility within (and after) mining, I will provide an overview of the demographics of the 
area. One pillar of my argument is that overall underdevelopment in the region structurally limited 
opportunities for the majority of the population, and that this limited potential was in large part what made 
SSM so attractive to so many. !
 The municipalities of Bayog and Diplahan were (and are) primarily farming communities. Even 
during the tenure of SSM, agriculture remained the most common occupational sector, with most 
individuals working as paid day labourers with little to no land of their own. In Diplahan over 30 percent 
of the land area was allocated to agricultural land and agriculture related activities were the main source of 
income for 75 percent of the population.  The average income for agricultural workers was approximately 
PhP2600 a month (Php1000=$21Cdn approx).  For Bayog, 46 percent of the total land area was classified 
as agricultural.  Rice, corn, rubber, lanzones fruit, and bananas rank as the top five crops of both 
municipalities.  Rice and corn production were the staples of the agricultural economy, with rice produced 
for sale at market and with corn being the staple food for the majority of the population (ground corn sells 
at half the price of rice and was used as a rice substitute).  According to the 2013 Philippines National 
Statistical Coordination Board data, Region IX (where both municipalities are located) was one of the 
poorest in the country. It had a 33.7% poverty rate (the national rate being 19.7%) based on a per capita 
income of less than PhP18,054 a year (NSCB, 2013). Agriculture makes up 50 percent of the regional 
domestic product, with the remainder accounted for by services (34 percent), industry (15 percent), and 
only one percent coming from mining and quarrying (Gomez 2012). ! !
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!  Municipal profiles for Bayog and Diplahan from 2014 were provided by the LGUs.40
!  Additional information from the official website of Zamboanga del Sur: http://41
www.zamboangadelsur.gov.ph/city-and-municipality/bayog.php  and  from the National Statistical 
Coordination Board: http://www.nscb.gov.ph  
Figure 1.3: Zoning map for the municipality of Bayog (Municipal Profile, 2014). !
 The populations of these two municipalities had been steadily increasing since their creation at the 
onset of Visayan migration to the region in the 1950s.  In recent decades the population of Bayog had seen 
a rise from 22,092 in 1990 to 30,048 by 2010.  The corresponding population numbers for Diplahan were 
21,211 to 31,215.  These growing populations were met with major problems with unemployment.  For 
Diplahan in 2010 it was calculated that almost 30 percent of the working-aged population (with three 
times more women than men) were not economically active  , while in Bayog that number was even 42
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!  Note here that these numbers were for the economically active, not the total employed.  In Diplahan of the 70 42
percent economically active, 64.41 percent were actually employed.
higher at over 37 percent.  Note that SSM in Balabag was still operational at the time of the 2010 census, 
and was near the height of its operation.   !
 An overview of the types of employment activities outside of farming provides a picture of the 
overall level of industrialization.  In Diplahan, the top three types of business permits issued (total in 
brackets) were for sari-sari (small family operated neighbourhood) stores (253), rice mills (50), and small 
family operated food stalls (30).  Thirty four mining related permits were also issued, twenty-two for small 
scale coal mining, two for large scale coal mining, and ten for small scale gold mining  .  Similarly in 43
Bayog, there were approximately 176 commercial establishments operating in the whole municipality of 
which the majority were classified as sari-sari or retailers in nature making up 28 percent of the 
businesses.  Bayog also counted seventy-three industrial establishments, however enumerated only twenty 
five in its municipal profile: nine rice/corn mills, six related to mining, four vulcanizing shops, three 
bakeshops, two hollow block factories, and one furniture maker. !
 It was in this socioeconomic milieu of limited employment (limited in both type and number) that 
we can begin to see the pressures that limit levels of educational attainment.  In Diplahan less than 15 
percent had graduated high school, and less than one percent for college.  The municipal office also 
estimates functional literacy rates at approximately 50 percent of the adult population.  The Bayog 
municipal profile did not present equivalent data, but they do note that most schools in their area were in 
dire need of repair, and that worryingly, school enrolment was dropping for both elementary and high 
school from 2009 to 2010, and that for high schools this had been dropping since 2007 (when 793 were 
enrolled, while only 751 in 2010)—this despite an increasing population. Bayog notes that most schools 
lacked libraries, computer rooms, washrooms, and lacked enough teachers, classrooms, and textbooks for 
students.  It should be noted that while Balabag had an elementary school (created by its SSM 
organization not by the government), it was cited by the municipal LGU as being in the worst condition 
overall having a student-teacher ratio of 73:1, and having no library, health clinic, computer room, or 
playground.  There was also no high school in Balabag and prospective students would have had to travel 
ten kilometres down the mountain to Bayog Poblacion. Malnourishment was also noted by both 
municipalities as adding to the stresses felt by many students.  The local governments both cite a lack of 
funds as central to resolving these issues. !
 Diplahan’s municipal profile (2014) grappled with the question of why development was stalled in 
their municipality. It cited a variety of socioeconomic problems that hindered agricultural development, 
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!  see Table 54 of the Diplahan Municipal Profile43
the top two were landlessness, and agricultural producer’s poor access to markets. The majority of the 
agricultural workers were poor landless peasants and this was seen as a disincentive to an increase in 
production.  And many farmers (including small landowners) were reliant on the poor buying prices of 
agricultural middlemen to whom they sell their products. Diplahan’s manufacturing sector, which the 
municipal profile lists as including “wood and bamboo craft industries, flower making and basketry, a 
number of rice and corn mills, and hollow block making” was seen to suffer from a lack of capital, poor 
incentives provided to investors, and poor access to market outlets for manufactured goods. These issues 
foreshadow the hopelessness many expressed to me in my interviews.   !
 Bayog’s municipal profile does not lay out their top developmental problems in the same way but 
by reading into its ‘vision statement’ we can infer current realities through its vision for the future: !
Bayog [will become] a highly-developed town steered by competent, politically-willed and 
proactive manpower with adequate infrastructure facilities, driven by sustainable and viable 
agri-mining industries, responsibly utilizing natural resources in an ecologically-balanced 
environment, and a haven of God-fearing, child-friendly, self-reliant, well-informed, 
empowered, culture-sensitive, and a drug-free community geared towards improved quality 
of life. !
This sentence hints at the negative effects of both the semi-feudal and mining economy in Bayog.  In a 
later section I will examine the issue of rising incidences of social vice (including substance abuse) both 
during and after the end of SSM.  As we shall see, the growth of vices have been associated with the “gold 
rush” masculinist culture that emerged as a manifestation of the lack of opportunities and incentive for 
productive investment. !
 In general, the dearth of income generating opportunities outside agriculture can be seen to be a 
limiting factor to the drive to improve class position.  With production focused heavily on farming the 
semi-feudal system remained dominant which helped entrench class positions within familiar lines.  The 
indigenous population, having been pushed away from their traditional lands, were also pushed from full 
participation in this new economy. In the municipal profiles it is unclear how the Subanen fared relative to 
the settlers.  These factors point to how different aspects of class processes were in play, both Marxian 
class antagonisms based on economic factors, but also class as influenced by relational processes as 
intersected by other axes of difference. !!
!50
A HISTORY OF MT. BALABAG BEFORE MINING !
In the 1970s the former pioneering areas became strongholds of the New People’s Army. In 
another result of migration, many peoples who had not been conquered by the Spanish found 
that their forest fallows and ancestral lands had been claimed by migrants as alienable 
public land. Others were tricked out of their land by settlers. The most common responses 
were either to adopt the culture of the newcomers or to retreat to remote hills (Krinks 
2002:136). !
 What was to become the gold mining site of sitio Balabag was before the mid-1990s a difficult to 
access mountainous area covered with second generation forests and classified by the state as 
‘timberlands  .’ This 1953 government classification mandated that timberlands cannot be legally titled to 44
any private individual (Borras 2006: 135).  Mt. Balabag is comprised of three peaks and the name (given 
by the Subanen peoples) predates the American colonial era.  Located then in the municipality of Diplahan 
(a designation that would later be contested by the neighbouring municipality of Bayog whence gold 
mining began) Balabag was very sparsely populated by “kaingin” (swidden) farmers of indigenous 
Subanen descent.  Though “poor” from the point of view of having low levels of economic capital and 
modern commodities, my interview subjects reflect on these days as providing plentiful food with the land 
providing fruits, vegetables, and arable land for corn and rice production—though meat was always in 
short supply due to dwindling numbers of large game animals.  Before the arrival of mining the area was 
known by two other names: sitio Misui and sitio Tinago.  These two small hamlets of all together less than 
a couple dozen simple thatch roofed wood homes were less than 500 meters apart and about a square 
kilometre in area.  !
 My most important key informants regarding the local history were three Subanen leaders (known 
as “timuay  ”), all of whom come from the region, and one of whom (timuay “Itim”, who was also one of 45
my two main local gatekeepers) was recognized by the state and municipal leaders as being one of the 
original pre-mining residents of Mt. Balabag.  As timuay, it is one of their main duties to maintain 
knowledge of the history of their community.  The following Balabag history was taken from my many 
interviews with them, augmented by papers written by Philippine academics (Lopez-Bernal 2010, Tigno 
2006, Tan 2000).   
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!  All land above eighteen degrees of slope (and all minerals found within) belongs to the state and is managed by the 44
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (Broad 1995:323).
!  “Timuay” is an honorific title given to Subanen community leaders.  It an inherited title, but may be taken away by 45
the community and given to another if they are not seen to be living up to the responsibilities of the title.
!
 Before the 1970s many Subanen communities lived in the lowland areas of Diplahan and Bayog, 
many in the barangays and sitios near barangay Guinoman where many of the former small-scale miners 
(Subanen and non-Subanen) originated.  Mount Balabag was part of their ancestral domain, but was not 
yet a place of residence.  It was a place for hunting and where they conducted some of their religious rites. 
The Subanen preferred to live in the lowlands as these were fertile lands more suitable to farming.  There 
they were able to harvest a modest surplus and had a system of trade with neighbouring communities. 
Beginning in the 1950s an influx of Visayan migrants entered the region (Tigno 2006, Tan 2000) and by 
the 1970s the settlers had driven out most of the Subanen from lowland areas (Lopez-Bernal 2010).  This 
local history connects to the overall history of Mindanao post-independence when the Philippine 
government began organizing internal migration by Christians from the Visayas as recounted earlier. !
 My interviews with displaced former Balabag residents provided family accounts of this process. 
“Mrs. Langka” (from a barangay in the municipality of Bayog) shared a family history that was repeated 
by many: “My [Visayan] parents came here in 1960.  They came in search of land, of places to farm. 
Visayans from all over came here then.  They were looking for opportunity.”  The migrants were mostly 
peasants and low level petit bourgeoisie (small to medium landowners, also called “middle peasants”) in 
search of greater opportunity.  Mindanao was presented by the national government as a new start (much 
like the American West), where one could escape from the long established hacienda structures found in 
the rest of the country.  In Diplahan and Bayog they discovered the fertile lands settled by the indigenous 
Subanen whose long and difficult history with outsiders   had created a culture that was wary of outsiders 46
(Lopez-Bernal 2010).  The timuays spoke of (interviews July 2014) how at first land was shared with the 
Visayans:  !
we have a culture of sharing, so when they came and wanted to plant we let them plant, just 
like we would our own people, but that didn’t mean that the land belonged to them… in the 
future when we need help they were supposed to help us.  
  
The Visayans, having establishing this foothold, began the process of obtaining legal titles—a process the 
Subanen were unfamiliar with and so never undertook themselves.  As more settlers arrived the Subanen 
began to feel the population pressure and became less open to simply sharing land, at this point they say 
that the outsiders began to offer money or trade.  Here too the timuay reported that their people then did 
not understand that the remuneration offered was for the permanent transfer of the land, “we thought it 
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   As summarized in the above section “A Brief History of Zamboanga Peninsula.”46
was just for a season or two”.  In time this effectively displaced the Subanen from the lowlands and 
pushed them into the highlands where the land was less fertile and rice cultivation more difficult 
(interviews July 2014).   !
 According to the stories shared by my Subanen respondents, the history of permanent human 
residence on Mt Balabag was quite recent.  It began in the late 1970s with less than thirty families   from 47
what are now the barangays (bordering Bayog) of Guinoman and Ditay in the municipality of Diplahan. 
In Balabag they lived as subsistence kaingin farmers who supplemented their agricultural work with the 
hunting of wild game, and domesticated fowl.  Another local resident shared that when he was a child on 
Mt. Balabag there were no roads through the forest, one walked or took a horse, and the nearest town was 
a three to four hour walk away.   !
It was an ok life, we had what we needed, we had all kinds of fruit, rice, corn.  Unlike now 
[summer 2014], it’s so difficult, we’re lucky to eat kanin   once a day, sometimes we only 48
had bananas instead […] Life was better then.  
  
While the forest was able to provide adequate food and materials for shelter, they did not seek complete 
isolation. The Subanen had long been exposed to the technologies, commodities, and medicines of 
outsiders (from the Moros onwards) and found value in them.  Despite their displacement from the 
lowlands the Balabag Subanen still engaged in regular trade with the settlers in the lowland community 
markets.  Adult members of the community would make occasional trips to trade forest goods and surplus 
agricultural products for items they couldn’t produce themselves (interviews July 2014). !
 This was the state of affairs until the early 1980s (during the last years of the Marcos dictatorship) 
when increasing tensions between the state, the Muslim separatist guerrillas, and the communist guerrillas 
led to increased militarization in the region.  Timuay Itim spoke to me about the hardship of this time for 
the residents of Mt. Balabag as both insurgents and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) would 
often pass through their community.  The Subanen felt caught in the middle of a conflict and felt pressure 
from both sides.  From the New People’s Army   (NPA) they were entreated for support citing agrarian 49
reform and a support for indigenous sovereignty as their goals, and from the Armed Forces of the 
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!  According to timuay Itim (interviews June-July 2014).47
!  The term “kanin” literally refers to rice, but was also used colloquially when speaking of the ground corn used as a 48
rice substitute.
!  The armed wing of the Philippine Communist Party.49
Philippines (AFP) they were accused of being communist sympathizers  .  Both also sought support from 50
their community in the form of encampment and supplies.  Timuay Itim discussed how his father (he was 
still a teen then) provided food to both in hope of avoiding trouble. !
My father would sell food to the NPA but begged them not to stay in the village because of 
what the AFP might think.  The AFP would come too but they weren’t as friendly, they would 
stay in our community even after we said we didn’t want them to, and they would call us 
‘sympathizers.’  We weren’t NPA you understand, we didn’t want trouble, but at least they 
would ask for food, and they would pay for it (interview June 2014). !
 Life for the Subanen of Balabag changed again after it became militarized.  By the middle of the 
1980s the small community became smaller still as many left to escape from military harassment.  Some 
moved to other Subanen communities and some left for the lowlands to find paid work in settler 
communities  .  For the latter group another rationale besides militarization became apparent in my 51
interviews: they sought to escape not just the place of their community, but also the perceived limitations 
of the social space accessible to a Subanen.  These individuals tended to be young men and women at the 
time and expressed discontent in the Subanen way of life which they saw as easily abused by the more 
powerful settlers.  Many went to rural communities to become agricultural day labourers or found work as 
general labourers (for example in gravel mining or in small-scale gold mining sites).  And some left for the 
urban centres to do work as domestic helpers (nannies and housekeepers), or as general labourers (e.g. in 
the construction industry), or even as members of criminal organizations. !
 “Norito” was one of these former Balabag residents that found an outlet for his discontent in 
criminal activity (interview June 2014).  He recounts that it was in 1983 when the militarization hit a peak. 
These were the last years of the dictator President Marcos’ rule. In that year his chief political rival 
Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino was assassinated upon his return to the country and there was a nationwide 
popular upswell in anti-Marcos sentiment. This period saw a nationwide growth in support for 
organizations like the NPA who advocated for the overthrow of the state through armed revolution 
(Capuyan 2006).  In response the government intensified its anti-insurgency campaign that targeted 
indigenous communities as they were seen as one of the prime recruiting grounds for a revolutionary 
movement with an agrarian reform agenda.  Norito’s family was one of those approached and while he 
claims that they did not join the cause, they thought their goals amenable and sold food to passing rebels. 
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!  The Moro separatists were more active in muslim communities.50
!  While Visayans remain the majority migrant group, there are also individuals originally from other parts of the 51
archipelago.
In response AFP units were regularly sent to their home and sometimes camped there for weeks.  These 
units would take what they wanted and were seen as rude by the Subanen.  Norito also said that for the 
women of the community there were also issues of harassment, but he was reluctant to provide details.   !
 In 1986 (before the “People Power” uprising that deposed Marcos), Norito’s family decided to 
leave Balabag for a neighbouring province where they had family.  Norito himself did not join them and 
instead choose to relocate to an urban centre.  As a young man in his late teens he felt anger and shame in 
his indigenous identity, an identity he saw as weak and easily abused.  Norito went to join settler culture 
so that he too “could be strong.”  In that city he joined one of the drug syndicates producing and 
distributing “shabu” (methamphetamine) which was (and continues to be) the most popular street drug in 
the Philippines   (Urada et al 2014: 139).  This work provided him not only a regular income of PhP150/52
day  , but also an outlet for his anger and the feeling of power and respect.  Norito shared this tale with me 53
in quiet tones, his voice tinged with sadness.  He claims that eventually the work wore on him as he came 
to identify with lower income people of all ethnic backgrounds being taken advantage of and made sick 
with the drug.  In those years he himself had also become a user, and he realized how his earnings were 
being either returned to the syndicate to support his habit or spent on other social vices like gambling, 
drinking, and women.  Worse, he shared that he began to realize that even here his Subanen identity was 
being taken advantage of.  Many of the front-line ‘gunmen’ were Subanen, he recalled, and they were 
involved in hold-ups and kidnappings for the benefit of the syndicate elites.  He left the work in 1989 
because he says “I realized it wasn’t good work, that I was being used there too, I didn’t get rich like I 
thought, only the Visayan bosses got rich.”  He rejoined his family, married, and sought to reconnect with 
his Subanen culture.   !
 Marcos’ presidency fell to a popular uprising in 1986, and in the years following the regional NPA 
suffered a major downturn in its membership and supporters (Abinales 2008).  This combination of factors 
led to a reduction in militarization and by the late 1980s to early 1990s many of the Subanen who departed 
Balabag returned.  During this period the community sought to formalize their land rights to Balabag. In 
1985 the Subanen residents of Balabag (including those that left) had made an attempt to apply for land 
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!  An estimated 65% of all substance abusers use “shabu” with an estimated 6% of the population report using it 52
annually—the highest in the world (Urada et al, 2014: 139).
!  According to the Central Bank of the Philippines (BSP) $1USD = PhP20.3857 in 1986.  In 2014 $1USD = 53
Php44.3952 (http://www.bsp.gov.ph)
title but were denied due to the land being formally classified as “timberlands  ” which restricted private 54
ownership.  And so, despite their return, their lack of formal land ownership would foreshadow the issues 
to come when small-scale mining arrived in 1994. !
 The history of the Subanen from pre-colonial times, to their migration to Balabag, up to the arrival 
of gold mining in the mid-1990s demonstrates how great changes to their socioeconomic and cultural lives 
were interwoven into the interplay of multiple scales of influence. In the more recent history it can be 
traced to the geopolitics of the granting of post-war formal independence to the Philippines on the basis of 
neocolonial globalization, to attempts to solidify state control of resources and people, to the local level 
power play between new migrants and indigenous peoples.  The lives of the Subanen people of Balabag 
have been a reaction to and a reaction against multi-scalar power relations. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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legitimate legal claim but was still a step away from full legal title (and different still from a Certificate of 
Ancestral Domain Title which would provide the land protection under the Indigenous People’s Rights Act).
CHAPTER FIVE 
SMALL-SCALE MINING IN BALABAG !
 In this chapter I will chronologically explore the lifespan of small-scale mining in Balabag from 
the initial discovery of gold deposits, to the creation of the mining community, to its ultimate end when in 
the autumn of 2012 government agencies forcibly implemented a cease and desist order (CDO) and 
displaced the community.  Within this journey I will explore the agrarian transformation that occurred 
when semi-feudal agricultural production was replaced by “gold rush” artisanal mining. This 
transformation gave birth to a new elite and created new class formations, and it also engendered new 
conflicts.  This new mining community, composed mostly of men, arose on lands inhabited by a small 
population of indigenous Subanen who had been pushed out of the lowlands only two decades previous by 
Filipino settlers from the Visayas and beyond.  And though during the lifespan of SSM socioeconomic 
mobility was experienced by many (mostly in the sense of increased earnings, but also to a smaller extent 
improvements in class position), there was at the same time a disincentive towards productive investment 
that limited long term mobility.  A culture associated with masculinist “gold rush” mining emerged, one 
where expendable income was put into social vices that were seen as expressions of “manliness.”  All this 
laid the foundation for the return of the majority involved in SSM to their pre-mining class positions after 
the land was claimed by TVIRD, the local subsidiary of the Canadian transnational mining company TVI-
Pacific. !!
THE DISCOVERY OF GOLD !
 The tale of how gold was discovered on Mt. Balabag was shared by a variety of sources and 
shared one element in common: gold was discovered by a Subanen.  Most of those that shared this tale 
knew only that one aspect, though there were four informants that claimed to know more.  Two were of 
Visayan background, two of Subanen background.  Three (the two Visayan and one of the Subanen) were 
once part of the MOSSMA leadership or staff.  The remaining Subanen was Mrs. Bale, the wife of the 
individual, known to all by his nickname “Tulabong,” who all agreed made the discovery  .  She was also 55
able to show me tattered documents with letterhead from the Municipality of Bayog that testified to her 
version of the story.  For the two Visayans, who recounted an identical story, a Subanen hunter (Tulabong) 
accompanied by a Visayan friend co-discovered gold by accident.  For Mrs. Bale, Tulabong was a part-
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!  These are not aliases as their names are common knowledge.55
time prospector   who sought out new areas for SSM and had his biggest success on Mt. Balabag.  And in 56
contrast to the other account, he was not accompanied by a Visayan co-discoverer, but by Mrs. Bale.  This 
is an important distinction as the “Visayan friend” (who was unnamed in our interviews) was supposed to 
be a small-scale miner from one of the rod mills in nearby Depore (the precursor to Balabag SSM)—thus 
his presence would have given equal claim to a non-Subanen for the discovery. !
 Here was how the tale was recounted by “Ginto” (who would eventually become one of the 
“Magic Six”—the term given by locals to the six richest mine owners and financiers in Balabag).  The 
story began with a recollection that SSM already operated in the nearby barangay of Depore, but it was an 
operation fraught with problems due to its geographic location in a valley:   !
There wasn’t mining on Balabag yet, just in the Depore area…  mining was kind of slow 
there because of large water deposits.  Draining the tunnels was hard work, so the earnings 
were low.  Many left.  Some, they went wherever there was SSM…  There came a time that 
an IP and his [Visayan] friend were hunting [for pig] in a part of Balabag. There they saw 
some interesting rocks at a landslide… [the Visayan friend] took some and brought it to [the 
SSM mills in Depore and it was discovered] that the rocks had gold.  So there it was.  Some 
of the people went up, then slowly more people.  … [That IP] was [called] Tulabong, that 
was his name (interview July 2014). !
 I spoke with Mrs. Bale in her simple, sparsely furnished, two room wooden home in barangay 
Depore (Bayog).  By the one rough hewn wooden table we sat on well aged plastic chairs which had 
broken multiple times only to be repaired with rope stitching together the cracked pieces.  A light breeze 
came in through the glassless windows from the rice fields behind the home (fields that her family did not 
own).  At that time her income came from occasional agricultural day labour (she claimed earnings of just 
over Php700 a month).  She spoke to me of how her husband was employed as a civilian armed force 
geographical unit (CAFGU)   member, but was also a prospector who used his job’s travelling nature to 57
hunt for possible mine sites.  In her story he was not with a Visayan but with her.  He was home from his 
job and they were collecting rattan from the mountain to sell in the local market when they came across 
the exposed ore.  He recognized right away that this was potentially gold bearing and so they collected 
samples for testing.  Her story is corroborated by a document she showed me titled “Balabag Mining: 
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!  Tulabong was also a member of the CAFGU (Citizen Armed Force Geographical Unit) once assigned to Canatuan, 56
the site of TVIRDs first LSM in Zamboanga Peninsula.
!  CAFGU are civilian armed forces under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.  They are used to 57
augment the AFP in conflict areas in order that the government soldiers need not be stretched too thin.
Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow (A Development Plan).” The letterhead states that it was an official 
document from the Municipality of Bayog, and was written by MOSSMA, though there was no date on it. 
Below is a transcript of the opening section under the heading “The Discovery” [note that I did not correct 
all the grammar or spelling as I was uncertain in some places]: !
After the closure of operations of the Depore Small Scale Miners Association (DSSMA) in 
Upper Depore, Depore, Bayog, Zamboanga del Sur in 1993 the minors [I believe this should 
be “miners” and is corrected as such in the remainder] from the area started to explore the 
neighbouring [sitios] hoping to look for new venture to mine.  When the DSSMA stopped its 
operations, other [miners] return to their old livelihood that was outing and gathering rattan 
from the forest for marketing.  !
One Subano resident of Depore, Bayog, Zamboanga del Sur named Tulabong whose real 
name is Reynaldo Bale [“Bale” is typed over a whited out section] happen to spot a landslide 
at the side of the mountain in sitio Misui, Depore, Bayog, Zamboanga del Sur.  He noticed on 
the rack the gold vein and got [a] few samples and brought to the mi-mine area for a test load. 
It was found out that it [had] potential for mining and this accidental discovery inspired the 
[miners] to venture in the said place. !
People [flocked] to the area and started to dig tunnels for that purpose.  It was May 1994 that 
the area was full with miners and rod mills were constructed at sitio Misui [located on Mt. 
Balabag].  There was rapid production of gold in that month of May.  Today the Araw ng 
Balabag was set on every May 27 yearly to commemorate the discovery.  !
 The similarities and the direct knowledge of the name of Tulabong as the discoverer by so many 
parties seem to indicate that there was a core of truth to the story, but the conflict between the two versions 
hinted at the relationship between the settlers and the Subanen.  The Subanen in general, often repeated 
the feeling of being cheated—not only of their lands, and the credit of discovery, but also of monetary 
compensation for both. The axis of ethnic difference that separated settlers and the indigenous people can 
be seen as an example of the embodied cultural capital (viewed as negative and/or problematic by setters, 
and sometimes internalized by Subanen individuals themselves as seen in the previous chapter). !!!!
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THE FIRST MINERS !
 At first, the mine site on Mt. Balabag was simply the successor of the small scale mining 
operation in Depore (organized under DSSMA since 1989) which had renamed itself the Balabag Small 
Scale Miners Association (BASSMA) in 1995.  BASSMA’s control over Balabag was short-lived as they 
lacked the necessary capital to truly grow the capacity of the new site.  This left the door open to outside 
investors capable of the upfront capital expenses.  Production in Depore was low yield and after operating 
costs and the repayment of loans, the producers earned only marginally more than the peasant farmers of 
the region.  These economic constraints also constrained mobility in class position.  Soon capital rich 
individuals (relative to the BASSMA miners) arrived, and within months BASSMA was dissolved and the 
Monte de Oro Small Scale Miners Association (MOSSMA) rose to replace it. !
 The following recounts how MOSSMA came to be and is based on interviews with “Ginto  ” and 58
“Yibe” (who worked with the MOSSMA leadership).  Yibe’s life experiences gave her unique insight to 
the history of the region’s mining. A college educated engineer, she had been employed by an international 
mining company prospecting at Mt Balabag after small-scale miners discovered gold in the region. Later 
Yibe would come under the employ of MOSSMA as an advisor.  Their names and identities are obscured 
as much as is possible in this paper as after demolition they both believed their lives to be threatened  . 59
Ginto was the forerunner to the eventual Balabag mining elite, collectively given the moniker the “Magic 
Six”—the six individuals, all of whom were friends or family, who became the top financiers and owners 
of the majority of plants, refineries, and mining tunnels. !
 Ginto did not occupy a high class position, nor was she from one of the regional elite families, but 
relative to the BASSMA miners she had notable advantages.  She had the benefit of coming from a minor 
petit bourgeoisie family with small land holdings and a small rice buying/selling business (recall that the 
Diplahan municipal office cited these businesses as one of the key problems for local farmers’ own 
development).  Ginto had a college education in a skilled professional field, but like many other graduates, 
had little to no opportunities to ply those skills.  Balabag presented her with a rare opening, a temporal 
window of opportunity presented by the discovery of an easily exploitable resource on land that was as yet 
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I am trying to keep as much of their identities hidden.  This means that in the case of Ginto, some aspects of all the 
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!  MOSSMA released allegedly “leaked” TVIRD emails in 2012 that claimed a “target” list that included MOSSMA 59
officials.  Further, claims of political killings of SSM supporters in 2012 added to the tensions felt by many of the 
former miners.
only claimed by indigenous peoples with no land title.  A site with as yet no major investors, but rich with 
SSM experience and labourers. !
 This presented Ginto with a decision that was only possible for individuals from an initial class 
position that provided her with enough capital (economic, cultural, and social) to be able to exploit an 
opportunity within the short time frame while the niche remained unfilled—and as discussed in the 
previous chapter, these openings were uncommon. The accumulated benefits of Ginto’s class position 
were realized in classed performances that allowed her to use her social capital to establish a foothold in 
Balabag.  It began with her transitioning from agricultural buying to gold buying.  In doing so she created 
new classed relationships with the miners.  And during the same period she sought out the necessary loans 
(from both financial institutions and, to a greater degree, from family and friends) to augment her 
economic capital so as to eventually set up and grow mining operations herself.  !
 Ginto was respected by all my interview subjects and many shared a similar opinion of her as she 
had of herself: that hers was a “tough life” previous to SSM and that it was a ‘rags to riches’ story earned 
through “perseverance” and “sacrifice” (interviews July 2015).  “There were those with some money but 
they didn't know how to take advantage of it, how to make it grow, how to do it themselves” (Ginto, 
interview July 2014).  Over the course of a few years after college graduation she struggled (sometimes 
unsuccessfully) to become a success through increasingly larger investments.  She began as the manager 
of her parents’ rice trading business  and eventually became one of the biggest capitalists in Balabag.  I 
would argue that her class position alone (a petit bourgeoise small business and land owner) was no 
guarantee of long term socioeconomic mobility.  This can be seen in Ginto’s initial SSM investment 
failure (which is a much more common story in most SSM sites in the region) that led to her returning to 
the agriculture business.  !
My parents they were rice traders, so when I was done school, it was me that took over.  I did 
the travelling [to the rural farming communities], I did the buying of rice… so my parents 
they just handed over operations.  So I saw that it wasn't enough, it wasn't enough for [my 
family to live on as I was now married and it was still my parents business so they had a big 
cut].  So when [SSM in] Dipuri [in the municipality of Bayog] began in 1991… that's where I 
went.  …my younger sibling took over [the rice trading].   !
[My spouse and I] sold [our home and land]… we scrimped and saved worked very hard, and 
I got a loan. I [began operating] a rod mill… but we stopped because it was slow because 
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there was a lot of water.  So we lost [money there], there were no earnings.  [I went back to 
farming by buying one hectare of land.]   !
[Four years later] that’s when Balabag hit [when easily accessible, high yield ore was 
discovered].  I sold the land to a neighbour for a very good price [and began gold trading] 
(interviews July 2015). !
To contrast Ginto’s earnings, she claimed earnings of approximately PhP3000-4000 (gross) a week with 
rice trading compared to PhP30,000-50,000 (gross) in gold trading in Balabag. !
That was… [in] 1994.  I was able to buy gold, then I sold it [to the Central Bank] in 
Zamboanga.  In one week I'd travel four times.  So slowly there was some ball mills up there, 
and gold prices were up, so there came a time that someone offered me a ball mill  … 60
because he set it up but didn't go through with it, so he loaned me the drums and ball mill.  So 
after that was the beginning.  I was able to grow it.  Then the operation expanded slowly.  I 
would save, if there was a chance, I'd grow it.  If there were those that wanted to sell, I'd take 
it.  I made big loans from this Chinese who had faith in me.  Then over time [I became what I 
became]… People know that I wasn't born rich (interview  July 2014). !
 Ginto’s rise in economic fortunes came from the confluence of her family’s social, economic, and 
cultural capital along with the discovery of gold on Balabag.  The site was in need for a major investor to 
maximize the operations at a time when the only other investors present were small-scale miners from 
previously low yield sites. Her entry into Balabag (along with the arrival of the rest of the Six) eventually 
filled the niche.  This allowed Balabag SSM to flourish, but as we shall see, limited opportunities for the 
others that followed.   !!
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!  Ball mills (also interchangeably called rod mills) are machines used in the final stages of the “gold amalgamation” 60
technique.  It is used to grind ore after it has been crushed manually by sledgehammers in order to facilitate the 
separation of gold.  Here is the process as described by Israel and Asirot (2005:525): 
 
“Lime and water are then added to the ore [in the rod mill], after which grinding commences. After several hours, the 
mill is turned off and mercury is mixed with the fine ore. Eventually, the milled ore is placed in a large basin, and the 
heavy metal alloy is allowed to settle to the bottom. Water is again added to the milled ore to remove the slurry, 
leaving behind the amalgam. The amalgam is then collected and placed in a fine cloth, which is squeezed to free 
excess mercury. Borax is often added to the amalgam as a cleaning material to remove impurities, and then 
blowtorched in a circular clay pot to separate the gold from the remaining mercury.” 
THE CREATION OF MOSSMA !
 The arrival of Ginto as the first major capital investor shaped the creation of a new power 
structure in the making of SSM in Balabag.  Ginto invited family and friends to join her and these early 
investors, who later were named the “Magic Six” by the labourers, became the wealthiest and most 
influential in the community.  Of the other five, three were friends or family of Ginto and the other two 
married into the Six.  Though they all came from similar class positions, their earlier relationships had as 
much, if not more, to do with their becoming grouped as the elite.  In this way we can see how class 
processes have bases beyond simply the labour process.  This familiar support structure too can be 
connected to the semi-feudal nature of Philippine agricultural production which privileges familiar and 
patronage relationships.  These six individuals became the main financiers to both the smaller mining 
capitalists, the main gold buyers, owned the largest refineries and the most productive tunnels, and up 
until the final years of operation held a monopoly on Carbon-in-Pulp (CIP) plant ownership.   !
 Together the Six founded the Monte de Oro Small Scale Miner’s Association (MOSSMA) in early 
1996 and officially registered with the Security and Exchange Commission (registration # G199700247) 
on 14 August 1997.  Its earliest goal was to establish itself as the legal miners on Mt. Balabag.  This first 
battle was lost when the national government approved an Mineral Production Sharing Agreement  61
(MPSA) for Zamboanga Minerals Corporation (ZMC), an exploratory company working in partnership 
with Britian’s Rio Tinto mining company in late 1997.  Despite this setback, for the first decade of its 
existence MOSSMA had some successes in dealing with local governments and received endorsements 
from the municipalities of Diplahan and Bayog   towards recognition from the national government  .  At 62 63
that time the local governments supported what they saw as a local initiative that provided more jobs to 
local peoples than LSM, and which paid their government’s business tax for the rod mills and CIP plants 
in operation (from unpublished research notes acquired from R. Junio of Ateneo University in July 2014, 
and from municipal summaries). !
!63
!  The MPSA (mineral production sharing agreement) is one of production agreements between the Philippine state 61
and a transnational corporation under the Mining Act of 1995.  The MPSA, approved by the Department of 
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), is given for up to twenty-five years, and is renewable for another 
twenty-five.  It requires that no more than 40 per cent of the mineral project be owned by a foreign corporation 
(Holden et al 2011: 146).
!  These two municipalities had a boundary dispute as to which included Balabag within their borders.  As such 62
MOSSMA paid taxes and made legal appeals to both.
!  These endorsements slowly eroded over time culminating with their turning full support over to TVIRD by 2012.63
 MOSSMA’s other responsibilities, beyond being the official body to represent Balabag SSM in 
legal matters, was to regulate mining operations.  Most critically this regulation was seen in its limiting of 
CIP plant and mining tunnel ownership.  It also collected a local tax on mine owners for use in the 
construction of tailings ponds, in limited public works programs (including the installation of water 
pipelines from fresh water springs, and the eventual building of a local elementary school), and for public 
events (i.e. community celebrations during holidays).  MOSSMA’s mission statement set these goals: !
[To] establish a progressive small scale mining industry with community support and a strong 
network with local government units, development agencies and Non-Governmental 
Organizations.  [To] aspire to become  [an] active promoter and advocate of “good practices” 
and better conceived approaches for meeting the poverty challenge and help build sustainable 
communities and sustainable local economies (MOSSMA powerpoint 2013). !
 In the periods before ZMC was awarded the MPSA in 1997, and again in between 2005 and 2009 
when ZMC and TVIRD entered into an option agreement  , MOSSMA attempted to create a “joint and 64
cooperative” operation between SSM and LSM. Similar agreements had been made in sites in the 
Cordillera mountains in Luzon (CPA interview August 2014) where small-scale miners did the front line 
extraction and sold the ore to LSMs.  A MOSSMA document explains that before ZMC acquired the 
MPSA,  !
… undertakings… [to resolve] the controversy was done by invoking a kind of understanding 
and application of the principle of “peaceful coexistence” where both small scale and the 
large scale [ZMC] (then only a claimant of a Declaration Of Location (DOL), [could] do their 
respective operation.  There was an attempt [towards] a joint and cooperative operation of the 
small scale and large scale… (MOSSMA 2011  ). 65!
A second attempt was made“[in the mid-2000s when our] lawyer… and the president of TVIRD, Eugene 
Mateo, met to create a compromise agreement. […]  We suggested a merger” (interview with one of the 
Six, July 2015).  Both attempts failed. 
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!  ZMC and TVIRD entered into an option agreement with the MPSA on 26 April 2005 which it exercised in 2008 64
for $350,000, and by 2009 TVIRD had acquired 100% ownership and thus the license to explore and develop the 
contract area (www.tvird.com.ph).
!  From a MOSSMA pamphlet entitled “MONTE DE ORO.... THE LAND, THE MINE, THE PEOPLE... still, the 65
continuing struggle!”  This was never published in any official media outlets but were distributed as pamphlets.  Its 
intended audience were the government and local, national, and international NGOs and activist groups.  Document 
obtained from a former MOSSMA official.
!
 By 2011, at the height of its struggle against the incursion of TVIRD, it claimed to have had:  
more or less 200-250 operators   in various phases of mine operations (i.e. tunnels, rod-66
millers, processing, tradings, labor, etc.) and dependents of more than 5000 people including 
laborers earning daily compensation. Moreover, about seventy percent of the people 
employed and benefited the area were the Subanen… (MOSSMA, 2011  ).   67!
The same document estimates 60-70 rod mills in operation, twenty productive tunnels, fifty sari-sari 
shops, and an expanded value chain that included jewellery makers. !!
THE REPRESENTATION AND REALITIES OF SSM “SUCCESS” !
Since the time of the Small Scale Miners’ legitimate occupation in the area as “builders or 
possessors in good faith” over the area at Balabag, and pursuant to its rights and privileges 
under the law (R.A. 7076) and corollary law, the PD 1899, it envisioned to establish a 
progressive small scale mining industry with community support and strong network of 
miners, communities, local government units, development agencies and Non-Government 
organizations, seeking to become a more active promoter and advocate of “good practices” 
and better conceived approaches for meeting the poverty challenge and building the basis 
for more sustainable communities [bold and italics theirs] (MOSSMA 2011  ). 68
!
 The above is from an informational English language pamphlet that MOSSMA released in 
defence of its operations in 2011 targeted towards a government, media, and NGO audience.  This was 
distributed during a critical period in its battle against the entry of TVIRD as preparations for the May 
2012 national and local elections were underway and local government support was moving towards the 
LSM.  MOSSMA had applied to convert their operations into a “Minahang Bayan” (People’s Mine) as per 
the small scale mining law RA 7076, and TVIRD was still trying to enforce the legality of the MPSA it 
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!  The term “operators” in this sense refers to owners of mining capital.  The same term (operators) is also used to 66
refer to the employees hired to operate the rod mills as shall be discussed later.
!  From a MOSSMA pamphlet entitled “MONTE DE ORO.... THE LAND, THE MINE, THE PEOPLE... still, the 67
continuing struggle!” Document obtained from a former MOSSMA official.
!  From a MOSSMA pamphlet entitled “MONTE DE ORO.... THE LAND, THE MINE, THE PEOPLE... still, the 68
continuing struggle!” Document obtained from a former MOSSMA official.
purchased from Zamboanga Minerals Corporation.  This pamphlet was quite telling as to how the 
organization wished to be viewed and how it viewed itself.  Balabag SSM was presented as a space where 
Filipinos were shaping development for the good of Filipinos, a place where initiative and 
entrepreneurship had created local success stories and lifted people out of poverty, and where the Goliath 
of “development aggression” by foreign companies was bravely faced by the David of a “people’s mining 
activity” (MOSSMA, 2011  ). 69!
 In an interview with one of the Magic Six, I was told that they were seen by the community as the          
“moral leaders” who worked for the good of the majority.  I was told that: !
many were able to benefit [in Balabag] because everyone was able to earn money.  The Lord 
gave us Bayog, but not only for [the people of] Bayog, it's for the benefit of all Filipinos. 
[…]  SSM and LSM are different.  With SSM it doesn't matter who you were, if you were 
interested [in employment] and were hardworking, then it's ok.  You would earn depending 
on how well you work.  So even if—even if—you were someone with no knowledge [about 
mining], even if you had no education, as long as you're hard working, you’d earn.  Unlike 
LSM, where if you don't have the technical ability or capabilities you won't get employed 
(interview July 2014). !
And yet, in my own interviews the moral high ground was much less clear and seemed to have more 
commonalities to the story of capitalist exploitation of natural resources and people as described by 
Marxian theory.  My research points to Balabag having produced a space that, while promoted by the local 
elites as a place of opportunity and development in the hands of Filipinos, remained a space of capitalist 
exploitation that primarily benefited the capitalist class (and among them primarily the elite).  !
 SSM in Balabag was able to create some downstream industries but in my interviews these seemed          
limited to the small-scale jewellery makers that sold their products to individuals and small urban shops, 
and to producers of SSM equipment like rod mills and CIP plants. The latter was heavily dependent on the 
existence of productive SSM locations however, so the eventual end of MOSSMA and with no high yield 
sites having yet replaced it as of this writing, these businesses had either collapsed, or at the very least 
seriously declined.  The production of jewellery too was hit as it was reliant on expendable income.   !
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!  From a MOSSMA pamphlet entitled “MONTE DE ORO.... THE LAND, THE MINE, THE PEOPLE... still, the 69
continuing struggle!” Document obtained from a former MOSSMA official.
 SSM in Balabag created new capitalist divisions of labour that differed from the semi-feudal          
agricultural system that dominated the countryside.  This new form of capitalism favoured the select few 
who entered the nascent industry at just the right moment to allow them to trade their relatively higher 
economic, cultural, and social capital for control over the newly created economic space.  In doing so they 
were able to take advantage of this newly opened niche and establish themselves as the new elite in a form 
that was derived from the power held by the semi-feudal landowner.  Once this niche was filled they 
attempted to reestablished the dominant class hierarchies based on semi-feudal agrarian life.  This resulted 
in smaller mine owners that were dependent on the financier, and labourers dependent on the mine owner. 
However unlike the large landowner, their power and control over the industry was less secure.  The high 
capital requirements of SSM, with its use of expensive machinery, tools, and the daily expense of 
chemicals and explosives meant that capital costs had to be shared with second tier mine owners.  And the 
wealth generated from that high yield site also resulted in even the working class earning significantly 
more than they would in agricultural labour.  This created an opening for capital accumulation which 
eventually led to intra-class fragmentation that resulted in the degradation of elite control (as shall be seen 
in the section below).  !!
SECOND TIER MINE OWNERS !
 My earlier example of “Ginto” provides an overview of the rise to power of the “Magic Six”. 
Ginto’s inability to find work in her field of study after graduating from college was representative of the 
challenges created by underdevelopment in the region. Despite a relatively privileged class background 
and high educational achievement her opportunities remained limited.  It was only the opening of an (as 
yet) unexploited economic niche in SSM that allowed Ginto to trade on their class background and 
accumulated capital.  It was this temporal dimension, in conjunction with their economic, social, and 
cultural capital, that helps us understand why they were able to take this elite position when others were 
not.  Another part of the puzzle  can be seen if we look beyond class positions as implied by one’s 
relationship to the means of production to other axes of difference, in the case of the Six, their familiar 
connections pre-Balabag SSM.  In speaking with twelve former small mine owners from Balabag I 
discovered that the Six were not the only early arrivals with a similar class background, and yet none of 
the others succeeded in becoming part of the Six.  !
 “Ibon's" story demonstrates some of the challenges to upward social mobility even for a petit 
bourgeois family.  College educated and coming from a small landowning Visayan family with political 
aspirations, an electoral loss in their home community in a neighbouring province resulted in a significant 
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loss of social capital.  Within a semi-feudal system that heavily leans on a culture of patronage, after the 
loss of the election their political opponents effectively made dealings with Ibon’s family detrimental to 
other families wishing to maintain the needed good graces with the new political powers.  This electoral 
loss pushed Ibon’s family to leave their home province in the early 1990s and they resettled in a medium 
yield SSM mining community in another province (not yet in the Balabag area). There they set up a series 
of small businesses with savings from the sale of their land and small businesses in their original province. 
Unfortunately they overestimated the profits being generated by that SSM site and their new investments 
never earned as much as they had hoped:  “We had all sorts of businesses, it was never permanent.  At first 
we had a tailoring business, then we were agricultural buyer/sellers, we had a small store, we raised and 
sold small livestock, just a string of small businesses to make ends meet” (interview July 2014).   !
 Having reached adulthood and married, Ibon and his spouse moved to Balabag in 1994 after news 
that a new and potentially more lucrative SSM site had been discovered.  This was in that critical period 
when SSM required major investors to take a risk on the site, yet despite having a similar class 
background to the eventual Magic Six, Ibon’s family did not invest capital into mining itself until 1999.   !
At first we started with just buying gold  .  If we were able to buy gold we’d sell it to a larger 70
buyer, that’s it.  Because money was easy.  Even if it was just PhP50 a gram (in profit), if you 
were able to buy ten then you had PhP500 right away!  … this was [from when we arrived] 
up to 1999 when I set up a ball mill.  Earnings were easy.  Even though gold was cheap, it 
was easy.  We’d be able to buy twenty or thirty grams—where else could you get [that kind of 
money in] a day?  That’s why we stayed here.  We bought land.  We were able to save.  We 
started with a house and land (interviews July 2014). !
Ibon saw his move to Balabag as a success relative to his previous situation, but it is interesting to note the 
deviations in his story relative to Ginto’s.  Here we can see that class background alone did not mean 
equality in opportunity.  In taking into account all three types of capital we can note that Ibon’s recent 
family history led to weakened levels of social and economic capital.  Ginto was able to gain the initial 
foothold in Balabag investments through a series of dealings that required the trading of land holdings and 
loans acquired through social networks. Ibon’s parents’ political difficulties severely disrupted these 
networks and constrained their social capital which limited his own ability to make similar moves. !
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!  Ginto also began in Balabag as a gold buyer.70
 Ibon was not the only eventual smaller mine owner of similar class standing to the Six to arrive in 
Balabag prior to them.  Their relegation to the second tier of local capitalists can be viewed through either 
a relative deficiency in one or more of the three types of capital, and/or simply due to hesitation.  An 
example of the latter can be found in one of my interviewees who had higher levels of capital upon entry 
yet did not invest in mining due to having what seemed to them to be secure employment with a 
transnational LSM company.  It was only after that transnational ended its Philippine operations that they 
scrambled to invest, and by then the Six had already entrenched themselves.   
 Further it was not only members of the petit bourgeois (middle peasant) class who became mine 
owners in Balabag. Over the course of SSM operations some enterprising mine labourers were also able to 
see class mobility.  Timuay Itim, one of my key informants and original resident of Balabag, was in the 
last years of MOSSMA able to invest his accumulated earnings into mine ownership.  The late investment 
timeframe of his story was repeated by some other labourer turned mine owners.  And there were also 
miners turned tunnel operators.  Though they were not able to threaten the overall power of the Six, nor 
were any ever able to join them within the elite, some did see economic independence relative to the 
agricultural life of the majority in region while within an active SSM industry in Balabag. !!
THE PRODUCTION AND REPRODUCTION OF CLASS !
 In this section I will examine how socioeconomic lives, class lines, and capital flows were 
produced and reproduced  .  Derived from semi-feudal class relations an elite established themselves as 71
the political and economic power in Balabag, however there were key differences from their agrarian 
origins.  SSM was closer to capitalist than feudal and it allowed for more productive investment and for 
socioeconomic mobility up to a point, and primarily within its spaces.  As noted in the above section there 
were some individuals who were able to rise from mine labourers to small owners (of independent tunnels, 
rod mills, and eventually even CIP plants).  !
 SSM may be seen as a local attempt at disrupting the globalizing discourse that the Philippine 
state accepts and manifests in the semi-feudal nature of agrarian life.  Contrary to the central government’s 
support of LSM which my interviewees saw as only benefitting foreign companies and the Philippine 
elite, SSM in Balabag was seen, not only by MOSSMA but by the majority involved, as an attempt to 
create local development that acted in the best interests of the local people.  Yet despite the lofty vision of 
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!  In the chapter following this I will explore the long term outcomes that resulted from Balabag after it was claimed 71
by TVIRD.  There I will inquire as to how many of the ‘successes’ seen in Balabag were able to be maintained 
without the lucrative SSM community.
an egalitarian space, its production of social and economic space was based on a capitalist mode of 
production and brought with it the class conflict and exploitation inherent in that system.  The economic 
nationalism discourse presented by MOSSMA, while providing for increased opportunities for 
socioeconomic mobility within that specific SSM community, remained limited in its ability to affect large 
scale regional development. !
 As Philip Kelly (1997:153) wrote, “rather than viewing the local and global, or place and space, as 
distinct scales, they should instead be seen as ‘nested’”.  Within this nested viewpoint the lack of support 
on a state level for SSM, and the constant threat of Balabag’s takeover by the local subsidiary of Canada’s 
TVI-Pacific was a ticking clock counting down to the end of MOSSMA operations.  These multiscalar 
influences helped shape the form capitalism took, and the consciously or not, helped inform the 
motivations of the different actors within. 
Figure 1.4: An image of the mountain range connected to Mt. Balabag (which is obscured by the trees 
on the right).  !!!!!
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AGRARIAN TRANSFORMATIONS !
 The economic system of the Philippines was shaped throughout the colonial period and 
legitimized in the modern day through neocolonial policies established post-independence and 
consistently reaffirmed through trade agreements both on state to state and intrastate levels. The national 
elite also tend to be the largest landowners and use this to control the export-based economy, this is the 
basis for their political power.  This has been the political economy of the nation since independence 
(Krinks 2002).  Thus at its core class divisions in the country remain embedded in land ownership: !
In lowland rural areas, then, a hierarchical social system of tenancy and subtenancy was 
established that fostered an elite class of land-owners and various subordinate classes of 
farmers and peasants.  American rule (1898-1946), emerging from the Spanish-American war 
in the late 19th century, enhanced this class structure as lands controlled by the religious 
orders were distributed among provincial elites. A social hierarchy based essentially on land 
ownership was thus reaffirmed and given new political legitimacy through the electoral 
system in the early twentieth century. This highly inequitable social structure persists today, 
although supplemented by a growing middle class and new wealth in the industrial and 
service sectors (Kelly 1997:155). !
 Previous to SSM on Balabag the majority of those involved (from top financiers to the labourer) 
were involved in agricultural production, with the majority being landless peasants who performed 
agricultural labour for landowners or indigenous Subanen with a subsistence economy based on swidden 
agriculture.  Similar to much of the remote rural areas of the country, the region retained what the Marxian 
inspired Philippine Left call a “semi-feudal” mode of production (Aguilar 1989, Putzel 1995) referring to 
the major class division between the landowners and peasants.  Elements of feudalism remained within the 
system while at the same time being embedded in an overall system of imperialist capitalism.  While 
peasant day labourers did receive wages and so were technically ‘proletarian,’ their limited education and 
skill set made agricultural work the only employment most were able to acquire, and so they retained 
many feudalistic elements to their class, which was why I retain the usage of the term “peasant”.  In 
writing about the peasantry as a class in the Philippines Tadem describes the peasant economy as “a form 
of incipient capitalism, represented by petit commodity production” (Tadem 2012:68). These poor 
peasants can also be subdivided into indigenous and non-indigenous groupings, with the indigenous being 
further subdivided into those that lived in rural lowland communities with setter families, and those who 
lived in the highlands in primarily Subanen communities.  The highland Subanen had a mixed economy 
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that combined swidden agriculture with occasional day labour and the selling of highland goods at 
lowland markets to supplement their income. !
 The majority of the landowning families who became involved in SSM were small  landowners 
relative to the larger hacienda owning families, and correspondingly had much less capital.  These were 
what Lenin called the “middle peasants  ” and were classified as precarious petit bourgeois elements in 72
threat of being transformed into a wage-working rural proletariat (Tadem 2012:71).  In the Diplahan and 
Bayog areas my interview respondents (both from the peasants and land-owners) estimated the land assets 
of most landlord families under twenty hectares, with many (including all those who eventually became 
mining capitalists in Balabag) owning under ten.  Most of the top mining capitalists in Balabag were not 
only small landowners but also had small businesses prior to mining, the most common being the produce 
buyer/sellers who roamed the rural interior in trucks to buy from farms.  These products were then sold to 
the large agricultural businesses of the regional elite, the large rice mills and agricultural industries.  It was 
in this environment that small landowning petit bourgeois families like that of Magic Six found an 
opportunity in mining to rise above their pre-Balabag socioeconomic stations. !
 For the most part the initial mine owners in Balabag tended to come from petit bourgeois small 
landowning families, while the vast majority of the mine labourers came from poor peasant and/or 
indigenous families.  Beyond class positions and levels of higher economic capital, the small landowning 
families (middle peasants) tended to have higher educational levels, with most having attended at least 
some college, as well as having had better social network connections.  The poor peasant labourers had 
low levels of educational completion with the majority having not completed elementary school, and their 
poor social networks made them more reliant on finding local benefactors—which as we shall see, helped 
recreate within SSM some of the feudalistic elements found in agricultural work. !
 The maturing of SSM in Balabag developed with it a combination of major changes to the class 
standing of the “Magic Six”, and increased economic capital for the majority.  After the establishment of 
the Six a glass ceiling formed that blocked attempts to crack the upper tier, but other petit bourgeois 
middle peasants were able earn improved livelihoods, and even some labourers were eventually able to 
rise to the ranks of small mine owners.  Contrary to life under semi-feudal agrarian production, my 
interviewees tended to agree that life under SSM was improving. At the least economic capital was being 
earned at significantly higher rates, and over the course of the almost twenty years of SSM on Balabag 
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!  Lenin in analyzing rural conditions in the late 19th century noted a “peasant differentiation”: the well-to-do 72
peasants, the middle peasants, and the poor peasants. The rich peasants were a rural capitalist class while the poor 
peasants were transformed into a wage-working rural proletariat.
socioeconomic mobility   was experienced— so that even former poor peasants turned mine labourers 73
were able to become small mine owners themselves.  It was the indigenous Subanen that found upward 
mobility the most difficult to traverse, but here too a small number were able to improve their class 
standings within SSM.   !
 These capitalist success stories somewhat mirrored the process of historical primitive 
accumulation when the commons were seized by capitalist interests, and the labour power of peasants 
forced into the market (Marx, Capital, Part VIII, Chapter XXVI). In Balabag the merchant classes (here 
led by the petit bourgeois “Six”) transformed themselves into new extractive capitalists through the 
dispossession and capitalization of the land of the indigenous Subanen community living on Mt Balabag. 
The new SSM enterprise attracted poor peasants from across the region hoping to find more lucrative 
salaried work in the mines—the class relationship was transformed from peasant-landowner to mine 
owner-labourer, and it retained elements of that semi-feudal past. !
 To put an economic context to earnings in SSM, two members   of the Magic Six personally 74
estimated that by 2011 (the year before the end of SSM on Balabag) up to 20 percent of the establishments 
were owned by their family.  They estimated that at a minimum they earned a net PhP10 million 
($280,000 Cdn) a month in personal gold sales alone (further earnings came from interest payments on 
loans, the buying of gold from other miners, and other business dealings). Conversations with second tier 
owners put their monthly gross earnings at up to two or three million. This was on very rare occasions and 
for only the largest of the small mine owners, most earned much less.Though they added that their 
expenses, especially in terms loan repayments,reclaimed a majority of that income. Labourers on the other 
hand estimated earnings from PhP6000 to 10,000 a month, though for tunnel miners this figure rose in 
excess of PhP200,000 a month with a “lucky strike”.  These earnings should be contrasted to the regional 
average monthly income of agricultural workers of PhP2800  . 75!!!!!
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!  “Mobility” in the sense of improvement within Kelly’s multi-dimensional concept of ‘class’ and relatedly in life 73
chances and perceived quality of life.  While this was not a universal improvement, it was perceived by respondents 
to have been much improved over the previous agricultural lives they lived.
!  A married couple.74
!  Php1000 = $21 Cdn approx.75
DIVISION OF LABOUR !
 Before I enter into a discussion of the class divisions and the class conflict that arose in Balabag 
let me quickly introduce the division of labour that made up economic activity in Balabag.  Most of the 
work was done by men.  In this “gold rush” site most of the population did not consider this their 
“home”and left their families in their communities of origin in the lowlands  .  In the brackets next to job 76
titles I list the number of interviews conducted with each. !
1) The Financiers (5)   provided capital financing to all the lower levels, from providing large scale 77
loans (up to millions of pesos) to investors wanting to open plants and mills, to smaller loans to the 
labourers.  This latter category worked as cash advances given every month to the different types of 
workers.  This advance came in the form of both cash or in-kind support. The in-kind advance was 
provided by the local shops/restaurants owned by the financiers who would tally items ‘purchased’ 
and have that amount deducted from their monthly earnings  .  Often workers were also housed in the 78
buildings of financiers and thus a monthly room and board was also deducted.  The biggest financiers 
in Balabag were the Magic Six, though there were also approximately twenty smaller financiers who 
were made up of both the top second tier mine owners and some outsiders that arrived in Balabag 
when it became widely known to be highly profitable.  These outside financiers were seen by many to 
be taking advantage of the less fortunate as they charged higher levels of interest than the Six.   !
2) The CIP Plant Owners (16)   had the ability to refine mine waste (from their own mills or from 79
another mill owner who did not own a plant of their own).  This used the Carbon-in-Pulp (CIP) 
process of gold extraction from the waste products of the rod mill process.  Until late in the lifespan 
of the Balabag SSM, MOSSMA limited ownership of plants to the Six which helped consolidate their 
power and wealth as plants provided the largest return of profit at the lowest expense.  Rod mills were 
only able to extract 25 percent of the gold from the raw ore with the remainder lost in the waste 
material.  This waste could then be reprocessed and extracted through the use of CIP plants.  The Six 
each owned and operated between ten to thirty plants.  It was only in 2010 when MOSSMA finally 
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!  There were some exceptions as some women did come up to work as well, and there were women mine owners 76
and financiers, and of course there was the original Subanen population.  However, the vast majority of the 
population at any given time was male.
!  The numbers in the brackets indicate how many of the interviewees were from each category.77
!  Prices were often inflated and were cheaper to buy independently for those not reliant on financing for their daily 78
needs.
!  Most of these owners were only able to invest in CIP plants beginning in 2010.79
allowed other mine owners to operate  CIP plants of their own.  By the time TVIRD claimed the site 
in the fall of 2012 no other owner had more than three.  It was estimated by one (non-Six) CIP plant 
owner that the cost for the equipment to set up a plant was approximately PhP200,000. !
3) The Rod Mill Owners (16)   were the most common type of local mining capitalist. By Fall 2012 80
one MOSSMA insider estimated that there were approximately eighty mill owners.  Compared with 
financing and plant ownership this was the most fraught with risk and had the smallest profit margin. 
A rod mill basically uses a series of encased cast iron drums that machine tumble (much like a 
washing machine drum laying on its side) with metal rods inserted to crush ore into a powder.  Once 
in this sandy state, mercury was added to collect the gold, and this product was then finished with a 
blowtorch to separate the metals.  As outlined above, only 25 percent of the gold was captured by the 
use of mercury in the milling process, leaving a majority of the gold in the waste product.  Equipment 
for milling was also very expensive and in need of regular replacement due to the erosiveness of the 
milling process.  Add to this the expense of mercury and the unpredictability of the quality of ore 
from the various tunnels in the region and the risks for mill owners pile up.  Interviews with owners 
had a common complaint that if their mill operator (the labourer who runs the machines) was 
inexperienced or careless, expenses could easily outweigh gains through the abuse of machinery or 
overuse of mercury (which was very expensive).  The estimated cost for ten of the milling drums 
(where the ore was crushed) was PhP1.5 million pesos, and these needed to be replaced every six to 
eight months.  The Six each operated two to three hundred drums, while the other operators normally 
had no more than sixty.  Rod mill and plant owners tended to also own the tunnels, though there were 
independent tunnel owners (I don’t include this as a separate category as I was only able to interview 
one independent tunnel owner). !
4) The Labourers (25)   make up the largest number and had the most differentiation.  There were eight 81
types that fall into this category.  
a) The tunnel miner (13) (“abantero”) did the physical labour of working underground in the 
tunnels. They dug out large chunks of ore with a combination of explosives and manual tools. 
There were approximately eighty to one hundred productive tunnels (and hundreds more that were 
unproductive) by 2012 according to MOSSMA officials.  Up to one hundred and fifty abantero 
worked each tunnel (in shifts).  The range of expected monthly earnings was between PhP9000 to 
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!  Some of these Mill owners were former labourers and thus were only able to invest in a rod mill in the last years of 80
SSM on Balabag.
!  Some of the labourers I spoke with did not specify their specific task, and there was also overlap as some labourers 81
did multiple jobs over their time in Balabag.
PhP50,000, however on large ore strikes this number could go beyond PhP200,000.  The amount 
earned was based on a 40:60 split between miner and financier based on the amount of gold (and 
other precious metals) gathered in the rod milling process  . 82
b) The “atrasero (1)” was the hauler of rocks out of tunnel to a nearby collecting area.  Each tunnel 
had approximately five to thirty haulers. They earned PhP25 per sack of ore they brought out and 
could earn up to PhP500 a day.  This was one of the jobs mostly occupied by transient workers, 
those coming to Balabag for a short time period to supplement their agricultural income and by the 
physically weaker members of the community (the elderly, women, and even children). 
c) In collecting areas, “breakers (4)” would use manual tools to break the rocks into smaller pieces. 
They earned the same amount as the atrasero, approximately PhP25 per sack of crushed ore.  They 
could earn up to Php500 a day.  From there the ore would be transported to the rod mill.  This was 
another of the jobs mostly occupied by transient workers and by the physically weaker members of 
the community. 
d) Rod mill “operators (4)” were charged with operating the machines that made up the first step of 
the refining process (as mentioned previously, this process extracted 25 percent of the metals 
found in the ore). They would ensure the machines were working optimally, and were responsible 
for milling process and the adding of mercury in the final stage to collect the metals. They earned 
PhP500-P1000 per twenty four hour shift, depending on experience. They worked alternating 
shifts and earned PhP7500 to 15,000 a month. 
e) Cargo transporters (10) (“kargadors”) did the heavy labour of bringing goods to Balabag from 
the barangays below.  As an isolated sitio that had no road access for most of its lifespan, the early 
transporters used manual labour to physically carry everything from foodstuffs to the materials and 
equipment needed for mining.  They used a device that distributed the weight of each load 
(approximately fifty to two hundred pounds depending on the capability of the carrier) on their 
necks, shoulders and backs. They earned approximately PhP250-500 per trip (the hike from the 
lower barangays to Balabag took approximately three hours).  After 2008 a road was constructed 
by the exploration teams of TVIRD which MOSSMA also used until 2011 when the road was 
closed to them and manual transport again became the norm. 
f) The “Peace Guard (0),” were the internal armed security employed by MOSSMA.  Their role was 
to protect ore stocks from the workers.  Stolen ore benefitted the ‘thief’ as it could be sold to a 
different owner thereby not being “deducted” for financing.  There were approximately eighty to 
one hundred in Balabag, approximately one per tunnel.  They had their room and board paid for 
and were given a monthly commission of PhP10,000 paid for my MOSSMA.  Despite their name, 
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!  This is similar the the “usual” sharing scheme as presented in an article on bulaltat.com, and better than the 30:70 82
split in SSM on Mt.Diwalwal (Rey and Saturay 2005:13)
they were not officially the community police.  It should be noted that while in interviews with 
MOSSMA they maintained that the guard was limited to small caliber arms like single shot 
shotguns, when the government forces raided Balabag to close down SSM in 2012 they claimed to 
have discovered thirteen high powered firearms including an M-16 rifle and KG9 submachine gun 
(Mindanao Examiner 2013).  Interviews with some labourers did confirm that they were aware 
that the large financiers protected their compounds with high-powered firearms, though they did 
not elaborate further. 
g) And finally there was the “monitoring team (0).”  They were a specialized team that were tasked 
with quality control for the processed ore to be sold outside the community.  They tended to have 
other jobs as well and were selected based on the trust of the MOSSMA administration. They were 
given a monthly commission of PhP6000.   
Figure 1.5: The SSM community on Balabag (photo courtesy of MOSSMA). !!
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OTHER LIVELIHOODS IN BALABAG !
 I should also note that other forms of entrepreneurship and employment existed in Balabag.  The 
most common other types requiring relatively large capital include: owners of large general stores (some 
of these “sari-sari” stores were colloquially referred to as “department stores” in some interviews due to 
their size and the range of products available), restaurants/bars (also colloquially referred to in interviews 
as “videoke bars”), and gold buyer-sellers.  On the lower end of the spectrum there were also individual 
roving vendors of foodstuffs (cooked and raw), and the usual small “sari-sari” community shops usually 
accessed from a window of a private home.  There also existed a strong black market for illegal vices (e.g. 
drugs, prostitution, and the illegal lottery (“jueteng”)). There was some overlap between all these forms of 
entrepreneurship, as for example many general store owners were also small gold buyers, and the top 
capitalists also had general stores.  But there were also many independent business people (e.g. the 
videoke bar owners) who came to Balabag after it became profitable to find a niche of their own. 
MOSSMA officials I spoke with distanced their operations from large alcohol-serving establishments as 
they were also known for their connections to prostitution and drugs.   !
 Gold buyers were an important part of this chain.  At the top were the Magic Six who required 
gold to be sold to them by those they financed and who also bought gold from the smaller gold buyers in 
the community.  The small gold buyers would buy from local miners who either were not part of a 
financier-miner relationship, or who wanted to bypass the relationship and sell gold obtained ‘illegally’ 
from work they did for a financier.  The top gold buyers reported that they would transport the gold to be 
sold to the Central Bank of the Philippines (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP)) in Zamboanga or Davao 
cities.  “Black market” trading was not reported to me by any interview respondents though this does not 
mean that it did not exist.  There were reports of independent gold buyers that periodically visited Balabag 
though as they were not local I was not able to speak with any of them.  In other SSM sites in central and 
southern Mindanao it has been reported that,  !
Black market traders would usually visit the community or are based in the community. 
Purchase price is lower in the black market but the miners save the cost of transportation in 
going to [sell to the BSP]. Sometimes, the owners of processing plants are part of the black 
market. Because of the savings in transportation, miners are encouraged to sell their gold to 
the black market (AFRIM 2012:14). !!!
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CLASS STRUGGLE !
 SSM in Balabag represented itself as a space where hard workers found success, as a 2011 
MOSSMA pamphlet outlining the benefits of SSM noted,  !
there are already numbers of local people who have accumulated wealth and improved their 
living conditions, expanded and diversified their investments or businesses  and thereby also 
helped other people through employment in the different business endeavours that they have 
entered into outside the mine site (MOSSMA 2011  ). 83!
Yet along side this official line of thought it was common for most of my interviewees, labourers and 
owners alike, to recognize that (as one small owner adeptly told me), “in Balabag it was about capital, if 
you had big capital you made big earnings.  If you had money you made money, but you need the 
capital” (interview July 2015).  Balabag helped release individuals from the agricultural semi-feudal 
system, but it ushered in new forms of capitalist antagonism resulting in class struggle.  !
 In discussing class struggle it should be kept in mind that I am not merely using the traditional 
Marxian definition of ‘class’ (referring to an individuals location within an economic order within the 
means of production). As discussed in chapter two, class is differentiated within the four dimensions of 
position, process, performance, and politics (Kelly 2012a, 2012b, 2012c).  In doing this I will be able to 
examine the appearance of intra-class fragmentation (‘class’ here referring to class-as-position), as well as 
how different axes of difference (especially as regards ethnicity) can lead to class groupings different from 
that which would be found if limited to economic location. The relationships between classes, the class 
processes, will be seen as not only derived from class positions, but created through the construction of 
another forms of difference. !!
THE MAGIC SIX vs SMALL MINE OWNERS !
 Despite their personal views of themselves as “moral leaders  ” and as a boon to the community, 84
the Six—as the established local bourgeois elite—sought (by nature of their class interests) to control the 
top means of production and thus their abilities to maximize profit. This included intra-class fragmentation 
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!  From a MOSSMA pamphlet entitled “MONTE DE ORO.... THE LAND, THE MINE, THE PEOPLE... still, the 83
continuing struggle!” Document obtained from a former MOSSMA official. 
!  These is an exact quote from an interview with one of the Six on July 2014.84
with the other mine owners.  The shared class-as-position status of mine owners did not necessarily create 
commonality of interests, processes, and outcomes.  Instead, having modelled SSM on the landowner-
peasant relationship of the semi-feudal countryside, the Balabag elite   sought to maintain economic and 85
political control of the most productive investments. The Six were able to gain early economic power 
through the advantages of being early big investors (and thus having a ‘head start’ in accumulating 
profits). They gained political control via leadership in MOSSMA and through successful election 
victories at the barangay level local government unit (LGU)  .  These political successes also 86
demonstrated class-as-performance as they were able to take political power with the support of the 
community.  These advantages helped the Six enforce and legitimize their dominance over the rest of the 
community, even (and maybe especially) over the small and medium mine owners.   !
 The emergence of intra-class fragmentation between the elite and the other mine owners was 
based on a growing feeling of unfairness felt by the latter group as Balabag SSM matured.  The medium 
and small owners (measured by the amount of investment into mining capital) expressed great frustration 
that despite their hard work and large capital investments they   tended to have left Balabag with millions 87
in pesos of debt.  They spoke of manipulation by the elite to frustrate their attempts at furthering their 
investments, and thus profits, during the years of small scale mining.  While none would assign direct 
conscious blame (as in no one expressed any malicious intent by the Six), all (to varying extents) realized 
that limits to their success were imposed by the Six.  This manipulation was mostly seen in the Six’s 
control of MOSSMA and MOSSMA’s restricting of CIP plant ownership to the elite, or as they call it “the 
top miners”.  They also pointed to the lack of regulations on tunnel creation, elite control over sales of 
explosives and chemicals, and generally to the financier-financed relationship which tied purchases and 
sales to a single financier. MOSSMA’s management of SSM was also blamed for poor waste disposal 
which was seen to contribute to a damaged environment and local health issues.  Many expressed a desire 
for stronger regulations but cited both a lack of knowledge about best practices, and not being able to go 
against the tide on their own as to do so as an individual would only hurt the ability to profit and to 
compete. Further, they reported to me that they saw these problems as part of why SSM lost its 
government support.  There were many “if only MOSSMA had” statements in my interviews that point to a 
subtle jab at the elite who became extremely wealthy despite the difficulties faced by the other owners. !
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!  The “Magic Six” individuals who were friends and family.85
!  A member of the Six always held the barangay captain position as well as kagawad (councillor) positions.86
!  This is based on the interviews I conducted within the communities I visited.  I wish to note a limitation in that 87
there may have been other smaller capitalists that succeeded that I never had a chance to interview.  But with those I 
spoke to, they saw their stories as common.
 I spoke of Ibon’s family history earlier in this chapter, and her story was used as an example of a 
petit bourgeois family who entered Balabag before the establishment of the Six yet was unable to take a 
place in the community elite.  In this section Ibon will also help highlight the issues faced by small and 
medium capitalists under the Six.  Unlike Ginto, Ibon was unable to secure loans from a friends and 
family network and so he took on a financier amongst the Six to set up his rod mill in 1999. By the end of 
Balabag SSM he would operate thirty drums in his mill. Ibon earned a personal estimate of PhP30-40,000 
a month net after paying off his monthly dues to his financier in the Six. This number would occasionally 
rise up to six figures on a large gold strike.   !
 In my interviews with the members of the Six, they spoke highly of their attempts to help finance 
all those that were capable to open up rod mills. They spoke of how they were happy to give out loans and 
to ‘help’ the community. What was never directly spoken of was how this benefitted them as the big 
financiers. Ibon spoke of not only the debt but of the frustration related to the inefficiency of the rod mill 
process which held the highest upfront costs and thus the greatest financial risks.  The financiers benefited 
from this inefficiency as part of their loan agreement was the exclusive right to purchase a mill’s gold and 
to process a rod mill’s waste product:  !
…thirty drums cost almost one million pesos! It was only [in Balabag] that I experienced 
having a debt for one million. The financiers [the Six] don’t have to worry about debt because 
they [just make loans and then they] buy our products, and [since at first we weren’t allowed 
CIP plants] they were able to process our waste. !
Without a Carbon-in-Pulp (CIP) plant of their own 75 percent of the valuable metals found in the ore 
became waste products which were provided to the Six to process themselves. !
 Near Ibon’s home (in the lowlands at the base of Mt. Balabag) there lay large sturdy rusting metal 
cones eight or nine feet high.  They stuck out like a sore thumb in the rural agricultural backdrop of the 
community, rusted husks acting as a reminder of former industry.  At the time I didn’t know what they 
were.  In speaking with Ibon I learned that these were the heart of his CIP plant—an investment they were 
not able to make until late 2010 or early 2011, just over one and a half years before the closing down of 
SSM in Balabag.  Ibon had had them shipped here from the mountain at great cost as he had hoped that his 
displacement was some kind of mistake, that the courts or the government or even the large scale mining 
company would hear the pleas of the small-scale miners and allow them back.  Ibon’s exuberant 
personality quieted when speaking of the CIP plant situation. !
!81
 It wasn’t until late 2010 or early 2011 that he was able to set up his own CIP plant (with loans 
from his financier in the Six) as up until 2009   MOSSMA restricted plant ownership to the top miners 88
(the Magic Six).  Ibon shares this account of how the issue of CIP plants galvanized a form of class-as-
politics within the smaller owners: !
You see it was like this sir, they didn't allow us to have plants before. […] The organization 
[MOSSMA], they controlled it.  They said it's not good to have so many plants, it should just 
be a few, because it's difficult to regulate if there were a lot. […] Some discovered that it was 
a big money maker and they broke with MOSSMA and they set up plants anyway.  Because 
those with rod mills they had to rely on those with plants, so we were not able to make that 
much.  And we had such big debts!  Some, they already were getting bigger, and they just set 
up plants. And we all started copying!  How could they control it?  So they gave in. !
It was somewhere around 2009 that the first one went up, something like that.  Then others 
just followed suit.  Oh, in the beginning the financiers [the Six] got angry.  But they couldn't 
control the people. Because some [outsiders] had businesses to buy gold, to sell chemicals, 
[these other financiers outside of the Six] said ok I'll give you a loan to set up.  So people 
were able to do it. !
Because just having a rod mill was tough.  The capital costs were high.  That's why I said, we 
really were relying on loans from [our financier in the Six].  Then later [after the plant] we 
were doing better, but it was too late, we had to leave [because of TVIRD].   !
That's how we found out [that plants were] why they [the Six] got rich.  That's it. From the 
plant really.  Because if it's just the ball mill, the expense was high.  The ball mill, when your 
drum [wears down] you need to buy another.  With the plant you just spend money once to 
set it up.  Every year, it just keeps on going.  That's where the money was.  You don't make 
that much out of the ball mill. !
[…] In Balabag [in the last two years] the financiers started giving loans [left and right] so 
more people could set up ball mills and plants.  They [the smaller owners] thought they were 
going to get rich, but all the money they earned went back to the financiers.  The people 
ended up with lots of debt [because Balabag SSM ended]… (interview July 2015). 
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!  The year TVIRD finalized their purchase of the MPSA for Mt. Balabag from Zamboanga Minerals Corp (ZMC).88
!
Years of successful mining had drastically increased the amount of available labour and the constant 
discovery of new gold veins on site had improved the capital holdings of small and medium capitalists. 
This provided the smaller capitalists leverage to force the Six to relaxing restrictions at first by bypassing 
them entirely to get financing elsewhere.  The Six conceded and even became promoters of CIP plant 
ownership so as to ensure their roles as the top financiers, but this does demonstrate a successful 
grassroots action by smaller owners. !
 The Six, however, were also (perhaps accidental) beneficiaries of this change.  In 2009 TVIRD 
secured the licenses necessary to develop the MPSA they had purchased from Zamboanga Minerals 
Corporation (ZMC), and TVIRD made it clear in their company memos to shareholders (as posted on their 
website www.tvird.com.ph) that they intended to take full control of Mt. Balabag and remove the “illegal” 
miners.  According to MOSSMA documents 2010 also saw the beginning of accusations of “divide and 
conquer” techniques from TVIRD to break apart the SSM community. Thus the financing of expensive 
CIP plants to smaller owners meant strengthening ties to their financiers through the acquisition of greater 
loans, and more plants meant that more gold could be extracted in a shorter period of time—gold that 
would be sold to the Six.  MOSSMA and the Six had been in embroiled in a legal battle with the 
multinational for years, and by 2009, the tide was swinging out of their favour.  It was also at this time that 
the Six began to refocus the bulk of their investments outside of the community (this included large rice 
mills, hotels, retail and other service businesses, plans to run for political office in the 2013 elections, 
etc.). !
 If the difficulties felt by those smaller owners who came from a petit bourgeois background before 
SSM were already harsh, so much more for those few who through grit and determination were able to 
save and invest their earnings as a labourer in an attempt to rise above their class.  This effort took many 
years, and in time some were able to achieve their goals—with the ‘help’ of loans from the Six.  Yet as 
they tended to became mine owners late into the lifespan of SSM in Balabag they ended up putting the 
majority of their accumulated capital into this task.  When plant ownership was promoted, they saw this as 
a great opportunity and dangerously went into deeper debt at a time when the TVIRD takeover was 
looming.  As one Subanen individual who was only able to enter into rod mill ownership in 2009, and then 
two years later acquired further loans for a CIP plant, told me:  !
if only we had been given a real warning of TVIRD’s entry I wouldn’t have spent the money 
on the plant and equipment.  I’d just have brought it to town and started a business there, I’d 
be ok now.  There was notice given [by TVIRD about the imminent takeover] in 2011 to [my 
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financier in the Six], but he assured us it would be fine.  We little people believed [him]… 
Don’t worry, [he] said, but after he just left us.  It’s us that suffered.  [He’s] fine now though, 
he was rich already [before 2011].  Not like us (interview July 2014). !
 For the SSM capitalists this intra-class fragmentation was indirectly implied in our discussions, 
but the above was closest they came to blaming the Six for their difficulties. Their most common 
complaint was that MOSSMA waited too long to relax the monopoly on plants.  They also expressed the 
above frustration in not being fully aware of the threat of TVIRDs entry as MOSSMA always projected 
confidence that they were positively advancing in their legal struggles and in negotiations with the LSM. 
The relaxing of plant ownership regulations was seen at the time as a success for smaller mine owners, yet 
in speaking with them in 2014 they spoke of how their decisions to enter into plant ownership resulted 
only in millions of pesos of debt.  And within their post-Balabag state of affairs, they felt that they would 
be in debt for years, if not a lifetime.  This brought remorse to many, as they felt that if not for that 
decision they may have left Balabag with money in their pockets. !
 At the end of the day, however they do not express direct blame on the Six and saw the failure of 
SSM as the result of mismanagement.  They viewed the problem as based on an attitude of “first come 
first served,” where immediate profit came at the expense of long term planning. They spoke to me of how 
if only SSM was more responsible with environmental compliance, and with ensuring that they complied 
with the legal frameworks, then Balabag would still be theirs.  They saw this lack of regulation as driving 
a ‘gold rush’ mentality which put the environment and the people second eventually leading the 
government to close them down:   !
It’s kind of the fault of small scale you see, [we miners] had become irresponsible, [our] 
tunnels—there were no regulations regarding distance.  Also there… was no care for the 
tunnels.  The tunnels went this way and that, there was no regulation.  The people just talked 
and talked about the problems, but no one stepped up to fix them.  You see this was how it 
was with SSM from my point of view, it was about money, money, money.  The hunt for 
money.  … With small-scale everyone wanted to get rich and no one wanted to spend money 
[to improve the conditions] (June 2014).  !!!!!
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OWNERS vs WORKERS !
 This most basic form of capitalist class conflict, between the labourers and the owners of the 
means of production, was an evolution from the relations between landowner and peasant.  This conflict 
was not as consciously felt and expressed as the intra-class struggle above, as the labourers did feel that 
they were earning more than they had before and thus expressed general contentment about SSM.  But 
beyond how people consciously assessed the situation, class conflict could be seen in the way the classes 
treated each other and how they performed perceived class roles.  Ethnicity  further divided the labourers 
into those of indigenous and non-indigenous descent, with those in the former category also having 
experienced discrimination based on the perception of their being less capable and less reliable.  As noted 
by Philip Kelly, when “individuals from a particular ethnic group… find themselves disproportionately 
represented in deeply exploitative employment relationships, then a class process is being constituted 
through the construction of another form of difference” (Kelly 2012a:56). !
 Class conflict was also seen to have manifested itself with the importation of modified feudalistic 
elements from the agricultural, land-based relationships that dominate the regional economy.  Some of 
these elements include the profit sharing found in sharecropping having been translated into extractive 
production, and in the system of patronage.  The latter can be seen in the benefits of being employed 
directly by the Six.  The Six were able to provide not only incentives like higher pay, but would also 
support long-time workers with support for health care, and the education of their children. In at least one 
example a long time operator who was ‘gifted’ a rod mill for his service after a decade, and he went on to 
become a moderately successful small owner himself.  Members of the Six I interviewed proudly spoke of 
how they had helped put some of their employee’s children through school,   !
Off and on [I paid for] about 15 to go to school.  Some would stop because they weren't 
interested, but I put them in school.  [One kid, her] parents were workers of mine [so I 
helped] raise her, I put her through school!  That one got to college and that’s rare.  She's like 
my kid, whatever she needs I’m here (interview July 2014). !
This system of patronage   was both a boon for their employees, but also for their patrons in the Six as it 89
helped shape their image as pillars of the community, and ensured them support within barangay and 
MOSSMA politics. !
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   This form of patronage is also seen in the semi-feudal agricultural system: “Occasionally, as part of their 89
patronage, landlords paid for the schooling of tenants’ children who showed promise (Krinks 2002: 117).”
 As noted earlier there were a wide variety of labourers in Balabag. Due to the limitations of whom 
I interviewed, I will focus mostly on the rod mill operators and the tunnel miners. I will discuss the role 
ethnicity played at the end of this section on class struggle. !
1) Owners and Operators: !
 Operators were charged with the responsibility of implementing the rod mill refining process and 
were paid between PhP500 and PhP1000 a day based on experience and/or the size of the rod mill 
operation.  The smaller the mill owner, the less they could pay operators and this meant that the best and 
most experienced operators tended to be employed 
by the Six.  Operators generally worked alternating 
24 hour shifts (one full day of work followed by 
one full day off) for two full weeks, followed by a 
two week layoff when another operator would take 
their place.  In the working weeks they would live 
in Balabag, often living in a small dorm at the mill 
itself, followed by two weeks back in their home 
communities with their families. There were also 
“full-time” options, but most preferred this 
schedule. They tended to be men who had some 
high school education, as there was skill required 
and the owners saw a basic level of education as a 
demonstration of this.  Some of the job hazards 
interviewees spoke of included: constant noise 
(which resulted in some speaking of a long term 
effect on their hearing), constant exposure to toxic 
chemicals (“no one used gloves or other safety 
equipment” said one interviewee), and the constant 
threat of accidents resulting from exhaustion and/or 
exposed machine parts.   
 Figure 1.6: A rod mill in operation  !
 These difficult working conditions meant that burn out was common (especially in the smaller 
mills that provided less pay and ‘benefits’), and few stayed for long continuous periods, which was a 
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source of frustration to mine owners.  Small mill owners recounted with frustration how they were able to 
support poor farmers but implied that their help did not elicit loyalty: !
They were content there. They were able to earn money every day!  And when they had 
enough money they went back home to where they're from.  And when they need money 
again?  They came back (interview July 2014). !
Occasionally operators would not return on schedule which necessitated the hiring of less qualified or 
experienced operators.  This was a source of financial strain for smaller owners as new employees needed 
to be taught new skills.  Inexperienced (or “careless” as they were sometimes called) operators were 
blamed for being wasteful with the application of mercury, either by adding too much, or at the wrong 
point in the process.  At PhP7500 a kilogram, mercury was the biggest daily expense for mill owners. 
“Half a kilo a day would be wasted if the operator was not careful,” said one such small owner.  Small 
owners linked these issues to the wealth extracted from them by their financiers, “that’s why we had such 
big loans from the financier… and they’re not afraid to loan it to you!  In this way they get a cut from all 
of our equipment and products!  The financiers didn’t care if there was waste.”  Here again we see 
elements of the intra-class struggle between owners, first with the financier - financed relationship 
between large and smaller mine owners, and second with the large owners able to pay greater salaries to 
operators and through it able to employ the more skilled operators.  !
 For the operator however, their concern was simply that they were able to earn enough for the 
wants and the needs of their families.  The success of SSM in Balabag meant that there was always a 
demand for their labour.  This was especially true during the final years of SSM when operations rapidly 
expanded with the relaxation of MOSSMA regulations, including the growth in mill ownership.  Since 
mills were in regular need of experienced operators, there was little incentive for workplace loyalty for 
operators who worked for the second tier mill owners.  It was not surprising that many often expressed 
their agency in the form of setting their own comings and goings. Thus despite how owners would speak 
emphatically of how they had helped poor individuals with little to no formal education.  !
2) Owners and Tunnel Miners: !
 Tunnel miners were more numerous than the operators due to the heavy manual labour nature of 
the work, and due to the many unregulated tunnels in Balabag.  As discussed in an earlier section, 
although there were a limited number of productive tunnels, there were a countless number of tunnelling 
attempts.  For the majority of MOSSMA’s operations each tunnel had an ‘owner’ which tended to be one 
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of local capitalists   due to the costs involved in all stages of mining.  Alongside the relaxing of plant 90
ownership, tunnel ownership also experienced growth beginning in 2009.  These new tunnel owners 
tended to be the tunnel miners (herein referred to just as “miners”) who had amassed enough capital. 
Though technically these new tunnel owners were minor capitalists in their own right, I will be speaking 
of them in this section alongside other labourers in contrast with the mill owners, as the tunnel owners 
shared more traits in common with the labourers than with the mill owners. In this section I will refer to 
mill owners simply as “owners.” Tunnels built by miners will be referred to as “independent tunnels.” 
Here too we can see how classed performances need not correspond to class positions. Miners in 
independent tunnels had to have upfront funds to support themselves throughout the month.  Tthey often 
still had a financier in the sense of an individual to provide them loans to purchase materials and 
equipment, but these tended to be non-MOSSMA financiers. These independent financiers came from 
outside the community and provided loans at higher interest but without the usual ‘strings’ that tied 
production and purchasing into a strict one way relationship.  !
 Miners were organized into work teams who worked the tunnels in shifts and split earnings 
amongst themselves.  Financed miners were supported not only with the tools for mining but with 
everyday needs like a place to sleep (they had dorm houses for this purpose), as well as food, drink, and 
legal vices like cigarettes and alcohol.  In exchange these tunnel miners were tied to that specific owner 
and the ore extracted had to be sent to their mill.  The rod milling process determined the amount of gold 
(and other valuable minerals) that the two parties (owner and miner) split between themselves at the end 
of the month. Similar to the terms found in sharecropping, the profits were divided 40-60 (40 percent to 
the mining team, 60 to the owner)  .  For financed miners, part of the agreement was that the minerals 91
were sold to the owner and so they tended to be paid in cash.  This income was divided by the owner 
equally to each member of the team.  From these earnings a further cut would be made based on rent and 
the other everyday products used by each individual miner (a tab was kept on their purchases).  Through 
this arrangement the owners were able to recoup some of the worker’s pay in a couple ways, via the price 
they offered for the minerals extracted (which differed from owner to owner), and via inflated prices for 
goods.  For this reason, miners spoke of buying food from other community vendors in the early part of 
each pay cycle when they still had money in their pockets.  And like operators, the Six tended to see more 
loyalty as they were able to provide better buying rates as the largest gold buyers in the community. These 
factors combined were part of the incentive toward the creation of independent tunnels in the latter years 
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!  Though the Six did not monopolize tunnels, as the individuals with the most total capital they also had the most 90
productive tunnels overall—and thus also financed the greatest number of tunnel miners.
!  Though similar to the sharecropping system in agricultural labour, the split was more favourable here.  In general 91
farmers are lucky with a 50:50 split, and more commonly the landowner gets 60-70%.
of SSM when tunnel miners had accumulated enough economic capital to support their daily needs 
without financing. !
 The miners’ work was a high risk enterprise for more than the obvious safety risks associated with 
underground mining.  Financially a miner was always in a precarious situation, when one worked a new 
tunnel there was no guarantee that a high yield ore vein would be discovered and one’s earnings were 
dependent on what one was able to extract from those tunnels.  And if one worked in a productive tunnel 
there remained the issue of the earnings being divided with the owner. While my interviewees expressed 
general contentment with their earnings, when pressed some did note that the 40-60 split seemed unfair as 
the heavy labour was done by the miners and not the owners.  This was compounded by the knowledge 
that the rod mill process only extracted 25 percent of the ore, leaving 75 percent as waste product that was 
then extracted in full by CIP plant owners.  Due to this theft was always an issue, which was the rationale 
behind MOSSMA’s “Peace Guard” who protected ore stocks in both the tunnels and mills.  Stories were 
shared by mine owners of miners “stealing” bags of raw ore from tunnels so as to sell it to competing mill 
owners who would buy them at a ‘per bag’ rate.  Though the exact value within each bag was unknown 
before the refining process this was still seen as guaranteed income.  Theft became an even bigger issue 
with the growth of CIP plant ownership.  This development meant an increase in the valuable minerals 
able to be extracted, which increased the rate paid per bag.  Said one small owner: !
Do you know why [so many miners didn’t earn as much as they could have?]  A miner would 
not make a lot of money when Balabag was new and that’s because there weren't yet many 
plants. It was like this sir, this was the situation before.... there was only a little gold in each 
sack that you refine [in a rod mill], only so how can they make money from that?  But when 
there were a lot of plants, then they could earn more (interview July 2014). !
 The physical risk was also a major issue as tunnel collapse, or some other such work related 
hazard was a known and accepted issue.  One former miner who later became a small owner spoke of the 
deaths in the community.  By his unofficial personal tally, seventy-two accidental deaths occurred between 
1995 to 2011.  This issue had become of interest to him when a member of his own family died in a tunnel 
in the early years.  He recounts with sadness that though he overall supported SSM, the deaths were a 
point of contention as owners never provided compensation for deaths or accidents as it was seen as the 
result of individual carelessness.  Also many long time miners suffered health issues as the years wore on, 
but most never sought out a medical diagnosis as there was no formal health care system and so to stop 
working due to illness meant an end to one’s income. It should be noted that members of the Six did speak 
of providing workers money for medicines when they became ill, but as not all of my respondents agreed 
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this to be the case, there at least appears to be an inconsistency with how this was provided and raises 
questions of patronage.  In any case even for those provided with medicines, they would still have  had to 
stop work and that would have had financial implications. !
 This relationship between the tunnel miner and the mining capitalist who owned the tunnels began 
to break down beginning in 2009 in much the same way as the elite capitalist monopoly over CIP plants. 
The threat of TVIRD’s entry, matched with a general increase in economic capital ownership by more 
individuals, put pressure on the community to maximize earnings in as short a time as possible (which 
itself might have been part of the rationale for the relaxation of tunnel ownership). The latter issue put 
capitalists and workers at odds as more workers had enough capital to not have to rely on local financiers 
and thus were able to gamble on investments on private tunnels.  While the capitalists saw an increase in 
tunnels as both harmful to the overall management of mining but also as an opportunity to maximize 
production.  !!
WORKERS vs WORKERS !
 As with the capitalists, intra-class fragmentation existed amongst the workers as well.  Other axes 
of difference came to affect class processes and performances. While it was consistently shared by 
interviewees that all who wanted work could access work during the MOSSMA era, I will discuss here 
two recurring narratives that show that behind this lay a new form of competition brought forth by the 
introduction of SSM.  The first was the inter-ethnic tension that divided Subanen and non-Subanen 
workers and privileged non-indigenous workers. The second came late in SSM development with the 
breakdown of the relationship between labourer and mine owner.  The tension between Subanen and non-
Subanen will be discussed in detail in the following section, so here I will focus on the example of intra-
proletarian struggle during the latter stages of the MOSSMA era. !
 The worst of the problems occurred in the latter years beginning in 2009. The reoccurrence this 
year and the year following should be seen in light of 2009 being when TVIRD finalized its purchase 
requirements for the Balabag MPSA land claim.   There had been a growth of independent tunnel creation 
as miners had accumulated enough savings to afford their daily needs without a local financier. With this 
the connection between tunnel and mill ownership was no longer absolute. This gave more power to the 
miners as they could now choose where to sell their ore.  The opening up of CIP plant ownership created 
further cracks in the social system as it allowed for backdoor sales of ore bypassing their financier 
(considered ‘theft’ by the financiers).  In this climate the miners began competing for access to the most 
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lucrative tunnels and  thus maximizing personal earnings within their work team. Three major effects of 
the dissolution of the miner-financier/mill owner relationship included (1) the growth in direct violence 
(including murder), (2) the further relaxing of safety measures, (3) and the independence of work teams, 
which meant that the division of income was left to the work teams themselves.   !
 The issue of peace and order is one that has been documented in other “gold rush” type SSM 
though-out the country: !
And because of their unsystematic mining methods and cultural differences, maintaining 
peace and order [is an issue] in a gold-rush community. For instance… since the discovery of 
[gold on Mt.] Diwalwal, violence of various forms such as murders, threats, etc., have 
erupted.  An estimated number of 4000 miners have been killed in the area for the past twenty 
years (Rey and Saturay 2005:12). !
Similar issues were reported in Balabag, as one Subanen resident noted: !
In 2009 they started killing each other.  There was the grabbing of tunnels.  They said they 
didn't want others to take what’s theirs.  !
Some of them said they should count how many of them there were and just make sure all got 
a fair share, they shouldn't fight.  Others said, ‘no I don't want to share, what's mine is mine.’ 
When they earned a lot sometimes [they debated on how to share the earnings] so some 
ended up killing each other.  That way whoever was left, then it's his.  It was like that.  So 
there was a lot who died.  Some were just hit on the head.   !
[Sometimes people died out of superstition.]  They said [the deaths] would help make their 
tunnels 'high grade.'  So many died.  […] one woman, she was part of our tribe, a Subanen, 
they pushed her into a tunnel—because they said they weren't extracting anything more out 
of the tunnel, it was no longer high grade, so maybe if they deposited a person it would 
become high grade again.  Yeah, that's how it was!  And yes, they did end up extracting a lot 
of gold after.  A lot.  It was like that. !
…why did they do that?  She was just selling vegetables!   !
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There were accidents too because there were so many tunnels.  They put a tunnel under 
gardens and homes, sometimes, if there was rain, or a earthquake, the tunnel would collapse. 
Lots died (interview July 2014). !
 Connected to this rush to maximize extractive profits came the boom in tunnels, which being less 
connected to mill owners and financiers, were created haphazardly.  This had an effect on not only miners, 
but also on community safety.  As the quote above mentions, tunnellers would sometimes dig under 
homes, or even near the school (as reported in a 2012 video by the Mindanao Examiner).  The breakdown 
of the social dynamics in this period relaxed the ties that bound owner and labourer, but it created a kind 
of capitalistic anarchy which pitted workers against each other and also increased ethnic tension with the 
indigenous community whom still experienced discrimination. !!
THE ROLE OF ETHNICITY: SUBANEN & NON-SUBANEN !
 MOSSMA documents claim that “about seventy percent (70%) of the people [who were] 
employed and benefited [from] the area were the “Subanen”, the Indigenous People coming from the 
barangays of the provinces of Zamboanga Del Sur, parts of Zamboanga Sibugay, and Zamboanga Del 
Norte who were marginalized, living in the communities along the periphery of the mine area” (MOSSMA 
2011, MOSSMA 2013  ). Despite their large numbers, the indigenous peoples tended to work the lowest 92
level labour jobs: cargo, rock crushing, and tunnel mining.  This frustration was evident in many of my 
interviews with the Subanen who cited racism by the settlers who saw them as culturally inferior.  At first 
they claimed difficulty in acquiring even these menial jobs, but this eventually gave way due to the high 
demand for labour. As one interviewee noted: !
At best [we] Subanen were just there to do the heavy labour, that’s it.  But when the times 
came that we needed help, the answer would be no.  The Visayans were afraid of us Subanen, 
they thought we would poison them with magic.  Eventually, after a lot of time, we got closer 
as they got to know us, and really we got close because we would follow their orders, they 
knew we indigenous people were dependent on them.  I’m mad, that’s true, but I can’t do 
anything about it (interview July 2014).  !
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!  These were never published in any official media outlets but were distributed as pamphlets and/or delivered as 92
powerpoint presentations.  Their intended audience were the government and local, national, and international NGOs 
and activist groups.  I obtained them directly from MOSSMA officials.
 Ethnicity can be seen here as an axis of difference that impacted upon the multiple dimensions of 
class.  Despite inhabiting multiple class positions (with a small number even becoming mine owners), 
‘Subanen-ness’ acted as a form of embodied cultural capital that impacted on how the Subanen were 
perceived and how the perceived themselves.  Their classed performances (and the classed performances 
of others) were always through this lens.  And in general their ‘Subanen-ness’ was seen as a negative. The 
non-Subanen settlers exhibited a paternalistic view of the Subanen, which in practice sometimes 
manifested as a ‘sympathy’ to their poverty and status in society.  While at first fearful, their eventual 
integration in Balabag was almost seen as an act of charity where they were able to improve the lives and 
culture of the indigenous: !
In their home areas the Subanens really did suffer.  I mean they didn't really have livelihoods 
there.  What did they do?  They'd just plant a little.  But when there was Balabag, their lives 
improved. Plus there they were educated.  They became aware [‘na mumulat sila'], they were 
no longer ignorant [‘di na sila parang walang alam']. Their life standards went up because 
money was easy, they were able to eat what they were not able to before, because they could 
now buy meat and the delicious foods.  They were able to buy clothes.  So look, they were 
able to improve their lives! (Interview with a small mill owner, July 2014) 
Figure 1.7: Canatuan Subanons performing a ritual before a community gathering (Alex Felipe 2010). 
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 In contrast to the settler discrimination towards the Subanen was the view of long-time Subanen 
residents of Balabag that control of their land had been taken from them by outsiders. The land and their 
connection to it was part of their cultural capital.  Whether they actively took part in mining or not, the 
original residents specifically and the Subanen in general felt that they (1) had no power over their own 
lands, (2) were not benefitting to the extent they should be from its exploitation, and that (3) were thus 
forced into a “take it or leave it” attitude towards mining. The Subanen relationship with MOSSMA had 
long been fraught with difficulty, from the complaints of the original Subanen prospectors (as discussed in 
chapter four), to the incursion of miners into the Subanen community on Mt. Balabag, to their early 
difficulty in finding employment and their continuous experiences with discrimination.  !
 Indigenous issues were also applied by MOSSMA as part of its political strategy to legitimize its 
presence as legal small-scale miners.  Five years after SSM began, and under the shadow cast by LSM 
exploration, MOSSMA approached the Subanen to formalize a Free and Prior Consent (FPIC) agreement. 
This agreement, which included a profit sharing clause, was signed in a private meeting between 
MOSSMA leadership and two Subanen leaders on 13 December 1999. In my summer 2014 interviews, 
MOSSMA representatives spoke of this as an example of their respect for the Subanen rights to the land. 
My Subanen interviewees were more conflicted. While they tended to support SSM as it (eventually) 
provided regular employment to them as individuals, they also recognized that as a community they had 
been disenfranchised from their land, and except for a few of the top Subanen leaders and their families 
there were no benefits. They claim that as far as they know the promise of profit sharing was never 
honoured beyond a one time payout of Php540,000 on 4 May 2010 (over ten years after the signing of the 
FPIC), which was provided in a private meeting to two timuays  . One former MOSSMA advisor 93
supported this claim: !
The royalties were not religiously fulfilled by MOSSMA.  During my time it was just that 
one time lump sum—which was backpay—and three motorcycles presented to Subanen 
leadership.  My suggestion was to put this money into the process to secure their ancestral 
domain claim [the CADT] and to present the royalty payment in front of the community, to 
have a ceremony—it shouldn’t have been presented to only two of their leaders in a closed 
room.  I don’t know how they distributed the money, I don’t know… Of everything that 
happened, I feel the worst for the Subanen… they sold their birthright… (interview July 
2014). !
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!  Copies of the FPIC agreement and one time cash transfer were provided to me.93
 Tania Li in“Land’s End” discusses the frustration of one indigenous tribe in Indonesia to “join the 
march of progress promised in modernization narratives, only to encounter the polarizing effect of the 
capitalist relations that soon emerged among them” (Li 2014:2).  In Balabag the advent of SSM was just 
the latest incursion of a modernization narrative. The experience of the Subanen with SSM replicated a 
process that predated the entry of mining to their community—one that has been tied to outside pressures 
that they could only react to.  As touched on earlier, the Subanen peoples of Zamboanga peninsula had a 
long history of displacement from their lands stretching beyond the period of Spanish colonization in the 
region (Imbing 2002; Lopez-Bernal 2010).  Their long history of disenfranchisement, not only allowed the 
state to stake control over ownership of the land, but also weakened social and cultural capital within their 
tribe.  When this met with the entry of SSM, the softened community ties created a situation where the 
“polarizing effects of capitalist relations” resulted in a scramble to find socioeconomic security on a 
family, rather than community, scale. !
 Among the Subanen, the top tribal leaders were able to trade the social capital of their leadership 
for advantages in the world of the settlers.  The top timuays of the area were given the most blame by the 
Balabag Subanens for their hardships.  When the community was displaced from the lowlands in the 
1970s they dispersed to different areas, including to Mt. Balabag, as noted in chapter four.  However, the 
leadership structure remained and even though most of the top timuays didn’t reside in Balabag it was 
they that dealt with the mining companies (first MOSSMA, later TVIRD).  It was they that received the 
MOSSMA pay outs, and it was they that the community blamed for later “selling Balabag to TVIRD for 
millions of pesos in exchange” (interview with a Balabag Subanen leader, June 2014).  This resulted not 
only in community, but family rifts.  As one Balabag Subanen shared: !
[The top timuays] were part of the demolishing [of Balabag SSM], because of money, 
because they were tranfixed by money so they said ‘why not join TVI?’   We’re related to 
them and they still did it. !
I cried I said, why did you did this, aren't you family, why did you do this? !
He said there was no more family!  ‘Look at me,’ he said ‘I was able to bring up the quality 
of my life and my family’s lives.  What's important is that I have money now, I can eat well.’ 
That's what he said (interview with a Balabag Subanen, June 2014). !!!
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HOW SSM PRODUCED A LACK OF INCENTIVE & “THE GOOD LIFE” !
 SSM capitalism was able to improve the earnings and to some extent the class positions of those 
involved relative to the semi-feudal agricultural production they originated from, but the shadow of that 
past also helped create a lack of incentive to re-invest profits in new technologies and in industrial 
expansion.  In Marx’s vision of capitalism profitable ventures come part and parcel with a competitive 
structure that didn’t quite fully blossom in Balabag due to the constraints imposed by basing the extractive 
operation on the semi-feudal system. While class struggle was creating changes near the end of the 
MOSSMA era, for the majority of its lifespan a core elite reined in the competitive compulsion found in 
Marxian capitalism.  An economy based on the dependency of smaller owners and labourers on the elite 
limited productive investment. Further without state support of the operations (which were always 
considered “illegal”) industrial linkages were limited, as were the creation of downstream industries. !
 The local elite (the “Magic Six”) had seen the most upwards mobility in class position and in all 
forms of capital, and in their rise to local power they modelled SSM after the semi-feudal system. This 
economic system of the Philippine countryside was not easily abandoned by SSM capitalists.  It produced 
a form of control over mining akin to large landowner control of land—and for a time they were 
successful in limiting the expansion of mining technology investments by smaller owners so as to 
maintain their own power.  As Philip Kelly wrote about agriculture, the same could be said of the 
extractive industries:   !
it has been elite control of agricultural export commodities, combined with the political 
power wielded by the land-owning class, that has defined the Philippine political economy 
and has provided a strong basis for an outward-oriented, export-based economy (1997: 155). !
 In the previous pages it has been discussed that within SSM there was a struggle born of the 
creation of new capitalist and class relations.  This however did not result in any coherent class 
consciousness based on Marxian class positions, perhaps due to the vertical ties of reciprocity in the 
patron–client relationships—and definitely influenced by classed performances that divided class 
groupings beyond shared economic interests. Focusing on the labourers, despite their struggles to 
maximize earnings, they were conscious of their significantly better financial position relative to the 
general  agricultural population. For a small number of the labourers class positions rose within SSM, but 
the majority expressed a general contentment.  Class performance, in the sense that higher earnings 
allowed individuals to consume and embody “higher class” life (as they perceived it), was the more 
common marker of success. The increase in earnings which saw barriers in productive reinvestment that 
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could raise class positions, often found an outlet in luxury items and social vices.  It gave the newly 
economically secure miners a chance for what they saw as “the good life.” !!
THE LIFE OF A LABOURER !
It's better to have work where the money is easy rather than [any other] livelihood.  Because 
if you're just an employee your status won't rise right away. Compare that to mining, with just 
a little effort, and business sense, and luck.  If you are able to… hit a jackpot, that's instant 
status, instant riches (from an interview with a member of the “Magic Six”, italics mine, July 
2014).  !
 Balabag small-scale mining was predominantly male, provided ‘easy money,’ had limited          
opportunities for investment for the majority of its lifespan, and existed in a region with limited 
opportunities for socioeconomic mobility.  This combination helped shape the production of social space. 
SSM provided much higher than average earnings and came with the real possibility of “hitting a jackpot” 
with discoveries of large deposits.  This made mining an attractive option relative to the agricultural work 
that dominated the region or to the few urban jobs  .  The relatively lucrative SSM work did not require an 94
education and this proved to be an incentive for many young interview subjects to drop out of school 
despite their parents (who worked in SSM) providing funding and encouragement. The dearth in 
opportunities in the region resulted in mining being the focus of their economic activities, thus when 
individuals made long term investments in a hope to secure their family’s future the focus was on SSM. 
However there was little incentive towards large investments beyond expensive rod mills as for most of 
the Balabag era MOSSMA regulations made investment into the most profitable technologies difficult. 
Most miners thus became focused on the performance of class mobility.  They became caught up in 
classed consumption by purchasing symbols of modern wealth (e.g. electronics, vehicles, modern 
appliances, etc.). One example of class-as-embodiment was seen in how ‘gold rush’ masculinist culture 
promoted social vices. !
 A range of incomes were made by the labourers of Balabag.  At the low end were the cargo carriers          
and rock crushers.  The cargo carriers brought in goods to the community from the barangays below.  This 
was for the most part very heavy labour as there were no roads for the majority of MOSSMA’s lifespan so 
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!  Dominated by construction or service industry work, with a small amount of factory or warehouse work 94
available, though mostly in Zamboanga City or in the large rice mills scattered across the peninsula.
everything from foodstuffs to the petrol and chemicals for use in refining was physically carried to the 
community.  It was here that many high school aged ‘child labourers’ were employed— this was not 
forced labour, the youth either chose work over school, or did the work as a “part-time” job outside school 
hours.  An average load of between 50 to 100 lbs earned PhP250-500 per trip (the uphill hike would take 
approximately three hours).  These labourers tended to do about three to six journeys a week, and as this 
only took up a portion of the day, many would also participate in “rock crushing,” which entailed using 
sledge hammers to manually crush ore collected from the tunnels into manageable pieces and putting them 
into sacks for hauling to the mills—this would earn them approximately another PhP250.  Thus on 
average cargo labourers tended to average a minimum of Php5000 of income a month, which compared to 
the average of PhP2800 for agricultural workers, was still a relatively good income for the region.  !
 On the highest end of the earnings spectrum were the tunnel miners who did the physical work of          
underground mining for the raw ore.  In general these individuals claimed regular monthly incomes of 
approximately PhP10,000 at the minimum in my interviews.  Here I will use the stories of the “Cana” 
family (father and son) to provide an example of the common socioeconomic outcomes of these workers. 
“Emilio Cana” was a forty-five year old father of three with a grade four education.  He started working as 
a small scale miner in 1986 when he was sixteen years old starting at a low yield mine before moving to 
Canatuan (then the future site of TVIRD’s first Philippine mine) which like Balabag was very lucrative for 
the small-scale miners.  When this site was claimed by TVIRD he relocated to Balabag.  He estimated his 
mine earnings at a minimum of PhP9000 a month (he provided the lowest monthly estimate of all my 
tunnel miner interviewees).  Coming from a landless peasant family, the mining income was considered 
very lucrative.  !
 The question of what became of these earnings from all those years mining weighed on me.  His          
twenty-three year old son “Julio” (interview July 2014) provided a candid response, one I was given time 
and time again when following up on this question.  He told me, “I wasn’t able to save, I thought this life 
was going to be forever—but it wasn’t.  When TVI came the good times were over.”  His father had 
spoken to me quite extensively about how he wanted his children to go to college, how he always ensured 
that he had saved enough each year for the costs of their schooling—a common story amongst the miners. 
But like his elder brother before him, Julio left high school in order to work in the mines.  He said, “I 
dropped out… because the earnings in SSM were high and no one tells you what to do, there’s no boss, if 
you want to work, there’s work.”  In my interviews with other labourers who were school-aged during the 
MOSSMA years, I asked them what employment ambitions they had when they were younger. 
Interestingly most did not have a clear job path in mind. The most common answers where just that they 
wanted a job that paid enough that they could afford life’s needs: 
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As long as I have enough to pay for my families needs that’s enough… to pay for good food, 
a nice home, education for my kids, gadgets… that’s what I want (interview July 2014). !
 Despite the hopes that higher incomes could help children reach higher levels of education, many 
respondents shared a sadness that despite their encouragement many of the children (especially the males) 
chose to drop out and work in SSM instead.  Higher education did not confer any great advantage in 
Balabag.  While a high school level education did make work as an operator easier to obtain, hard working 
tunnel miners could earn just as much as an operator in an average month, and far exceeded them in 
‘lucky’ months.  SSM was more lucrative than most forms of employment that students could hope to 
attain, so former students like Julio did not see the value in continuing. !
 For the Canas, as with the majority of the miners, life was lived without much thought given to 
life after SSM.  When compared to the region’s other economic opportunities, Balabag was clearly 
providing far and away the greatest socioeconomic returns for individuals with limited social, cultural, and 
economic capital.  Emilio Cana was one of those tunnel miners turned independent tunnel owner in 2010. 
It was only in SSM where he saw a future for his family.  But the boon of SSM produced a kind of local 
space, not only as a social formation but also as a mental construction, based on the reaction to the social 
and material realities of limited regional opportunities.  Without the opportunity to improve 
socioeconomic mobility, the local culture was shaped around ideas of ‘the good life’ and this manifested in 
outward displays of wealth and ‘manliness.’ !
 As Julio recounted, the opportunities to “live for today” were seductive. “Life there was like being 
abroad!  Money was no object.”  As such it was common for the miners to see their money, which they 
often called “jackpots,” easily spent on “the good life. […] Drinking with the boys was part of a normal 
night. It was normal to spend PhP1000 a night for drinks alone.  …I had a friend there that had a lucky 
strike and spent PhP150,000 in just two months entertaining his friends!”  As one mine owner put it, 
“drinking, gambling—the money from gold was easy to spend. It's easy.  Because [the workers] thought: 
later I'll just make more money.  So they spend it easily!  But for those who really were using their brains, 
they were able to buy things… but most often they would just buy a motorcycle.” !
 Balabag, like many mining communities around the world (Scott, 2007), had a population that 
was predominantly male.  “There were a lot of vices, even the kids had vices!  It was normal to see kids 
smoking by age eleven.  This life is normal for men (interview July 2014).” The influx of economic 
capital combined with the reinforced patriarchal culture resulting in a boom for the local tavern owners 
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who began to bring in so-called ‘dancing girls’ (as Julio called them) who made up the underground sex 
industry.  As Julio shared,  !
It was mostly men in Balabag, it was a community of workers, most of the women (wives, 
sisters) lived in the towns below.  It was like a prison up there… The women were expensive, 
even the older ladies that weren’t much to look at cost PhP2000 for three hours.  The videoke 
bar owners brought in the women from out of town… they were officially the workers at the 
bar — but they’d be made available if you made ‘special plans.’ !
Julio adds another element to the story of sex work in Balabag, that “sometimes [the women] leave when 
people got tired of their faces.” !
 It was interesting for me that the most candid interview subjects on the issue of social vices and 
prostitution were two young people in their early twenties, this young man, and Leia (an original Subanen 
resident of Balabag pre-SSM).  The majority of my interview subjects (who tended to be in their late 
twenties to early fifties—with the majority being in their thirties) would admit that social vices existed in 
passing, but were not comfortable exploring the topic.  In general when discussing social ills the subjects 
and/or victims were always someone else, never themselves or their families.  And it should also be noted 
that Julio and Leia both expressed discourses from gendered lenses.  For Juilo, vices and womanizing 
were normalized expressions of ‘manliness’ (“ang lalaki may bisio [men have vices]”).  The linking of 
vice and ‘manly’ behaviour was also a common comment from my other respondents in the brief moments 
they would touch on the subject.  For Leia, such discussions were tinged with sadness and despite her 
candour it seemed that she was still holding back. I told her about the stories I had heard about the 
drinking, drugs, gambling, and ‘dancing girls’, and mentioned that most others were uncomfortable 
speaking to me about it and I asked her if any of it was true.  !
[Drug abuse] happened.  That's the truth…  True.  …when there was a lot of small-scale there 
was when it was the worst.  Even women!  …they would hide it in their bra and offer it to 
people… PhP500 only.  My cousin was one of them. !
They called them ‘bamboo girls’ …you saw them dancing without a bra, without underwear. 
Naked!  That's what they want, to earn money.  Bar owners liked it because it increased their 
income, so… then more would come.  And they were pretty!  Pretty, and light skinned-- but 
that's at night only, during the day [she laughed] you’d look at them and say ‘uy!’ [She 
laughed again.]  Some, [her laughing stopped] some already were sick.  My cousin, we 
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thought she was dead, because she—she—that illness of women, she caught it—I don't know 
what its called (interview June 2014). !
 Leia wouldn’t elaborate further on what became of her cousin, or how she had become involved in 
the sex trade. This situation can be viewed as another manifestation of the lack of opportunities in the 
region.  Previous to arriving in Balabag her cousin had been living in one of the regional cities, after she 
became ill she left.  Though I would get no further accounts as to what became of the ‘bamboo girls’ I 
believe that it would be safe to assume that her illness (being an ‘illness of women’) was not an isolated 
case.  It was common for many young Subanen women who leave their homes and ancestral lands to find 
work in the urban centres to support their families back home.  Leia herself had left for three years and 
had gone as far as the Visayan islands to find work with a Tagalog speaking family as a domestic helper. 
She wouldn’t give many details of this, and when I asked her relative about it, he hinted that it was a very 
traumatic experience for her and that was why she returned.  Another cousin of hers had also left for 
Manila to find work; this was in 2006 when she was eighteen and they haven’t heard from her since. In 
my interviews with Subanens this theme of leaving home to seek work was not limited to women, nor was 
involvement in illicit illegal activities, but there was a clear gendered path  .  For the women the legal 95
work tended to be domestic labour, which on average paid less than PhP4000 a month (that’s the average 
salary in Manila), while the sex trade loomed for those either unsuccessful securing work, or for those 
lured by money, or coerced through other means. For the Subanen men urban work often meant 
construction work as this required no formal education, but was precarious labour (in terms of both job 
security and job safety) and often paid just as much as agricultural work (PhP150/day) but came with the 
additional burden of the increased expenses that come with living in urban centres.  Some shared that the 
stress of finding adequate pay led them to find employment with illegal organizations, primarily the drug 
syndicates (“sindicato”) which were common across the region. !!
THE END OF SSM IN BALABAG !
 The era of small-scale mining in Balabag ended in the autumn of 2012 with the demolition of their 
community by government agencies supporting the TVIRD claim.  MOSSMA and the people of Balabag 
had been aware of the threat of a takeover by large-scale mining since its earliest days.  LSMs had been 
exploring in the area since the 1990s and TVIRD, which eventually bought out the ZMC MPSA in 2009, 
established an exploration camp in the Balabag community alongside the SSM operation in 2006. The 
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!  Also see “Norito’s” story in chapter four.95
small-scale miners were also aware of what became of SSM on Mt. Canatuan at TVIRD’s first site in the 
Philippines in the province just north of them, as seen in these quotes from a 2012 MOSSMA 
powerpoint  :   96!
…the tranquility of the Mt. Balabag area … small scale gold miners … had been abruptly 
disrupted upon the entry of TVI … who are notorious for its conquest of the hapless 
indigenous people and small scale miners in economically productive but blood-drenched 
Canatuan, Siocon… !
[…] !
Effect One: The Subanen people and their Council of Elders were polarized and divided. 
Their sacred land exploited. !
Effect Two: The small-scale miners who were originally occupying and mining the area were 
ejected, evicted, and buried in the dustbin of history. !
But where have all our minerals gone?? Gone to a foreign land!!! !!
 The conflict began to escalate in 2010 as MOSSMA began to reach out to human rights and social 
justice organizations with accusations of “scheming aggression” and “divide and rule” tactics which 
resulted in human rights breaches which they accredited to TVIRDs interests in claiming the land 
(MOSSMA powerpoint  2012).  That year TVIRD reached out to Balabag mine owners with offers of pay-
outs for their homes, businesses, and land—which according to many of my interviewees were eventually 
accepted by “many  ” of the local owners as the reality of the takeover became more likely (interviews 97
June-July 2014). These payments were seen as “inadequate” but those who accepted saw it as an option of 
leaving with something compared to losing everything. At the same time MOSSMA claims that TVIRD 
deployed armed security forces which they blame for intimidation tactics including blockades for their 
mining equipment and goods, and the burning of homes, mining equipment, and facilities.  MOSSMA 
replied by pressing charges and filing legal cases, as well as reaching out to media, activists, NGOs, and 
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!  Document provided by a former MOSSMA official.96
!  Though it is interesting to note that as of August 2012 Butch del Castillo reported for the Business Mirror that 97
“Less than half of the scores of small-time miners accepted, but the rest steadfastly refused” (16 August 2012).  So it 
is unclear if “many” truly accepted or if this was just how it was perceived by the community.
multiple scales of government (up to pleas to the President for assistance and intervention) (MOSSMA 
2012  ).   98!
 On 22 December 2011 the Zamboanga Del Sur “Inter-Agency Task Group on Mining, 
Environment, and Public Order and Safety” unanimously passed a resolution   urging for the issuance of a 99
“stoppage order against all persons conducting mining operations or activities within the territorial 
jurisdiction of Zamboanga del Sur without permit or contract duly issued by the government.”  This 
resolution sparked the most heated period of conflict between MOSSMA and TVIRD.  The first quarter of 
2012 saw an increase in accusations of human rights violations. These included claims of NPA rebel 
activity which resulted in violent encounters (including the burning of TVIRD vehicles—though in my 
interviews I spoke with witnesses claiming that the burning of the vehicles was conducted by TVIRD 
forces themselves in order to accuse the NPA).  Organized protests against the LSM takeover organized by 
MOSSMA and supported by activists and NGOs intensified during this period, which was matched by an 
increase in the presence of armed TVIRD security forces who were accused of firing of weapons at or in 
the direction of Balabag residents, including at a protest rally.  The security forces were also blamed for 
the extrajudicial killings of small scale miners themselves.  In late February 2012 MOSSMA released 
what they claimed to be official emails between Yulo Perez, the Chief Operating Officer and Vice 
President of Operations at TVIRD and AFP forces regarding an armed night raid on MOSSMA to 
confiscate and or destroy their equipment  .   100!
 On Friday 13 April 2012 the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) issued an official Cease and 
Desist Order   (CDO) to MOSSMA blaming their “illegal mining activities” for “deplet[ing] government 101
mineral resources” and causing “unnecessary violence in affected areas resulting [in the] loss of people’s 
lives.”  The rationales for this order revolved around the “illegal” nature of the operations which lacked a 
People’s Small-Scale Mining Contract, and Mineral Processing Permits for their Carbon-in-Pulp (CIP) 
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!  Document provided by a former MOSSMA official.98
!  This resolution was signed by: Provincial Governor Antonio Cerilles, Regional Executive Director Arleigh 99
Adorable Ceso IV (Dept Energy & Natural Resources), Albert Johann Jacildo (Mines and Geosciences Bureau), 
Allan De Gala (Environmental Management Bureau-IX), Dr. Adelaida Borja (Provincial Environment and Natural 
Resources Officer-IX), Jose Bayani Gucela (Philippine National Police), Col. Gerardo Barrientos (Armed Forces of 
the Philippines, 1st Infantry Tabak Division), Hon. Ernesto Mondarte (Board Member-Committee Chair on Peace 
and Order), and Rito Ordiz (Local Environment and Natural Resources Officer-ZDS)
!  TVIRD disputes the authenticity of these emails.  The raid did not materialize, though whether that was due to the 100
falsity of the claim or the public release of the operation is not known.
!  Signed by OIC Regional Director Albert Johann B. Jacildo in Zamboanga City.101
plants.  This was followed by a provincial resolution from the office of Governor Cerilles (PPOC 
Resolution No. 05),  !
urgently [requesting] the National Government, through His Excellency Benigno Simeon C. 
Aquino III, to take the lead… by ordering the PNP [Philippine National Police] and AFP 
[Armed Forces of the Philippines] to assist the MGB in the enforcement of the CEASE AND 
DESIST ORDER (CDO)… in coordination with the LGU [local government unit] of 
Zamboanga del Sur, LGU of Bayog, and the LGU of Tigbao (from a copy of the undated 
document acquired through the MGB on July 2014, caps theirs). !
 Before the implementation of the CDO, on 12 October 2012, members of the Criminal 
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) raided several mine processing facilities belonging to the 
“Magic Six” in Balabag. Reported by the Mindanao Examiner (Jacinto 2013) as “about peace keeping and 
crime prevention because of growing lawlessness and criminality in the area” members of the Six were 
charged before the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office for alleged violation of Republic Act 8294 (for the 
illegal possession of firearms, ammunition, explosives), as well as Republic Act 6969 (for the possession 
of toxic substances): !
Raiding personnel of the CIDG recovered thirteen high powered firearms including an M-16 
rifle and KG9 submachine gun, 4,000 metres of detonating cord, four sacks of commercial 
dynamite, and assorted ammunition, tons of cyanide… and gallons of nitric acid.  !
And two weeks later on 24 October 2012, the CDO was implemented by a task force (created by 
Zamboanga del Sur Governor Antonio Cerilles) composed of the Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources (DENR), the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB), the Environmental Management Bureau 
(EMB), the Philippine National Police (PNP), the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the 53rd 
Infantry Battalion of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and a disabling team to dismantle the 
homes and SSM structures of miners. !
 My field interviews included many stories surrounding this event, most spoke of how it came as a 
surprise.  There were stories of being awoken in the morning by the task force (with a heavy emphasis in 
their stories on the heavily armed soldiers, police, and security forces) and having had to vacate their 
homes just moments before they were destroyed.  On the TVIRD website (Deliverio 2012) in an article 
titled “Illegal gold glitters no more in Balabag” they reported that: !
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At the break of dawn, a hundred Philippine National Police (PNP) officers proceeded to the 
place on board transport vehicles. !
[…]  !
Trucks loaded with uniformed military and police began to arrive by the dozens. They were 
all carrying guns. Others who were not wearing uniforms had guns too, but clearly seen at the 
backs of their bullet-proof vests were the big three letters: NBI (National Bureau of 
Investigation). !
[…]  !
But on this day, the destruction wrought by illegal mining in Balabag hill had finally come to 
a stop. The glitter of illegal gold that blinded lawless elements from sensibility has now faded 
away. Sadly, it was the same glitter that tempted some people in the government who allowed 
the illegal trade to thrive and flourish for three decades in the first place.  !!
THE SEEDS FOR POST-SSM LIFE !
 This chapter described the rise and fall of small-scale mining on Mt. Balabag.  With  the transition 
from semi-feudal agricultural production to extractive production came changes to class formations, class 
dynamics, and capital flows.Class positions did shift to varying degrees for some of those involved in 
mining.  The greatest mobility was realized by the so-called “Magic Six,” the Balabag mining elite who 
translated pre-mining class position and accumulated capital, combined with the temporal contingency of 
being the first large investors on-site, into economic and political power on the site.  These six were also 
able to convert their gains into investments outside of SSM and the Balabag area so that when the TVIRD 
takeover occurred their gains were not lost.  Balabag SSM also resulted in a level of socioeconomic 
advancement for many of the second tier owners and even the labourers—especially after the disincentive 
towards productive investment was overturned by class struggle.  However unlike with the elite their 
investments (along with their earnings) were tied to SSM in Balabag.  This would lead to a difficult post-
mining life, one in which the frustration of having lost what was gained met with the realities of a return to 
a mining-free life. !!
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Chapter Six: 
LIFE AFTER SMALL-SCALE MINING !!
 The majority of my fieldwork was conducted in the barangays of Diplahan and Bayog.  In this 
chapter elements of participant observation into community life will be incorporated to complement data 
gathered from semi-structured interviews to describe the changes in circumstances for the former miners. 
In the previous chapter on the development of Balabag SSM the focus was put on the economic 
dimensions of socioeconomic mobility (with a stress on class dynamics). In this chapter I will complement 
those elements with an inquiry into class mobility as seen through the vernacular sense of general well-
being. I will examine how changes in class dynamics before, during, and especially after Balabag 
impacted life chances (i.e. educational attainment, chances in acquiring stable above-subsistence 
livelihoods, etc.) and quality of life (i.e. cultural and health impacts). !
 When the demolition of SSM operations in Balabag began in late October 2012, the residents 
were forced to leave the community and for the most part returned back to the communities from which 
they came.  Many of my interview subjects spoke of having to walk with what they could carry back down 
the mountain to their home barangays and sitios in the municipalities of Diplahan and Bayog where their 
families lived, a three to four hour walk.  Those who accepted the payout offers of TVIRD spoke of being 
given one way transportation on the back of pick up trucks, and promises that their belongings would be 
delivered to them—though some reported that either that their goods never arrived, were incomplete, or 
were broken.  A MOSSMA leader shared this reflection on what became of the former Balabag residents:   !
They went back to where they were from because they didn't know anything else... some 
went to places where there were other mines, but mostly they went back to their homes 
because firstly, how will they eat if they don’t have a livelihood? So they just went home and 
went back to agriculture work (interview July 2014). !
There was one notable exception to this story, and these were the original indigenous inhabitants of 
Balabag.  One of these original families, the top timuay’s family, had parlayed the social and cultural 
capital of their leadership positions into economic capital and political power during both the tenure of 
SSM and then even more lucratively in their dealings with TVIRD—but for the majority of the original 
Subanen of Balabag, the end of SSM meant not only the loss of their livelihoods, but yet another case of 
loss and displacement from their lands.  For the majority their ‘Subanen-ness’ resulted in difficulties 
within SSM and harsher post-SSM outcomes. 
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 My fieldwork began approximately twenty months after the demolition of MOSSMA’s small scale 
mining operations on Mt. Balabag.  In my interviews it was post-SSM life that people first wanted to 
discuss. They wanted to share their hardships and talked with longing and nostalgia for SSM life in 
Balabag.  The common message was that life was improving for all during SSM, and that for the first time 
they had opportunities.  For them the improvement and opportunities were directly related to 
improvements in income and opportunities to purchase commodities that they had previously been unable 
to. These commodities ranging from everything from daily needs, to consumer goods, to education for 
their children, and personal spending for enjoyment.  After an initial set of interviews conducted with my 
local partner AdPeace outside the communities where the former miners had returned, I was able to secure 
local key informants and guides that were able to help me access the rural communities of Diplahan and 
Bayog.  I wanted to discover how almost two decades of increased opportunity and of significantly higher 
earnings impacted the local people.  Despite the loss of SSM, did the increased revenue gained from 
mining reflect upward mobility    relative to their pre-mining lives?  Were they able to make long term 102
decisions to translate their economic capital into social and cultural capital that would benefit the future 
opportunities of their family? !
 In this chapter I will discuss the lives of the people post-SSM, I will begin with a general 
discussion of the field site and of my two main local gatekeepers timuay Itim and Cory  .  While both 103
were ethnically Subanen, Cory was raised in the lowlands within settler culture, and while he 
acknowledges his ethnicity he was aware that in many ways his cultural milieu was closer to that of the 
settler.  Cory also had closer connections to MOSSMA (due to the work he did with them as an 
employee  ) and thus was helpful in helping me access a wider variety of former Balabag owners, 104
labourers, and residents.  In contrast timuay Itim had closer connections to social justice activists and with 
the Subanen.  From here I will discuss the post SSM lives of the labourers as they represent the majority, 
before turning to the top earners (the elite and smaller capitalists).   !
 I will argue that despite the stated goals of MOSSMA to create development ‘by Filipinos, for 
Filipinos’, upward mobility beyond SSM faced difficult challenges due to an overall lack of regional 
development.  Without government support in developing the physical and industrial infrastructure, and 
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!  “Mobility” not only in terms of the four dimensions of class, but in terms of perceived life chances and quality of 102
life.
!  Introduced in chapter three.103
!  Though he did some tunnel mining in the beginning, he spent most of his tenure in Balabag as an administrator 104
for a MOSSMA community project.
productive industry, there was limited incentive for labourers to expand their social and cultural capital 
and they were thus left dependent on SSM.  Except for the Six, the majority of those who made productive 
investments did so within SSM in Balabag, and thus when that was lost, so too were their investments—
but the debt to the financiers (who were primarily the Six) remained. !
 In the previous chapter SSM was seen to have had a socioeconomic benefit to those involved and 
it most likely would have continued if not for the entry of LSM and the displacement of the community. 
This benefit should also be contrasted to some of its negative effects (especially seen in ‘gold rush’ sites), 
from its harmful effects on environmental and human health, to its effects on local culture, as seen in 
Balabag in both the growth of vices associated with a ‘gold rush’ masculinist culture and the inter-ethnic 
tension between settlers and indigenous peoples.  Further the question of ‘what happens after?’ is one that 
should be of interest to researchers interested in long term upward mobility.  By its nature mining has a 
limited lifespan, ore reserves do eventually run out.  As even the Canadian CEO of TVI-Pacific noted in 
our conversation in July 2014: “Let me tell you something: there is no sustainable mining.” !
 Overall, long term socioeconomic mobility for those involved in Balabag SSM was extremely 
rare.  Of the SSM capitalists only a few, primarily the “Magic Six,” were able to maintain their 
improvements in class position.  This was achieved through the domination of mining capital in Balabag 
at the expense of those below them, primarily the smaller mine owners.  The Six’s political and economic 
control allowed them to maximize profits by creating dependency amongst the second tier owners.  Key to 
this was the regulation of CIP plant ownership.  In the latter years before the TVIRD takeover they relaxed 
their mining regulations and increased their lending to those wishing to operate a rod mills, tunnels, and 
CIP Plants (which until then was limited to the Six). This accelerated production, but also invited 
increased indebtedness as individuals (both old and new small mining capitalists) gambled on maximizing 
their increased economic capital with capital investments.  Many of these new investors saw little to no 
return on their investments as SSM ended with a TVIRD takeover in the fall of 2012.   !
 In contrast, during this same time frame and with the threat of a LSM takeover looming, the Six’s 
position at the top of the hierarchy allowed them to maximize this acceleration in production and they 
made investments outside of the mining sector. The Six entered into the mining industry as middle 
peasant/petit bourgeois, and small landowners After mining they joined the ranks of large landowners and 
ran businesses in the agricultural and service sector.  Through their SSM operations they were also able to 
improve their social capital and converted these into ties with the regional elite, with one of the Six even 
achieving high political office at the municipal level in the 2012 elections, and another winning top 
political position at the barangay level. 
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 SSM may be good for livelihoods of local people, as Nancy Peluso (2015) argues, but it also 
comes with a lot of problems which are only heightened after SSM comes to an end.  Socioeconomic 
improvement needs to be viewed as tied to overall regional development that affects more than one 
community.  In Balabag the boost in economic capital occurred in a region where overall  livelihood 
opportunities remained poor.  This limited the ways this capital could be invested by individuals and 
families.  And it limited their ability to imagine a life outside of mining.  Thus when SSM in Balabag 
came to an end, many found themselves right back where they started. !!
MY FIELD SITE IN THE MUNICIPALITIES OF DIPLAHAN & BAYOG !
 It was after the initial set of organized interviews arranged by my local partner AdPeace that I 
became determined to visit the home communities of the former miners.  During these offsite interviews I 
was surprised at how our initial estimates of attendees had exponentially grown as they brought their 
entire families with them.  What’s more, I noted how poor their health seemed to be.  Unlike my past 
experiences with children in the Philippines, these kids were quiet and inactive, and many looked 
unhealthy—the parents shared that since the end of SSM that their health had noticeably deteriorated.  The 
adults too expressed health issues, most commonly problems with their breathing, and with their backs, 
yet most did not have official medical diagnoses due to a lack of funds.  We learned that they had all come 
to the interview session as they knew food would be provided and they wanted the children, who they said 
had not had a nutritious meal for days, to have a good meal.  AdPeace had initially wished that I conduct 
all my interviews offsite, but this first experience strengthened my resolve that I needed to visit their home 
communities in order to better my understanding of their post-mining lives.  I asked their timuay (timuay 
“Itim") if it would be possible for me to visit them and if he could help me interview more former miners. 
He agreed that we could meet at his daughter’s home as it was better located centrally to other 
communities and also due to it having a better security situation—his home was much smaller and was in 
an area frequented by TVIRD security forces and by the private forces (or “goons” as he called them) of 
LSM supporters.  !
 Travel to the interior of Diplahan to meet with timuay Itim was an exercise in alternating patience 
and frustration. From the one major road that connects municipalities along southern Zamboanga 
peninsula it was approximately a two hour trip from Pagadian City or six hours from Zamboanga City to 
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reach the poblacion   of Diplahan by public transit.  From there I had two options: either to wait for one 105
of the sporadic jeeps or vans that I was told left hourly, or to rent a motorcycle taxi. The former costs 
Php80, the latter Php200 (minimum)  .  When this cost is put in relation to the average pay for an 106
agricultural worker (Php150/day when available, and a monthly total typically under Php3000) regular 
travel to and from Diplahan poblacion was prohibitively expensive for most.  For this reason trips to the 
poblacion are rare occurrences for most and a drain on meagre resources.  This can be problematic as the 
poblacion was the nearest ‘urban’ centre where government services and/or modern health services could 
be obtained. !
 I arrived at Diplahan terminal at 930am with a member AdPeace (my local partner) to act as an 
interpreter if needed, we had been told that jeeps and/or vans ran from five AM until noon.  There was a 
jeep there when we arrived, and I felt myself lucky.  There were only three other passengers within so I 
knew it would probably wait a while longer before leaving.  We expected to wait at most an hour, and 
were told each time we asked the driver (or by the two other ‘helpers’ he had with him, or by the terminal 
‘caller  ’) that it would be 15-20 minutes before we would leave.  Despite there only being three 107
passengers, the jeep’s roof was already packed with canvas bags filled with livestock feed and fertilizer, as 
well as miscellaneous boxes. Inside the jeep were large plastic bags filled with the everyday items seen in 
most sari-sari stores (toiletries, snacks, cigarettes, etc).  On future trips livestock (including a live pig) 
were also seen on board.  After two hours and only two more passengers arriving the jeep driver decided 
that it was not worth his while to make the trip in and out of the interior (“the gas will cost more than I’ll 
make!” he said) and we had to disembark and wait for the next vehicle.  We didn’t leave the station until 
noon, when there were eight passengers in all—but the jeep was tightly loaded with baggage. !
 The ride into the interior took about an hour (on other trips it ranged from 45 minutes to 1.5 hours 
depending on road and weather conditions).  It was almost entirely rough dirt roads with deep dips and 
jagged exposed rocks.  On later trips after or during rains, the roads were awash in water which the drivers 
weaved about in as if using a memorized mental map to navigate the dangers of deep potholes and large 
jagged rocks which lay underneath.  For obvious reasons there were more motorcycles than four wheeled 
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!  “Poblacions” are towns that are the municipal centres, in rural Zamboanga peninsula it is in the poblacions were 105
you can find access to social services (including health and police services), colleges (though there were no colleges 
in Diplahan poblacion), and relatively large retail centres.
!  A return trip to the poblacion cost the same.106
!  The individual who stays by the station stop to call out to potential customers and to try to convince them to take 107
their vehicle instead of another.  The number of workers per vehicle was also interesting and indicative of how few 
jobs were available that often they were just friends/relatives of the driver/owner who were willing to work for food 
and/or a very small cut.
vehicles, though even then, there were many fewer vehicles than the population numbers suggested there 
should be.  The land was virtually all made up of rice fields in various states of planting—I was later told 
that landowners tend not to all plant at the same time so as to use labour efficiently.  It was the beginning 
of the second annual planting cycle (there were three in a year) when I first arrived there in mid-June, by 
the end of July all the fields were verdant green.  Carabaos (a type of water buffalo) were more commonly 
seen than mechanized agricultural machines, though some small manually operated push tractors were 
occasionally seen.  Field workers calf high in water could be seen working the fields in large teams, their 
hands darting in and out of the water like human sewing machines—with each stitch leaving a rice stalk 
standing.  The homes we passed were mostly made of traditional construction techniques using bamboo, 
wood, and nipa.  A few were made of blocky grey unpainted cinderblock, and some of the roofs were of 
corrugated iron. Though there would also be the occasional home with painted walls, gardens, fences and 
satellite dishes that stood out for their uniqueness—examples of class as performed via residential 
architecture.  !
 Timuay Itim’s daughter’s home was tucked some two hundred metres away from the road down a 
thin dirt path that skirted a couple rice fields. We arrived just minutes before a torrential downpour. 
Timuay Itim had previously told me that the home (constructed of wood, with a mix of thatch and old 
corrugated iron roofing) was made mostly from scavenged items as they did not have the funds to 
purchase them new.  I was reminded of the ravaged elementary school in Canatuan, site of the first TVIRD 
mine in the Philippines.  I was there in 2005, less than a decade after it was built, and all that remained 
was a skeletal facade.  The former small-scale miners had used it to scavenge building materials after their 
livelihoods as miners came to an end. !
 Laundry lines were stretched across various fruit trees that grew near timuay Itim’s daughter’s 
home.  On those lines laundry, hanging semi dry, began to sway and then were one by one flung off by the 
wind. Timuay Itim’s daughter scrambled to collect the various items from the ground, which were all 
clearly well worn with faded colours. Some were obviously re-stitched and had frayed ends.  We were 
under cover just in time as the sky opened up and all that could be heard was the cacophony of wind 
through trees, rain pounding on corrugated iron roofing, and the occasional slam of fruit hitting the home. 
As with the modern painted homes that displayed class as performance, this home too spoke of the 
embodied class of its peasant residents. !
 Timuay Itim and the daughter’s husband weren’t home, the husband was working in the fields (an 
occasional job for the local landlords that could be found perhaps two weeks in a month, paying 
approximately Php150 a day), and the timuay was at a community meeting for the many local residents 
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still holding out hope that one day they’d be allowed to return to mine on Mt. Balabag.  The inside of the 
home was basically a living room of sorts, the floor was earthen, and there was no ‘furniture’ in the sense 
you’d see in urban homes, just a couple simple wooden benches, a raised wooden platform that was 
covered in a small harvest from empty fields that they plant in, an old 1990s era TV and DVD player, and 
a short stack of pirated DVD movies without cases.  In the corner of the inside of home was a relatively 
large raised platform with bamboo walls that made up the bedroom, mats were spread on the floor for 
sleeping.  On the opposite end of the home was their kitchen, a ‘sink’ made of bamboo slats with gaps in 
between so that when the washing was done it would spill through the gaps to the ground outside the 
home, and an indoor hearth where they would cook in blackened cast iron pots over an open flame. There 
was no indoor plumbing, only gallon sized plastic jugs filled with water from a nearby spring.  There was 
no bathroom, they would use the fields or a neighbours squat toilet a few houses down.  And behind the 
home there was a shallow well of non-potable water used for washing and bathing.  !
 This home was similar to the neighbours in appearance, though later I would learn that some 
neighbours did have more possessions.  In the barangay there were also a handful that had better 
constructed homes. These tend to be for families with local businesses like the local large sari-sari owner, 
the mechanic, and the barangay captain  .  Here, as in the other rural communities I would visit, there 108
was an inverse relationship between proximity to the road and level of poverty.  Many if not most of the 
homes in this village had family members involved in SSM, though most had been labourers.  Though 
before the 1970s this was a predominantly Subanen area, there was now only small population of Subanen 
in this barangay, with most living in the smaller sitios further off from the main rural road (or even further 
afield in remote mountain communities).   !
 Timuay Itim, despite personally viewing his family as “poor,” was one of the more successful 
Subanen during the SSM era.  In that period he was able to rise from the position of tunnel miner to the 
owner of an independent tunnel, a rod mill, and eventually to a CIP plant in the last months of SSM 
operation.  However the class processes of Balabag did not hinge on ownership alone and factors such as 
his ‘Subanen-ness’ meant greater hurdles and different long term life chances.  As one of the original 
Subanen residents of Mt. Balabag he was part of the group most impacted by displacement, the group that 
had no home to return to because Balabag was their home.  Some of these pre-mining inhabitants, like the 
family of timuay Itim, moved down to the lowlands to live in the communities of the settlers.  Others, 
migrated further afield to new upland sites or to join family in upland Subanen communities.  For those 
that relocated to the sitios and barangays of Diplahan and Bayog they cited the difficulties of living in 
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   “Barangay captains” are the local level community leaders.  They make up the lowest level of local 108
government unit (LGU).
remote communities.  After almost twenty years of integration with settlers their children were no longer 
familiar with that kind of life and so they chose to join the agricultural labouring class.   
Figure 1.8: Rural Bayog homes.  On the left in sitio away from the main road, on the right 
are three homes next to the main rural road (note: though the homes were typical, the 
picturesque landscaping was not). !
 In mining-induced displacement literature some of the common effects of the loss of land to LSM 
included a toll on socioeconomic, cultural, and psychological well-being.  This was best seen in ‘the 
resettlement effect’ where the loss of community had severe impacts on economic, social, and cultural 
capital.  For the Subanen of Balabag the loss of their land not only meant a loss of pre-SSM livelihoods, 
but also their social and cultural networks. This was further exacerbated the difficulties they experienced 
as they were now scattered from each other and from the mutual support community could have provided. 
As an example of the impact on their cultural and social capital, timuay Itim, one of the traditional leaders 
of the Balabag Subanen community, was virtually unknown as a timuay in his daughter’s community.  The 
Subanen that lived there had a different timuay.  Timuay Itim had to travel to different communities to 
meet his constituents, or they had to travel to him. With his community scattered his position and 
responsibilities became more difficult to manage and he expressed doubts if he could maintain the 
position. !
 Where my time with timuay Itim first introduced me to the communities where the former miners 
returned, my time with Cory allowed me greater access due to his wider familiarity with the miners of 
Balabag, due to his former position as a MOSSMA employee, and also due to his cultural familiarity with 
the non-indigenous settlers, which when combined with his Subanen ethnicity helped others see him as a 
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cultural bridge.  Cory lived in a more populous central barangay in between Diplahan and Bayog, and 
through the use of a motorcycle (borrowed or rented) we traversed the dirt roads that connected barangays 
and sitios to conducte interviews.  Cory lived on a raised home constructed of weathered wood which 
would sway in heavy wind.  Rusted corrugated iron roofing gave protection from the elements, but due to 
age, also leaked in the rain.  Like the home of timuay Itim’s daughter there was no indoor plumbing and 
food was cooked in an indoor hearth.  There were two key differences between the homes of timuay Itim 
and Cory: 1) Cory’s electrical connection ran twenty-four hours (rather than just in the evenings for 
timuay Itim); and 2) they had a simple squat toilet in a structure outside the home (the waste drained into a 
nearby canal).  !
 In the weeks ahead I would have a chance to see more of the communities the former mine 
labourers returned to, and to see that even beyond this initial impression there were a greater variety of 
living spaces.  The homes in the barangays (being the larger rural communities) like that of Cory and 
timuay Itim tended to be as I described above.  Most had electricity, though the amount of electrical 
appliances tended to be few—for example, none of the labourer homes I visited had a refrigerator or stove. 
None of the homes I visited had indoor plumbing, and so the people relied on a combination of wells and 
spring water that they paid for by the gallon.  Deeper into the rural interior, the homes were generally 
smaller and more rustic (even the presence of corrugated roofing became less common), and some did not 
have an electrical connection.  There was also a general divide between indigenous and settler families, 
with the former tending to live in much more basic conditions and further from the road.  When speaking 
of post-Balabag poverty timuay Itim and others highlighted that “even here there are squatters, it’s not just 
in the cities”—these were landless families that built homes where there was unclaimed space.  Despite 
being in rural communities, finding unclaimed land was easier said than done, especially if one wanted to 
live relatively near a road.  The timuays (along with some MOSSMA leaders) spoke to me of how some of 
the poorest Subanen relocated to new mountain communities (much like how the original inhabitants of 
Balabag arrived there after the Visayan migration to the Diplahan lowlands in the 1970s).  These 
communities were not accessible by road and could be up to a six hour uphill hike into the forest.  For the 
rural landless poor who decided to build without land title in the officially recognized barangays and sitios 
of Diplahan and Bayog, the homes tended to be located in “danger zones” as delineated by municipal 
flood and landslide maps.  I spoke to one such set of families that lived next to, what was at the time of my 
visit, a small river.  The homes were unique in the sense that they were built on stilts and tended to sit 
about ten feet off the ground.  I was told that during the rainy season the area floods.  From a “normal” of 
about knee deep water, to flash floods that would go up past the height of a person during heavy rains.   !!
!114
Figure 1.9: Landslide hazard map for Bayog (Municipal Profile, 2014). !!!!
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HEALTH ISSUES  !
 As I noted earlier, one of my first impressions was the apparently poor health of the former 
labourers.  The main health concern they expressed was that since the end of  SSM the quality of their 
food intake had seriously declined.  As discussed in interviews and noted in my field journal, domestic 
fights over food was one of the most common issues in post-SSM communities.  The following is 
expanded from my field journal dated 23 June 2014, my first morning in the home of timuay Itim: !
The sun rose over the home of the neighbour to the east, the couple and their children (one 
eight, the other just a few months old) were awake.  This was the same couple we could 
overhear fighting well into the evening last night.  It began in hushed tones.  They knew there 
was a visitor in a nearby house and they reminded each other constantly to keep their voices 
down—of course timuay Itim and I still heard them as in these rural areas sound carried. 
When midnight passed these reminders were forgotten and their voices had became raised. 
Timuay Itim told me this was a regular event, virtually every night.  Their baby could be 
heard crying here and there but never for too long—which seemed strange considering the 
volume of the voices that echoed past the thin wood walls and across the surrounding 
neighbourhood.  The fight was about how the breadwinner had yet again come home without 
food nor money, yet smelling of alcohol. That day he had done day labour planting rice, and 
should have returned with Php150, instead he came back with Php30 ($0.75 Cdn).  The one 
who stayed home with the children screamed in exasperation that their baby was hungry and 
yet the other had spent the money on drink rather than food.  The partner replied that it was 
because of all this yelling that he didn’t return directly after work, that the stress of being 
home drove them to drink.   !
It was around 6am when timuay Itim joined me on the porch.  He moved slowly, coughing a 
lot, and it was clear to me that he was ill.  Health care is private and out-of-pocket here, and 
as there is no local doctor in the barangays, seeing a medical professional means spending 
money to travel to the poblacion or to the city, and as public vehicles only travel in and out of 
the rural areas in the mornings, additional charges could also be incurred for overnight 
accommodations and of course food.  Despite only being in his 40s Timuay Itim is frailer and 
weaker than most indigenous men I’ve met who even in their 60s and 70s tend to be robust. 
He slumped down with a morning coffee and lit a cigarette. !
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 The financial boon of the SSM era had provided miners with enough earnings to eat well and 
provide for daily needs and wants. This was without doubt a major reason why SSM was remembered so 
fondly. The long term negative consequences to their environment and health were known to them, but 
their personal cost-benefit calculations overwhelmingly saw income outweighing the known risks.  After 
SSM ended those benefits ended as well, but the risks lived on.  As one Bayog area timuay who was never 
involved in SSM shared with me, “there are a lot of illnesses in the area now. It started when MOSSMA 
arrived… from chemicals they released” (interview June 2014).  In one still-operational small scale mine I 
visited in the municipality of Bayog I witnessed some of the problematic practices that could result in 
environmental and human health issues.  
Figure 1.10: On the upper left is a CIP plant. On the lower right the community garden and 
empty bottles of liquor. In the middle is a tailings pond. !
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 Post-mining illnesses were common to virtually all my interviewees who had worked as miners 
for over a decade, and some even spoke to me in hushed tones   about the effect on non-miners as well, 109
especially to the children.  Timuay Itim, a SSM supporter himself, shared that he knew that mining 
brought health consequences—only that it was something he felt they had to live with.  As an original 
resident of Balabag he was at first hesitant to support the miners, but it soon became clear to him that SSM 
was in Balabag whether he wanted it or not, and to join them at least provided a livelihood and 
opportunities for their children.  He shared that the most common symptoms felt by the miners were 
related to their lungs, and to their hips and backs.  Timuay Itim himself, as reported to me by his daughter 
had long been ill.  She believed it to be “TB” (though “TB” was the go-to self-diagnosis by many of those 
who were ill post mining and could not afford a medical diagnosis, it generally seemed to mean that a 
person had trouble with their lungs).  She regrets how much mining had taken from them, including the 
health of her family members.   !
 Emilio Cana, the tunnel miner and independent tunnel owner whom I spoke of in the previous 
chapter, was another interviewee who expressed problems with “TB”.  He had become so ill that he was 
left unable to work and was dependent on donations from friends and family.  At the time of our interview 
I learned that Emilio currently lived in a simple home of scavenged wood in a barangay of Bayog.  Like 
with many other older miners he was sick and weak, long suffering from a lung illness and a bad back, 
though a lack of funds has prevented him from a medical diagnosis.  With the remainder of his savings 
from SSM he purchased a hectare of land on which he built his home, but his illness prevented him from 
planting on it.  Instead he allowed neighbours to plant and asked for a cut, but he felt that he was being 
cheated.  Emilio blames LSM saying, “what kind of life is this? They’ve taken the future of my 
children  .”  110!
 The health of the children was also a concern as complaints of regular illness were common. 
Some of this can be attributed to their poor post-SSM diet, but others seem to implicate other causes. 
Common symptoms reported to me by parents of children who lived in Balabag spoke of persistent skin 
conditions (‘galis’), and even of blackened toe and finger-nails that would fall off.  Most of the children 
who lived in Balabag were Subanen, and many of those were the original residents of the land  .  The 111
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!  I note the “hushed tones” as it was clear that the majority did not want to disparage SSM in any way, even if it 109
had impacted their current health.
!  All quotations in this paper from local interviewees are from the authors field notes.  Interviews conducted in June 110
and July 2014.
!  As mentioned earlier the families of most of the miners stayed in the lowlands.  Only a small number relocated 111
there with their families. 
blame for the children’s poor health went to the safety standards of chemical use in the mining process, as 
one Balabag resident noted: !
The SSMs would dump chemicals everywhere, they didn’t care where… the kids would play 
in the chemical water and some died, they must have swallowed some of the water… 
(interview June 2015). !
The pollution of the SSM era was still blamed for the fevers and diarrhoea which continued to be common 
ailments for many in the community, miner and non-miner alike.  Respondents believed that some of the 
chemicals may continue to make their way into the community’s water supply via the rivers and streams 
that originate from the mountain. !!
POST-SSM LIVELIHOODS !
 In agricultural communities like these the days tended to start early as working the fields tended to 
be more productive in the early morning before the heat of the sun becomes overbearing. In hacienda 
areas in the other parts of the country I’ve previously visited many peasant farmers tend to take a break 
from about 11am until about 2pm to avoid that mid-day sun. But in those areas the system was closer to 
traditional feudalism in the sense that peasant families all had specific regular areas to till (the landlord 
receiving their cut at the end of each planting season) and they tended to live on or near that land.  In the 
Diplahan and Bayog interior the field-hands did not have regular work on any specific field, they worked 
in fields that needed work that day.  Word of mouth spread the news of which fields needed work when, 
and labourers were hired on a first-come, first-employed basis.  One would travel to that field in the 
morning and the field manager (who was only regular employee of the landowner and tended to live on or 
near the site) would take on as many workers as was needed that day.  Work was not guaranteed and some 
would travel to a place only to find that they were too late, or that no labourers were needed that day.  Due 
to the irregularity, prospective workers would sometimes travel far afield for work. In my interviews it 
was common for agricultural labourers to tell me that they would travel as far as three to five hours away 
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!  In these cases they would become short term regulars, staying in those areas until the planting was done.  This 112
meant staying for a week or more at minimum in order to make the travel costs worthwhile.
if they knew there was work available  .  Day labourers were paid by how much work they did, averaging 112
P150 for a twelve hour work day  .  113!
 My interviewees also spoke of other former Balabag labourers who did not return to their home 
communities after the TVIRD takeover.  Foremost were those who had no home community to return to, 
the original Subanen inhabitants of Mt. Balabag. Some of these Subanen had organized post-SSM with 
grassroots and legal organizations and were still making legal and political attempts to reclaim their 
community on Mt. Balabag.  Other former mine labourers left for the cities to find work in sectors like 
construction (usually the men) or as domestic helpers (the women). While most stayed within a day’s bus 
travel from their communities, a small handful travelled to other islands and even to Manila using the 
remaining savings they had—and others used those savings for their children to have this opportunity. 
The most common post-SSM livelihoods revolved around agriculture and other SSM sites closer afield. 
Some spoke of leaving the community for weeks at a time when they hear of work in other municipalities, 
“I’ve gone as far as Ipil [four hours by bus from Diplahan poblacion] to do day work with farms,” said one 
respondent who went on to explain that the reason for the long stays were due to the cost of travel.  They 
would simply live with other workers and have room and board deducted from their pay.  Others went off 
to other SSM operations, though at the time of my fieldwork, there were no others in the peninsula that 
matched the yields of Balabag (or of Canatuan before it).   !
 Julio Cana (the son of Emilio), whom I wrote of earlier, was one such former miner that left 
Balabag first in search of new SSM work only to find it unrewarding and from there relocated to 
Zamboanga City.  I spoke with Julio at his residence, which he shared with two other families (he himself 
was single) in an urban poor community  .  He sought out a new SSM site after Balabag as it was the 114
only job he had ever known but left after seven months due to the work being much more difficult, more 
dangerous, and far less lucrative.  The ore there was scarce and of poor quality and the tunnels ran deeper 
into the ground and were more prone to accidents than in Balabag. At best he claimed that he earned 
P2000 a month, P800 less than the average wage for an agricultural worker and P8000 less than an 
average month in Balabag.  Leaving this work he went to Zamboanga City and found work in construction 
which paid P150 a day, but he found this work difficult not only on his body but also to his spirit as he 
!120
!  Walking with timuay Itim one day we saw groups of men (and a few women) in a flooded rice paddy.  They 113
combined slow methodical body movements with a rapid fire ‘stitching’ movement with their planting hand.  I asked 
timuay Itim about their exact pay and was told that it was usually about Php1 per bundle of seedlings.
!  Zamboanga City is eight hours away at a cost of four days at his current salary, from his father Emilio whom he 114
had not seen since their departure from Balabag.
spoke of long backbreaking hours in the sun with a boss that was cruel.  At the time of our interview (July 
2014) he was working as an ice candy vendor which paid him based on the amount he sold, which he 
claimed averaged out to about the same as construction, but was far less stressful. !
 I also spoke with a woman (in her late 30s-early 40s with five children aged 4 to 17) who was to 
about to begin work as a domestic helper in one of the poblacions (interview July 2014).  Her husband had 
been a miner since before MOSSMA was established, beginning in the previous SSM in Depore in 1994. 
The couple both relocated to Balabag when it began operations. He worked in the tunnels and she as a 
sari-sari store minder before transferring to a local bar.  After TVIRD claimed Balabag he relocated to a 
new SSM site three hours away, but similar to Julio’s experience the mine was less lucrative.  She says 
that he would remit money back when he could but this was rare and not nearly enough to support their 
family.  He had not returned home in months as the cost of travel would eat away at the meagre income. 
This woman had moved back in with her parents six months previous due their financial situation, and it 
had reached a critical point.  At the time of our meeting she had just accepted a job in one of the municipal 
poblacions to work as a maid and nanny for a wealthier family, she was due to begin the following week: !
[Balabag] was easy money… now it’s just like punching the moon [‘suntok sa buwan,’ an 
aphorism referring to a hopeless act].  When my husband comes home I don’t know if he’s 
bringing money back… this month he hasn’t sent anything back so far… !
That’s it.  I have to start working now, I’m about to start next week… !
I have to leave my kids because if I don’t they won’t be able to go to school.  I should have 
started this past week, but [the employer] told me to make sure that everything’s ok with my 
kids first because ‘once you’re here you’re here’.  So I’m waiting for my mister, he has to 
take care of them for now—but I don’t know when he’s coming back really because we can’t 
get in touch with him because [he hasn’t been answering the phone].  He doesn’t even know 
my plan yet, I don’t know if he’ll accept staying home with the kids.  But I have to go 
through with it, I’ve already gotten an advance [from the employer] because we didn’t have 
enough money for food. [July 2014] !!!!!
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SOCIAL IMPACTS !
 Overall, the situation regarding employment and earnings opportunities was seen as dire by the 
former Balabag residents and their families.  Related to this lack of opportunity, my interviewees spoke of 
the increase in crime in their barangays and sitios after the end of SSM.  They told me of how this was 
new  : even though they saw themselves as poor before SSM, theft then was rare.  It was especially the 115
women whom I was able to interview who would open up about these issues. The timuays I spoke with 
were also quite candid about the problem.  The problem of theft was also compounded by the increased 
interest in gambling reported by my interview subjects, as well as the growth of the drug use.  While 
neither of these issues were unique in and of themselves in the Philippines, my respondents noted that 
there seemed to be an increase in their use since the arrival of SSM.  If true, this was likely due to the 
increase in earnings  . With the end of mining these had become entrenched habits and addictions.  As 116
noted in the previous chapter, the disincentive towards productive investment for the majority of the SSMs 
lifespan put limitations to upwards mobility in class positions.  In its place the relatively better earning 
miners performed class mobility in classed consumption and class embodiment—some of which saw an 
outlet in social vices. !
 On one occasion my translator  , a former user of shabu (methamphetamine) himself, pointed out 117
that the expressions of many of the passing motorcycle taxi drivers seemed familiar to him.  “I know those 
eyes,” he told me, “that blank look that looks like they’re not here, that’s shabu.”  Norito (an original 
Subanen resident of Balabag introduced in chapter four, and a former employee within the drug trade), 
later corroborated the claim that drug use was rampant in these rural places.  He told me that the local drug 
dealers would buy the product for approximately Php150 “a package  ” in the urban centres and resold 118
here for Php300.  They told me that for a new user a package can last a few days, but for long time users 
sometimes they would need two or three packages a night.  According to multiple interviewees drugs 
entered the community by various means. They shared stories of rich local families being involved in the 
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!  It should also be noted that there is of course a difficulty in reports based on memory.  What people recall, 115
especially after a traumatic event such as the loss of their livelihoods after Balabag, should not be understood as 
ontologically “real”.  Their recollection of happier times during or previous to SSM should be understood within the 
context of their situation at the time of my fieldwork, as a narrative that helps them make sense of their present in 
relation to their past.
!  As explained in the previous chapter.116
!  This translator was not personally involved in Balabag SSM himself, nor was he local to Diplahan or Bayog.117
!  I was never able to get a clear picture of how large an amount that was by weight, just that it was smaller than a 118
pinky fingernail.
drug trade, and stories implicating members of the municipal police as local drug runners into these rural 
places.  !
 The rise in these social vices was possibly one factor adding to perceived increased crime rates in 
the communities.  In my view this would only be a compounding factor to the frustration felt from the loss 
of livelihood with the end of SSM.  As many respondents noted, most did not expect an end to SSM, and 
felt that LSM had “stolen” their futures from them.  This unsurprisingly can act as a push factor towards 
the escape felt via drug use and/or towards theft as a means to supplement a lifestyle that was felt to be 
inadequate.  Similarities can be seen to the frustration felt by the Subanen in the late seventies, which, as 
recalled by Norito and others, led to some turning to crime as a means to gain personal power. 
Figure 1.11: One of the barangay ‘prisons.’ (Note: The person in the photo is not actually inside the 
cage, I asked my companion at the time to make his shadow appear to be inside.) !
 On one evening walking back to timuay Itim’s daughter’s home we saw many young people by 
one of the local stores. They had just installed a television and gambling machine for regional horse 
racing, a form of gambling common to the Philippine urban places but rare in the rural areas due to the 
need for equipment.  I asked timuay Itim about the source of the teens’ money that they were using for 
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gambling and intoxicants.  I was told that theft from one’s parents was one of the most common problems. 
He shared that “many don’t go to school, even though they tell their parents they go.  So they get money 
for school that they use for drinking, drugs, and gambling” (interview June 2014).  Home break-ins were 
also reportedly common as many of the homes were of simple construction and easy to enter.  One of my 
interviewees was an elderly woman who came to speak with me at the home of timuay Itim. She spoke of 
the lack of good work since the end of SSM and of how her sons agricultural labour and her own 
harvesting of bamboo from the forest to sell was not enough to make ends meet.  Later I was told by 
timuay Itim that she was not to be trusted and that her family were known thieves.  Her family, he 
claimed, had been accused of, and punished for, breaking into homes in the past (interviews June 2014). !
 These remote villages and hamlets were too far from the municipal centres to have a regular 
police presence, and so this work was left to the community.  They would elect local “tanods” to act as 
local peace and order officials, and if a problem could not be resolved through mediation, the bigger 
barangays had makeshift prisons that they used as a form of punishment (only if they felt that the crime 
was too unmanageable would the municipal police be called in).  I saw two of the barangay ‘prisons’ for 
myself: one was set of cages approximately seven feet high and six feet across that were in the local 
basketball court; the other was a cave-like bunker with a ceiling too low to stand in under the community 
gazebo near the public market.  Both were obviously very public, and both were regularly used.  For the 
cages in the basketball court I was told that the longest someone had been incarcerated there was for five 
months.  That individual was the son of the elderly woman I spoke of above, he was caught thieving from 
homes.  And I was witness to the gazebo being used when one evening I came across a crowd of people by 
the structure in the near dark (as there were no street lights in the community).  Inside were five men, aged 
from fifteen to their early thirties. They were incarcerated for the evening for drunken misconduct and 
threatening violence after a night of gambling at a sari-sari owned by a purported drug dealer—some of 
them I had previously interviewed days before. ! !
IN CONVERSATION WITH THE WOMEN !
 The impacts of the loss of livelihood, and the perception of the loss of the secure future SSM gave 
was acutely felt by the women in these communities.  Women were the primary care-givers and secondary 
economic contributors to the family within a system that retained feudal relations not just economically 
but also socially.  The cooking, cleaning, and child rearing were primarily women’s responsibility while 
the men would leave during the day to look for work—even if later it would be learned that there was no 
work for them that day.  Though agricultural labour was primarily work done by men, some women also 
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participated if their children were old enough to care for themselves or had someone to care for them 
during the day.  !
  During my time with Timuay Itim there were afternoons or days that were spent at or near his 
home as he had other responsibilities to take care of.  And so I had some time alone with the neighbours, 
and it was here that I was able to gain some very insightful interviews with the women.  This was difficult 
at first as often they would ask that I just speak to the men, but I wanted to speak with them as well as I 
felt that their perspective would help flesh out aspects of everyday life that the men would were not privy 
to.  Moreover, women were impacted in ways often distinct from men, and often resulting from the actions 
of the men themselves. My approach to gain their trust was to try to help with housework.  By helping 
with chores I also hoped that they would feel more relaxed with my presence, and I hoped that in sharing 
their labour   we would be able to break down some of the walls between us. 119!
 This was how I came to know “Leia,” a young Subanen woman in her early twenties and one of 
my most informative and enthusiastic interview subjects (first introduced in chapter five).  She was also 
one of the original residents of Balabag, and though she was not directly involved in SSM her family was 
and she had lived in Balabag during the SSM era. Though reserved at first, I spent some afternoons with 
her and her children helping process their meagre harvest of corn.  Through the shared activity of 
removing dried corn kernels from the husk I was able to gain many insights regarding her experiences as 
an indigenous person and a woman.  We discussed elements of life in Balabag that many of the men would 
only allude to: about violence, community prejudices, and social vices that plagued SSM from the 
beginning (these aspects will be discussed further in the following section).   !
 Post-SSM she moved to this barangay with her family and to supplement the modest income her 
husband brought in via agricultural labour, they planted crops (mostly corn) in parts of field that were 
unused, often on the corners and/or boundaries of the fields of landowners.  They would ask permission 
and provide the landowner with a ten percent share of the harvest.  Corn was one of the main crops of the 
municipalities of Bayog and Diplahan as it was cheaper to both buy and grow.  The corn was ground up 
and cooked in the same way as rice, though it was grittier and a bit rougher on the digestion for those 
unaccustomed.  For many of my interviews with former labourers, corn with salt (or some other savoury, 
or even sweet, element) was a common meal.  In Leia’s home the dried corn was piled atop a large, well 
used, tarpaulin and using ones hands the kernels would be torn off the husk. Their experienced hands 
simply seemed to grab hold of the corn and with a (seemingly easy) twisting motion the job would be 
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!  Though I was also aware from previous experiences in the Philippines that if I overworked myself that would lead 119
to an inverse outcome: that I would shame them for not caring for their guest.
done in three to five seconds.  To the family’s amusement my hands were incapable of the speed nor the 
technique. I used my thumb (first the right, then after it blistered, the left) to painstakingly remove kernels 
row by row.  !
 During the work Leia opened up to me about the difficulty of life for the women in the 
community. With SSM gone it was a return to agricultural labour for most.  Leia spoke about the appetite 
for social vices that began in Balabag, and got carried over to their post-SSM lives.  And she spoke to me 
in hushed tones that many of the women experience domestic violence (most commonly verbal and 
psychological, but not so rarely it also became physical) because of the frustrations experienced by the 
men.   !
There's still a lot [of drinking and drugs].  It's gotten worse.  So much.  Some they can't even 
get enough to eat because they get drunk then they'd go home and it's the wife that suffers… 
beatings.  Because they say, ‘I have nothing left for food,’ and then… the kids cry, and then 
he doesn't know what to do.  You know how it is here, there's no easy work, there's only small 
labour jobs sometimes.  The livelihoods are few and far between (interviews June 2014). !
Claims of spousal abuse were confirmed by my interview with the Department of Social Welfare and 
Development (DSWD) office in Diplahan poblacion (interview July 2014).  They reported that the 
communities of former Balabag miners had the highest reported incidents in Zamboanga Peninsula of not 
only spousal abuse, but also rape and incest.  Their records show that these levels began to increase in the 
mid-2000s as the SSM operations grew. !
 Leia believed that often the men weren’t “smart about money” and would spend it on the things to 
help them forget their problems: alcohol, drugs, gambling.  “They don’t think about the children’s 
education sometimes, they just want to forget” (interview June 2014).  The loss of funds for the education 
of their children was also something that the mothers spoke of with regret.  Though they admit that during 
the MOSSMA era many youth decided to drop out of high school or college to join SSM, at least families 
at that time could afford schooling and encouraged it.  Since 2012, the funds had become more difficult to 
allocate.  Though schooling was technically free in the Philippines to the end of high school, there were 
ancillary costs that made it restrictive for poor families: from the cost of transportation, to school uniforms 
and supplies, school meals, and school “projects” (funds charged by the school at their discretion to pay 
for various school or student needs). ‘Free’ education wasn’t actually free.  And as discussed in the 
demographics section (chapter four), while all barangays had an elementary school, high schools were 
only in the largest barangays, and the nearest college in Bayog poblacion. 
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 The women were expected to do the cooking—and I personally noticed—they seemed to also be 
the last to eat.  I experienced this in the homes I visited, the women wouldn’t eat with the men or children 
who were served first.  Even if I asked them to join us they would usually tell me that they were not yet 
hungry and would eat later.  And unfortunately, later there would be little food left, many nights I saw 
them left with just a small amount of corn and a smaller amount of leftovers.  One of the most common 
(non-income related) complaints I heard was that there was not enough to eat on a regular basis, and that 
protein-rich meals rare.  The women especially lamented that often children would go to school hungry 
and/or have no lunch.  In my time with them I noted that the majority of their calories came from boiled 
corn. This was supplemented by the in-season fruits that could be freely harvested from nearby trees (in 
my time there these were bananas and rambutan), and perhaps twice a week they would have dried salted 
fish or small amounts of meat (mostly fat and bones).  Timuay Itim’s daughter told me,  !
in one day, sometimes, we can't even eat three times.  Sometimes we can only eat once.  Oh 
my.  At night we'd have congee  , that's what we do.  I’d cry.  Sometimes I think, I can't last. 120
I'm going to die here.  My stomach hurts, because I'm not used to it. […] In the mountains… 
we eat more nutritiously there.  We didn't experience hardship (interview June 2014).  !
 With Cory’s family I had a more difficult time connecting with his wife as I didn’t have much 
time alone with her.  Cory was a devout evangelical Christian and I would join him in church and heard 
many sermons about the proper gender roles for the members of the community.  His wife was a 
housewife with a full high school education.  She was very quiet and always deferred to her husband when 
we spoke.  Except for one brief exchange, we never really talked, and to be fair Cory was so diligent and 
enthusiastic in taking me around to meet people that we never had much of a chance.  In that one 
exchange (I wouldn’t call it a full conversation), Cory had stepped out and as his wife served me breakfast 
she asked me about Canada.  She said that “it must be wonderful there, life must be easier.”  She asked me 
about domestic work (she was referring to Canada’s Live-in Caregiver Program) as she had heard that 
Canada was a place where Filipinas could go find lucrative work as a caregiver.  She was concerned that 
her husband’s meagre salary was not enough to ensure their children a good life.  I spoke to her about the 
live-in caregiver program and the hardships faced by some of the program participants, and that Canadian 
citizenship was not necessarily guaranteed.  “It’s still better than life here,” was her response (field notes, 
July 2014).  !
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!  “Lugao” in tagalog.  This is a savoury rice porridge made with leftover rice (or ground corn).120
THE MINE OWNERS AFTER SSM !
 In stark contrast to the post-SSM lives of the majority of the labourers (indigenous and non-
indigenous alike), the Balabag elite (the “Magic Six”) were the outliers, able to see socioeconomic 
improvement (in terms of class mobility and overall quality of life) in the long term for their families. 
They were able to see their investments grow—and along with it their forms of capital—and they were 
able to rise to the ranks of regional bourgeois owning multiple means of production in multiple forms of 
industry.  And though they were not the only individuals to earn in the millions (of pesos) from SSM, the 
other local capitalists shared one key element in common with the labourers in their post-Balabag lives: 
they were not able to rise above their pre-SSM class position  .  Also for some of these smaller owners 121
their post-SSM lives left them with relatively worse economic capital relative to their pre-SSM days. 
Though they often were able to purchase land and homes, and even some small local businesses (or 
improved upon previously owned businesses), they were saddled with large debts—often to the Six who 
were their financiers—that they were not sure they would be able to repay.  As Richard Ligan, Provincial 
ENRO (Environment and Natural Resources Office) for Zamboanga del Sur noted in our interview, “if you 
conduct a survey of the miners, you’ll see that only the financiers got rich, the others remained what they 
were before […] and that’s despite there being more money there than in farming (interview July 2015).” !!
THE MAGIC SIX !
 From the very first interview in the field I conducted with an activist from Bayog, the name of 
“Ginto  ” was brought up as one of the few “rags to riches” stories of Balabag.  Ginto was spoken of with 122
a kind of reverence, as an individual with no social vices and who through personal initiative turned both 
Balabag, and themselves, into a success.  In this initial interview (June 2014) there was no emphasis on 
Ginto’s class origins, instead the focus was that she was “smart with money”.  Over the course of a few 
weeks I attempted to correspond with Ginto via phone calls and text messages.  After initially answering 
my calls, it became clear that she was suspicious of me and told me that she was currently too busy to be 
interviewed (Filipino culture generally frowns on outright saying “no”). Her suspicions could be partially 
traced to the outstanding legal cases between MOSSMA and TVIRD, as well to allegedly leaked 
documents from TVIRD that had outright threatened a few of the bigger names attached to SSM in 
Balabag.  Ginto only finally agreed to speak with me after one of her close friends, whom I was 
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!  Even though within SSM they may have seen class mobility.121
!  First introduced in chapter five as one of the first investors of the MOSSMA era and member of the “Magic Six”.122
introduced to via my local partner organization (AdPeace), vouched for me and my research.  We met at 
one of the large (non-mining related) businesses Ginto’s family operated in the poblacion   of one of the 123
nearby municipalities to Balabag.  It was a lavish place—the sort I had become quite unaccustomed to in 
the field—it was cooled by multiple air conditioners, had high ceilings, large windows, and clean tile 
floors that smelt of bleach.   !
 Ginto was kind, soft spoken, and very simply dressed. If you met her on the street you’d not think 
for a moment that she was anyone special. Her classed performance was quite counter to my expectation 
of ‘new-money’ stereotypical behaviour and appearance.  Ginto was open with her time and we spoke off 
and on over the course of about five hours, though our conversation was continuously interrupted by 
phone calls regarding her business dealings.  One of the first things Ginto told me in our interview was 
that she was finished with mining (in Balabag or anywhere else) as she now had other means to earn 
income that were more secure than SSM.  Another member of the Six was even more adamant in his 
detachment from mining, stating repeatedly to me that he had no more connections to the area and did not 
have much to say about SSM to me (his stated concern was the welfare of the Subanen who he saw as 
being exploited across the region  ).  After the closure of SSM in Balabag all but one of the Six left the 124
rural interior and relocated into urban centres and began lives quite different from Balabag or from their 
lives previous.  I saw the homes of three of the four Magic Six members I interviewed, they reminded me 
of the large mansions found in Manila’s gated communities. !
 For the Magic Six not only did their economic capital increase with SSM but so too did their 
social capital as their success in Balabag established them as the top capitalists which extended their 
network to other elites through both political and economic channels.   !
Modesty aside, there are already numbers of local people who have accumulated wealth and 
improved their living condition expand and diverse their investments or businesses thereby 
also helped other people through employment in the different business endeavors that they 
have entered into outside the mine site (MOSSMA 2011  ). 125
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!  “Poblacion” meaning the central town of the municipality123
!  This member of the Six was one of three that ran for political office in the 2012 elections.  Two ran for high 124
municipal positions, the other for a lower level LGU.  In our interview what he wanted to speak about was his plans 
to help the Subanen gain legal recognition for their land claims.  He spoke of how even after gaining land title they 
would need help in managing these lands and that his office was doing its best to help set up training and create 
foundations to help them.
!  The grammar was left uncorrected in this quote from a MOSSMA pamphlet entitled “MONTE DE ORO.... THE 125
LAND, THE MINE, THE PEOPLE... still, the continuing struggle!” Obtained from a former MOSSMA official.
!
The economic capital that SSM brought was accumulated and invested into a variety of non-mining 
related ventures ranging from greater agricultural land holdings (outside of Balabag), to agricultural 
industries, to service and other commercial properties.  Further there were attempts to trade their newly 
increased capital into political power which proved successful for two of the Six (with a third losing by a 
very narrow margin).  While politics may not seem an ‘investment’ at first, high positions of political 
power were seen by some Philippine activists and academics (as well as beyond) as one of the most 
lucrative sources of wealth in the country.  Described by Philippine activists as “bureaucrat capitalism,” 
political positions were seen as a means of enriching oneself and one’s family by incorporating themselves 
as key lynchpins in a neo-colonial network that benefits from the semi-feudal nature of the Philippine 
rural economy.  Through this system one can use one’s position of political power to benefit from both 
legal and extra-legal dealings with Western governments and companies (Aguilan 1973; Quimpo 2005).  !!
THE OTHER MINE OWNERS !
 The former SSM owners who were not part of the Magic Six spoke of a different post-mining life, 
one that shared a key point in common with the former labourers: while SSM had increased their 
economic capital for a time, and while some had made various levels of investment outside of mining, 
when SSM in Balabag ended, they found their overall class positions unchanged from the pre-SSM status 
quo.  These individuals remained in the rural communities around Balabag and though they tended to live 
in homes of better construction than the former labourers, and tended to operate small businesses, they all 
spoke of large debts and a large drop in quality of life since the end of SSM.  Though their children all 
tended to have at least a high school education, some spoke of having to make the hard choice which of 
their children would receive a college education in lieu of dwindling funds.  And beyond that, the fear for 
their children’s future was apparent as they were uncertain what opportunities even a college education 
would open to them.  !
 In general what became of the smaller owners could be related to their class positions pre-SSM.  A 
small number of the former small mine owners I interviewed were able to enter into ownership after years 
of work as mine labourers.  For this group, having come from a poor peasant background mostly 
(according to my sample of interviews), rejoined this class and returned to agricultural labour (e.g. timuay 
Itim), or transitioned to other (far less profitable) SSM locations. In an example of the latter, one husband-
wife team invested what remained of their economic capital into a rod mill near the original sitio Depore 
site that predated Balabag (interview July 2014). A mixed marriage between a Subanen and a Visayan, 
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they both came from poor peasant families. They spoke of their struggle to first set up a rod mill in 
Balabag and the frustration of having had to leave in heavy debt to the Six.  After the demolition of the 
community they spent what remained of their savings, combined with the pawning of their luxury items, 
in an attempt to maintain the a portion of the success they had experienced.  In the new site they operated 
a rod mill, a CIP plant, and a small (“sari-sari”) store. All together they estimated average monthly 
earnings of approximately Php5000 (compared to P175,000 a month average in Balabag).  “Here in 
Depore the problem is the water, the tunnels flood easily due to our being at an even level with the river, 
so it costs a lot to pump this out of the tunnels.” While they succeeded in maintaining their class position 
by remaining mining capitalists, the low yield of the Depore site meant low profits which impacted their 
performance of class.  Of their three children they could only afford to send one to college. They chose the 
second child, a male, over the first born female. They spoke of how it was very difficult to make the 
choice, but they felt that the male child would have a better opportunity to find work (as a seafarer) after 
graduation.  They had hoped that this new rod mill would earn enough for the schooling, but it was under-
performing.  They worry they may not be able to afford it for much longer and that the son will have to 
take a break and find a job. !
 Other former small mine owners, like Ibon (first introduced in the chapter five), had come from a 
petit bourgeois family who had fallen on difficult times.  For Ibon it was an electoral loss that drove them 
from their home community and damaged their economic and social capital.  Ibon had made the risk to 
venture on his own and invest in SSM with what remained of his family savings and with financing help 
from the Magic Six.  After the end of Balabag SSM he too tried to find a semblance of what he had lost by 
reinvesting in a rod mill in another part of Diplahan, but was becoming disheartened.  The site, like that in 
Depore, had poor yields (“there’s not much there, we’re lucky to get two grams a week”).  He also ran a 
small gold buying business and was one of the local buyers for the remaining low yield SSMs scattered 
around Diplahan and Bayog. They would sell this purchased gold to a larger regional gold buyer in the 
poblacion.  They also had invested in a three hectares of land where they planted rubber and coconut trees 
but at the time of my interview they were still too young to harvest.  Ibon estimates that in the month of 
our interview (July 2014) they will make a net income of Php5000.  !
 Ibon lived in one of the bigger homes in his baragay, it was solidly built, two stories tall, and had a 
large kitchen area and multiple living spaces.  Yet it was very much unfinished.  Ibon spoke of how the 
funds simply ran out as they had only began building when the threat of TVIRDs takeover became closer 
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to reality  . Hastily completed in concrete, it almost seemed as if the Ibon family were “squatters” in an 126
unfinished home they discovered.  The large kitchen had a fridge and stove, but Ibon told me that the 
stove was rarely used these days as they couldn’t afford to pay for gas, and the fridge usually wasn’t 
plugged in as they needed to conserve on their energy expenses. The entire first floor was almost 
unfurnished and the bare concrete made it feel cavernous.  They had a makeshift wood burning kitchen set 
up outside that they used most of the time.  Our interview was conducted on the second floor, which was 
the floor where it seemed they spent most of their time.  It was comfortably furnished and had photos and 
colourful cloth covering the concrete walls. The photos were mostly of their five children, two of whom 
were currently in college (the other three in lower grades).  Ibon spoke much about the expensiveness of 
schooling and their fears for their kids future. They were only able to afford the schooling of their two 
college aged children with help from their social network, but they were uncertain how long they could 
rely on this support.  He was also thankful that for now, his financier in the Six had given him time to 
settle his affairs before asking for repayment of outstanding debts. The hope was that eventually the elder 
kids would find work abroad after graduation and thus be able to help with family debts and pay for their 
younger siblings college education—otherwise Ibon was unsure how their family would survive 
economically in the future.    !
 The vast majority of these smaller owners began as middle peasants who operated plots of 
agricultural land or small business owners like the agricultural buyer-sellers, or owners of small to 
medium sized retail establishments in the municipal centres.  These individuals tended to return to their 
original sources of income.  Take for example “Arsy” who came from a small land owning Visayan family 
from a neighbouring province and held a college degree (interview July 2014).  Her parents were famers 
and had a small rice buying/selling business. Balabag allowed Arsy to grow that business but she also was 
saddled with debt to a financier in the Six.  I also spoke with a Muslim former mine owner who had been 
the owner of a medium sized retail establishment in the poblacion before Balabag (interview July 2014). 
He returned to that business after 2012.  He was already moderately successful before mining and so did 
not amass a large debt.  He was able to reinvest earnings from his rod mill back into his retail business, but 
he felt that if CIP plant investment wasn’t discouraged he could have earned much more. !!!!
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!  The threat of an LSM takeover was ever-present since the late 1990s so it had become normalized.  It wasn’t until 126
the second decade of the 21st century when government support was more clearly shifting against MOSSMAs 
favour.
ANALYZING MOBILITY IN THE POST-SSM ERA !
 While in the previous chapter I focused on the class dynamics found within Balabag SSM (from 
the changes and developments in class position, process, performance, and politics), in this chapter on life 
after SSM I wanted to complement that analysis with a combination of participant observation and 
respondent reflections about their post-Balabag well-being. In the transition from an agrarian- to an 
extraction-based economy, many were able to see improvements (at least in the sense of increased 
earnings), but for the majority the economic gains were not carried over to their post-Balabag lives. The 
loss of artisanal mining operations had severe social impacts from the loss of funds for the education of 
their youth, to domestic problems, to the perception of increased social vices. With the loss of SSM the 
quality of life for many of the participants dropped. Health problems, once considered an acceptable trade-
off for the better life chances mining provided, were now chronic issues that impacted their ability to earn 
even a subsistence living.   !
 For the majority, the gains made in class position and economic capital during mining had come to 
an end and they were pushed to either return to their previous livelihoods, gamble on new SSM sites that 
could provide a ‘lucky strike’ (but more likely provided earnings similar or lower than agricultural work), 
or risk migrating to urban centres. Speaking in economic terms many returned to the class positions they 
originated from, but the class processes and class performances of their previous lives were not easily 
rewinded.  Debts to financiers remained, and the classed consumption and embodiment’s of their former 
lives clashed with their new economic realities.  Further, there was one group who lost more than their 
socioeconomic earnings and investments on Mt. Balabag, they lost Mt. Balabag itself—these were the 
original Subanen residents. After they were displaced from Balabag by the TVIRD takeover their 
community was scattered. Some went to other isolated Subanen upland communities, and others joined 
the settler communities in the municipalities of Bayog and Diplahan. !
 The small mine owners who came from petit bourgeouse/middle peasant class positions previous 
to Balabag were mostly able to retain or even modestly grow the businesses/lands they previously 
operated.  They retained their (pre-SSM) class position and tended to retain the classed performances 
associated with that position.  So while they saw a significant loss of economic capital, their social and 
cultural capital remained relatively higher than the majority in the rural areas.  This should be contrasted 
with small mine owners who came from labourer and/or indigenous backgrounds.  For them post-Balabag 
life often meant a return to their pre-mining livelihoods, with three exceptions.  First, there were those 
who sought labour work in other SSMs or in urban centres.  Second, there was the one married couple 
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who continued as small mine owners   by investing in a new (and unprofitable) SSM site. And finally, 127
there were the owners who were part of the original Subanen Balabag community. This group of 
labourers-turned-owners perceived the most significant negative impacts to their life chances and quality 
of life after the end of artisanal mining operations.  These former poor peasants who became mine owners 
may have improved their economic capital and class positions during Balabag SSM, but their social and 
cultural capital did not increase to the same degree—which became more noticeable after their 
displacement.  In their performance of class, which included the embodiment of culturally encoded 
markers, they were perceived, by others as well as themselves, as ‘poor’. !
 The major exception in post-mining outcomes, of course, was for the elite (the “Magic Six”) who 
not only saw their class positions rise during SSM, but were able to translate that to post-mining 
socioeconomic mobility.  Previously to Balabag they were petit bourgeois/middle peasants with small 
landholdings and small agricultural businesses, after Balabag they were able to increase their land 
holdings and were able to join the regional bourgeoisie as medium to large business owners and/or large 
land owners.  They saw an increase to their economic capital both in terms of direct liquid assets as well 
as the aforementioned investments, to their cultural capital in high educational attainment for their 
families, and to their social capital in joining the regional elite (with two of their number also achieving 
political office). !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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!  There were stories of a few other small owners who similarly went on to a new site, but they tended to be former 127
petit bourgeois individuals like Ibon and not former agricultural workers or indigenous people.
Chapter Seven: 
CONCLUSION !
 In 2007 I was exposed as an activist and journalist to the issues faced by former small-scale 
miners impacted by the large-scale mining of TVIRD (the Philippine subsidiary of Canada’s TVI-Pacific). 
This experience became the inspiration for my field research in the summer of 2014 which was 
documented in this thesis. I conducted interviews and collected documents regarding socioeconomic 
mobility resulting from small-scale mining (SSM) on Mt. Balabag (Zamboanga del Sur, Mindanao).  This 
work included inquiries to life before, during, and after the end of operations in the autumn of 2012, when 
TVIRD enforced their land claims and the mining community was displaced. I spoke to former mining 
community members about how their lives had been changed by SSM and how that experience impacted 
their post-mining lives. I wanted to discover how mining had impacted social mobility both during, and 
after, operations. My research asked: What effect did SSM have on the production of class and capital 
accumulation?  As the risk of a LSM takeover was always present (as the threat was there from the 
beginning of the SSM’s existence and the events at Canatuan were well known), were the former miners 
able to make long term decisions to translate their socioeconomic gains from mining into post-mining 
socioeconomic mobility? Why or why not? !
 I examined socioeconomic mobility through the relationship between class and different forms of 
capital.  Class was analyzed through through Marxian terms (via the structure of land ownership and 
related productive assets) and via wider theorizations that intersect the economic with cultural and social 
factors.  Using the framework of Philip Kelly’s four dimensions of capital (position, process, performance, 
and politics) the improved economic potentials of Balabag SSM were related to Pierre  Bourdieu’s three 
types of capital (economic, social, and cultural) which posited that a distinction between financial flows 
and other axes of difference can provide analytically beneficial implications. Where in Marxian theory the 
ownership of economic capital is the prime determining factor for class identification, Bourdieu shows 
that other factors also play key roles in how class is performed and embodied. This can impact how 
relationships between class positions can also be processes that individuals choose to enter into. Further, 
these conceptions also help in the understanding of why individual interests can be multi-dimensional, or 
why the members of the same economic class position can have divergent interests and even create 
political groupings that seem to demonstrate intra-class struggle. !
 In this research I analyzed the changes in class position (and the related impacts to class 
processes, performance, and politics) that occurred in the transition from an agrarian- to an extraction-
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based economy—and how these were carried over to post-SSM life.  This was complemented with an 
analysis on how these changes impacted  the perception of overall life chances (i.e. improved educational 
attainment, improved chances in acquiring stable above-subsistence livelihoods, etc.), and quality of life 
(i.e. cultural and health impacts). The economic aspects were stressed in chapter five (“Small-scale 
Mining in Balabag”), and the social and cultural aspects in chapter six (“Life After SSM”), though there 
was much overlap between the two. !
 The primary group that saw long term (post-mining) mobility were Balabag’s capitalist elite, who 
were given the title of the “Magic Six” by the SSM labourers.  They were petit bourgeois middle peasants 
and their relatively advanced social connections, buttressed by the legitimacy conveyed by educational 
attainment, allowed them access to the fledgling Balabag SSM community.  From there they used those 
same forms of capital to access low interest loans which allowed them to invest into mining equipment 
and labour when there were not yet other large investors on the scene.  They created and led the Monte de 
Oro Small Scale Miners Association (MOSSMA), the mining organization that would control local SSM, 
and in time they became the new SSM elite.  For the Six all three forms of capital rose during the Balabag 
SSM lifespan.  Their positions of economic and political power (the latter coming from their leadership 
both of MOSSMA and the Balabag LGU) allowed them greater access to, and social connections with, the 
regional elite. They made investments in industries outside of Balabag and two of the six won positions of 
political power in the 2013 elections, with the third falling short by a narrow margin. !
 In comparison, the majority of those involved with SSM saw themselves return to  their pre-
mining class positions after the autumn of 2012.  While some of the second tier mine owners were able to 
modestly invest outside of Balabag (mostly into small parcels of land under five hectares, into small 
agricultural businesses, and/or into new—and less productive—SSM sites) these tended to be those who 
already had small businesses or landholdings previously.  The majority of the mine labourers returned to 
precarious and inconsistent agricultural labour, with some exceptions. This was a source of frustration for 
the majority as they reported socioeconomic mobility within SSM only to have it end with the LSM 
takeover. !
 Within this story was embedded the struggles of the local indigenous peoples, the Subanen.  They 
were the first inhabitants of the peninsula and were the original inhabitants of Mt. Balabag before the 
arrival of SSM.  Pre-mining the Subanen residents of Balabag engaged in kaingin (swidden) agriculture 
and though economically poor, they had relative food security and attempted to keep themselves separate 
from the migrant settlers who lived in the lowlands.  The neoliberal era brought new waves of intrusion 
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into their lives, first under the guise of anti-insurgency in the 1980s and then mining in the 1990s. They  128
eventually came to represent the majority of the population involved with mining, but very few came to 
fill mine ownership positions within the class position structure.  Entering SSM with low levels of all 
three forms of capital they faced both discrimination and economic marginalization, and the long term 
impact of SSM on them was the most generally negative of all my respondents.  In viewing this through 
the class-as-performance lens of Kelly’s multi-dimensional class framework, their ethnicity can be seen as 
a form of embodied cultural capital.  The Subanen were viewed as less capable by settlers by virtue of 
their being indigenous (especially in the early stages of Balabag SSM development), and though with time 
they were able to gain social capital within the community, the perceptions of difference meant that they 
had more obstacles relative to settlers who began from similar class positions.  The original Subanen 
residents of Balabag also experienced the harshest effects of displacement as unlike the settlers they had 
no ‘home’ to return to and so were doubly displaced. !
 In general however my interviews with the small-scale miners of Balabag painted a relatively 
positive picture of economic growth (at least in terms of income).  During the SSM era most of those 
involved did see a significant increase in earnings, and some labourers were able to improve their class 
positions to become small mine owners. Former small land owners turned small miners were able to see 
greater earnings and eventually won a significant victory (in the final years of SSM operations) over the 
elite so as to weaken their control over the most profitable means of production.  Yet the majority of these 
individuals, perhaps due to not having had enough time to accumulate the capital to spread beyond 
Balabag and/or SSM, were unable to significantly strategize for post-mining life.  Their socioeconomic 
mobility was tied to SSM, and when the end came in late 2012 so too did the improvements it provided 
them.  And for the majority of the labourers, the end of artisanal operations meant a full return to their 
difficult pre-mining agricultural livelihoods—though they brought with them the baggage of having once 
known relative economic security.  Thus the majority, despite the knowledge that a LSM takeover was an 
ever-present threat, were unable to strategize successfully for life post-mining.   !
 Of the few that did see some improvement, these can be split into two groups: !
1) A very small number, primarily the Balabag elite known as the “Magic Six,” were able to translate 
their involvement in SSM into post-mining upward class mobility, and into non-mining related 
business investments that continued to see benefits for their families post-2012 (as discussed above). 
In terms of class performance, their outward displays of class mobility were seen, for example, in 
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!  “They” in this case referring to Subenen in general, not just those originating from Balabag.128
their forms of consumption (e.g. large lavish homes and expensive cars), which were recognized even 
by other former Balabag miners as signs of their ‘rags to riches’ stories. 
2) A slightly larger, but still small relative to the total, group of smaller mine owners who did not see 
post-mining improvements in class position but were able to make small investments outside Balabag 
SSM.  Like those in the Six, before Balabag they had been small landowners and/or owners of small 
businesses, but contrary to the Six they left mining with only moderately increased investments. The 
TVIRD takeover came at a time soon after the small mine owners victory over elite control over 
productive investment. This resulted in the significant economic losses. Despite having been mine 
owners, their classed relationships to the elite were always subservient and post-mining many of these 
individuals continued to be in heavy debt to the them. Their classed consumption suffered a decline 
post-2012 which led to their perception of downward mobility.  An example could be seen in their 
relatively modern homes, built during the SSM era, that they could no longer maintain   at the same 129
level.  There is a question left dangling in this analysis that this research cannot answer: had their late 
investments into highly profitable CIP Plants come sooner, or the entry of LSM come later, would 
their post-SSM lives have followed a similar path as the elites? !
 The positive (though for most short-lived) aspects of Balabag SSM also came paired with 
negative elements: !
1) The impact to environmental and human health: SSM, being mostly unregulated, was conducted 
with the goal of immediate profits. Safety regulations and equipment were often sub-par and/or non-
existent.  Miners themselves reported that waste disposal procedures were not optimal and probably 
impacted human health.  Long term environmental health was not a priority.  The effect on the 
environment was especially a concern for the Subanen residents of Balabag who saw the site as their 
community and who still held out hope of a return.  Both these impacts had a direct effect on their 
long term life chances and quality of life.   
2) The exploitation of the indigenous Subanen:  Previous to the arrival of SSM Mt. Balabag had been 
home to a small community of Subanen.  While this land (and most of Zamboanga Peninsula) had 
been part of the ancestral domain of these indigenous people, they only came to reside on the 
mountain after the arrival of Filipino settlers to the lowlands of Diplahan and Bayog pushed them 
upland starting in the 1960s.  Despite this, and despite being the initial discoverers of gold deposits on 
the mountain, the Subanen saw only tacit recognition of their rights. The 1999 FPIC document with 
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!  This could be seen in the presence of appliances (e.g. stoves, refrigerators, and other electronic devices) that were 129
unused due to the lack of funds to pay electrical bills.
MOSSMA was perceived to only benefit Subanen leaders who hadn’t resided on Balabag.  The 
community believed that their rights were not respected and that only their estranged leaders 
benefitted.  Reports by many Subanen interviewees of racist discrimination within SSM employment 
can be seen as an example of classed embodiment.  
3) Despite an increase in income, educational attainment remained low:  The reality of poor 
educational attainment for the majority, especially within the families of labourers, demonstrate that a 
direct link between economic capital and education is problematic. Other factors, such as the value of 
schooling in improving life chances in a region dominated by semi-feudal agriculture need to be 
examined.  Most respondents spoke highly of their desire to see their children educated, and of how 
SSM allowed them the funds to send their children to school.  However, in my interviews I 
discovered that many youth chose to drop out of school in their high school years in order to join the 
SSM workforce.  They did so because they saw mining incomes as greater than what they could find 
elsewhere and it did not require a diploma or a degree.  College attendance remained extremely low 
during the SSM era, except for those from settler   petit bourgeois/middle peasant backgrounds 130
previous to SSM.  However, even in this latter group a college education was not universal. 
4) The lack of incentive and opportunity for productive investment:  For much of the lifespan of 
Balabag SSM the mining elite attempted to limit ownership of mining capital (modelled upon the 
semi-feudal agricultural system). This limit, matched with increasing economic capital within the 
community, had effects on the way earnings were spent, with many labourers focusing on the 
perceived “good life” of classed performances via consumption. The tight control on productive 
investment by the elite eventually resulted in intra-class fragmentation.  A form of class-as-politics 
emerged within the small mine owners to break the hold of the elite over the most profitable 
investments (especially regarding the ownership of CIP plants) which led to the relaxation of 
MOSSMA regulations in 2009.  Overall, the class processes of Balbag SSM maintained a division 
between financier and financed, and this kept labourers and small mine owners alike tied to the elite 
resulting in obligations of debt and profit sharing. 
5) The development of a ‘gold rush’ masculinist culture:  Balabag was a ‘gold rush’ site where 
individuals from other communities congregated to earn a livelihood.  As such, it was a community 
predominantly of men who left their families in their home communities in the lowlands during the 
period in which they worked (the main exception here were the original Subanen residents).  This 
helped create a hyper-masculinist culture that amplified the already “macho” culture found in the 
Philippines.  Drinking, gambling, drug use, and womanizing were normalized part of their routines as 
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!  None of my Subanen interviewees, even those who were small mine owners, had children that reached the college 130
level.  Here again the embodied nature of their “Subanen-ness” seem to play a role in how they navigate classed 
performance.
reported to me.  These issues can also be seen as having some basis in the lack of incentive and 
opportunity for productive investment during the majority of the SSM era. This masculinist culture 
also resulted in reports of household difficulties after the end of Balabag mining, seen in domestic 
conflicts over money, as well as in direct violence against women. 
6) Problems with peace and order:  Reports of intra-community violence in the rush to maximize 
personal profits were also shared during my fieldwork.  Unsystematic mining methods and cultural 
differences helped fuel distrust.  This was further compounded by the lack of community solidarity 
found in a ‘gold rush’ site which puts groups of male strangers in competition with each other.  Here 
the known threat of a TVIRD takeover may also have added a temporal pressure to maximize 
earnings in as short a timeframe as possible, but this is only speculation. !
 It is interesting to note that the negative social consequences within this SSM community are 
comparable to results found in LSM around the world.  From the weakening of familial bonds, to anxiety 
depression, social vices (like alcoholism and gambling) and other ‘high-risk’ activities (Donoghue 2004; 
Gibson and Klinck 2009; McLean 2012; Sharma and Rees 2007), and increased gender inequity and 
gender specific issues (e.g. prostitution, domestic violence, etc.) resulting from the growth of ‘macho’ 
culture (Ahmad & Lahiri-dutt 2006; Bhanumathi 2002; Carreon 2009; Gibson and Klinck 2009; Sharma 
and Rees 2007), turmoil has been shown to follow foreign LSM.  For example, in her work with the 
Mayan-Mam of Guatemala, Suzana Caxaj (2014) discusses the social unravelling within mining sites, not 
just in her field sites but as seen in other literature.  She refers to this as a climate of fear and discord, as 
seen in embodied expressions of distress.  By the former she was referring to deeply divided views on the 
mining company resulting in divisions in the once collective unity of the community.  These experiences 
of distress were physically, emotionally, and spiritually embodied and resulted in overlapping symptom 
clusters much like the symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (2014:54).  Her work also noted that 
poor health resulting from mine labour, environmental contamination, and/or economic degradation was 
an additional area of study that needs further attention, with the work that has already been done strongly 
hinting at how this negatively affects mining communities (2014:51).  With the former miners of Balabag, 
all the above was discovered to be present even before the claiming of the SSM land by the Canadian 
transnational corporation.  This points to causes that go beyond TNCs alone, and suggests a more systemic 
problem related to the nature of extractive industries within the logic of capitalism itself. !
 After SSM in Balabag ended these negatives continued to have effects and ramifications.  Health 
issues continued and potentially could be further aggravated due to the loss of income needed for 
treatment.  The impacts on family life were noted as well as the loss of livelihoods combined with the 
effects of the masculinist SSM culture.  Respondents noted how this made women and children especially 
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vulnerable, as seen in reports of increased domestic abuse.  This may also have informed why many of the 
former miners had reportedly turned to increased social vices relative to pre-mining levels as an escape  . 131
For the Balabag Subanen, the complete loss of their lands and community show elements of the 
‘resettlement effect’ as noted in the mining-induced displacement literature. These include “multi-
dimensional impoverishment, the loss of homes, communities, productive land, income-earning assets, 
subsistence, community-shared resources, and cultural sites (Downing 2007:1).”  And even for the other 
members of the community who never called Balabag ‘home’ some elements of this effect could be seen 
as hinting at how important economic factors were to these displacement effects. !
 The benefits seen in this SSM site also raised many questions about gold rush SSM (in Balabag 
and in general) that this research is unable to answer. I pose them here as a challenge to future research. 
What would have been the long term socioeconomic impacts in a similar site where an LSM had not 
succeeded in claiming a high yield small-scale mine, and/or where the SSM association had been been 
successful in securing a legal permit?  And how many of the changes seen in the latter years of artisanal 
mining were due to the outside influences outlined in this thesis?  It was the case that while operational the 
majority did report an increase in at least their economic capital in comparison to that seen in the 
agricultural sector that dominates the region.  And it was the case that some did see, and more were 
beginning to see, some level of socioeconomic mobility, with even some former mine labourers becoming 
small mine owners.  The class politics of small mine owners had begun to win victories against the elite 
and the structure based on semi-feudal agricultural production was breaking down.  But to what extent 
was this shift the result of rising fortunes by the increasingly wealthy small owners and miners? And how 
much was it informed by the ticking clock of LSM dispossession?  Did the TVIRD threat influence the 
elite’s decisions to relax regulations for the purpose of maximizing short term gains at the expense of their 
control of production? !
 The changes in 2009 to 2010 allowed greater productive investment within SSM by other 
members of the community (beyond the Magic Six) that created significant incentives to investment 
which did not exist previously. This resulted in a spike in lending by smaller owners and relatively 
wealthy labourers from financiers within the Six. Had TVIRD not entered just under three years later 
would the path to greater long term socioeconomic mobility have been laid?  In contrast, what if the 
restrictions to productive investment not been relaxed?  If not for the spike in SSM investment in these 
latter years the level of post-mining debt would probably have been lower. How would this have changed 
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!  Though this may also be a case of how memory narratives were employed a means of making sense of their 131
present through a comparison with a more tranquil past.
post-mining outcomes?  This work on Balabag SSM poses more questions than answers and reflects the 
need for further research.   !
 In contrast to my research, the literature I reviewed on small-scale mining worldwide tended to 
have a more positive outlook (Jennings 1999; Hentschel et al 2002; Peluso 2015; Villegas et al 2012).  For 
example, Nancy Lee Peluso’s article on a ‘gold rush’ style small-scale mine in Indonesian Borneo (2015) 
saw benefits resulting from locally controlled mining while recognizing some of the dangers.  !
Small-scale illegal mining in West Kalimantan is dangerous to human and environmental 
health. It’s also a shot at economic independence for marginalised rural people (Peluso 2015). !
While my research did see similar benefits, I also discovered that few of those lived beyond the SSM era. 
The end of artisanal mining saw a return for most to pre-mining standards.  Other researchers into 
Philippine SSM also found that in general,  !
…the fact [is] that the living conditions of the vast number of small-scale miners, who have 
long been contributing significantly to the country’s economy, have not improved. And just 
like the rest of the peasantry, small-scale miners also remain in exploitative social and 
economic relations with the financiers, middlemen and large-scale mining corporations (Rey 
and Saturay 2005:21). !
How much can the differences seen between Peluso and myself be the result of the different histories of 
Kalimantan and the Zamboanga Peninsula?  The contrasts in our work could be used to highlight how the 
different forms capitalism can take in different places can have significantly different effects on how 
extractive gains are controlled and distributed.  For example she indicates that Kalimantan miners also had 
access to agricultural land, whereas in my site (as with most of the Philippines) there was little agricultural 
land not already owned by large landlord families.  The countryside’s semi-feudal system in turn, helped 
inform the way extractive production was systematized in my research site, which could possibly account 
for further differences in our research. !
 Extraction is also by definition a short term industry.  The minerals will eventually run dry and its 
environmental and human effects will linger beyond that end.  So if it is the case that ‘gold rush’ artisanal 
mining’s benefits are tied to the existence of that mine can this industry alone be a path to long term 
economic independence?  In other words, can this be a sustainable path to development?  In looking to 
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successful places where development began with a gold rush the connection between the local and state 
scales can be seen.  In describing California Richard Walker (2010) writes, !
the secret of California’s success is to be found in its social relations of production, especially 
open property rights and a syncretic class system, rapid capital accumulation, and a 
redoubtable state based firmly on the capitalist society that crafted it. (Walker  2010:167) !
In contrast to gold-rush California which existed within a core state, Zamboanga Peninsula exists within a 
neo-colonial peripheral. The Philippines remains governed mostly by political dynasties (Simbulan 2012) 
whose family power comes from the semi-feudal system in which benefits from their position as ‘middle 
men’ facilitates the transfer of economic capital from the periphery to core.  As large landowning families 
who derive the majority of their profit and power from the extraction of rent, they had little incentive to 
reinvest their earnings into greater productive capacity: “rather than reinvesting to raise farm productivity, 
most landlords behaved as ‘rent capitalists’” (Krinks 2002:104).  Thus in the rural areas like that 
surrounding Mt. Balabag socioeconomic opportunities remained poor for the majority, which was in great 
part what made mining so attractive. !
 Since the Philippines was granted formal independence by the United States after World War Two 
it has played the role of peripheral state within the global capitalist economy. Core states, like Canada, 
have found value in extracting raw materials and cheap labour in this relationship and in the neoliberal era 
that has extended into mining. However, this was not purely the top-down relationship as portrayed in 
orthodox globalization discourse. The global scale does not dictate actions on the local scale. If it did LSM 
would dominate without opposition.  The fact that SSM exists in myriad forms (generally put into the 
broad categories of ‘traditional’ and ‘gold rush’) displays the power local people can wield.  The 
development of local mining in Zamboanga peninsula, a region with no history of mining before the 
twentieth century (and no SSM until the neoliberal era), was testament to agency on the local scale.  The 
scales should not be viewed as independent but as nested within each other, the global affected the local 
and vice versa. The profitability of the extractive industries in relatively remote areas provided what 
Harvey called a ‘spatial fix’ to the crises of global capitalism.  This interest in mining, and the spike in 
gold prices, also created new possibilities for the people of mineral-rich Zamboanga peninsula to act upon 
this opening. !
 In contrast to the globalization discourse that privileged economic neocolonialism via 
transnational corporations, local entrepreneurs sought a form of economic nationalism through SSM. 
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According to MOSSMA mining would improve the lives of the local people who engaged in the activity. 
In my research the former miners unanimously agreed that SSM did at least improve their economic 
capital.  In a region that lacked large domestic industry, and dominated by a semi-feudal agricultural 
economy, the earnings found in mining were a significant improvement. Unfortunately, with state support 
behind LSM and with most of benefits found within SSM seemingly tied to its lifespan, the question of 
long term socioeconomic mobility for local peoples remain problematic.  !
 Considering the vast mineral wealth of the Philippines it seems that the potential is there for a 
better way to create local development through extraction, but the current choices between foreign large-
scale mining and poorly regulated local small-scale mining (that is virtually unsupported by the state) are 
both problematic.  Any long term development strategy will require a more integrated approach that 
focuses on creating overall greater opportunities beyond mining.  As my study on SSM shows, the benefits 
of a single industry are precarious and depend too much on that industry’s  continued existence. This 
points to an even greater problem within the Philippines that goes much beyond the scope of this research, 
the general problem of an overall lack of both job and investment opportunities. The development of 
industrialization both in support of, and as an alternative to, mining can help incentivize the productive 
investment of all forms of capital.   !
 In their analysis of SSM AGHAM writes: !
The character of the small-scale mining in the Philippines is a clear reflection of the 
neocolonial and semi-feudal character of the country’s economy and society – an age-old 
livelihood source and tradition, forced to integrate into the cash economy and the export-
orientation of the whole mining industry (Rey and Saturay 2005:21). !
When I arrived in the summer of 2014 to conduct my research I discovered that the benefits of small-scale 
mining were much more ambiguous than they first appeared.  It was reported by former miners that the 
industry gave them a “future,” but just two years after displacement few were able to show long term 
socioeconomic mobility beyond their pre-Balabag levels. It seemed that artisanal mining was a fragile 
economic bubble that once popped returned most to their pre-mining lives and left little long term 
developmental benefits for the rural communities from which the extraction was done.  Add to this the 
negative effects to human and environmental health, and the harmful post-SSM impacts to cultures and 
communities, and the short term benefits become more difficult to justify.  The experience of this research, 
from the fieldwork to the writing, has been a difficult process, one that left me with questions and 
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uncertainties.  It is my hope that these queries will help drive the need for further work, and that hopefully 
one day something positive will come from the hardships faced by the peoples in sites like Balabag. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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APPENDIX: Sample Questions !
*note: I did not always have a lot of time when conducting some interviews, so I did not always follow this 
list step by step.  To complete this interview in full required at least half an hour, and an in-depth interview 
could last beyond one hour.  For the most part I used this as a guide and asked questions based on the 
highlighted (in bold) themes.  Further, I would ask many follow-up questions based on their answers and/
or ask questions based on the answers of others.  For example, while there is no direct question here about 
social vices in asking about community problems I would follow up with a query like: “Some respondents 
have told me that there were some problems with drug use, why do you think that was?”  I would never 
ask them about themselves, their families, or friends in connection with these problems, as I knew this 
would not elicit a favourable response. !
General Personal Data: 
sex:  
age:  
ethnicity: 
married?  
children (number and ages)?  !
Education level attained: 
Yours: 
Your children: 
Your future aspirations as a child: 
Your future aspirations for your children: !
Where did/do you live: 
Before SSM: 
During SSM: 
After SSM: !
Before SSM: 
- Your parents livelihood: 
- Your livelihood?  
- Describe the work: 
- Monthly earnings? 
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!
During SSM: 
- Why did you choose to work in Balabag? 
- Take me through the different jobs you did. Describe the work. 
- How much money did you earn/compare to pre-Balabag? 
- How much money was left over at the end of the month? 
- How did you spend your earnings? (on yourself, on your family, on investments, etc.) 
- Did you invest in mining? Describe the investment 
- Where did you get the money to invest? 
- Were you happy with the work? 
- What were the biggest problems/worries you had/your community had? Why? 
- What were the biggest problems/worries your spouse had? Why? 
- If you could do it again would you? what would you change? Why? 
- Who were the most successful people in Balabag, why? 
- Why do you think Balabag SSM was shut down by the government? !
How long did you work/live in Balabag before displacement? 
- Did you live there with your family?   
- If not where did your family live?  
- Why didn’t they come with you? 
- When did you leave Balabag?  Why? !
How did you strategize your relocation after displacement? 
- Did the company help? or pay for your land? !
After SSM: 
- Compare life then and now? 
- Livelihood?  
- Describe the work: 
- Monthly earnings? 
- What are the biggest problems/worries you have/your community has? Why? 
- What are the biggest problems/worries your spouse has? Why? !
*     *     * !
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FOR ORIGINAL SUBANEN RESIDENTS: 
- What can you share about the history of the Subanen on Balabag? 
- Describe life before SSM: 
- Describe how SSM began: 
- What was the relationship with the settlers like? Before/during/after SSM? 
- How did you feel about SSM at first? Later? Now? 
- Do you think the Subanen benefitted from SSM? !
*     *     * 
*note: The below are additional specialized questions directed as specific individuals: !
FOR MOSSMA OFFICIALS: 
- Can you share the history of Balabag SSM? 
- What was the role of MOSSMA? 
- How many people worked/lived there? 
- Can you describe the different roles within SSM? 
- Can you share some of MOSSMA’s successes and failures?  What would you do differently? 
- How do you respond to the criticisms about Balabag SSM? !
*     *     * !
THE MAGIC SIX 
- I have been told that you are one of the great success stories in Balabag, the people greatly respect you.  
Can you share your story?  How has your life changed? 
- What were your key roles in the community? 
- Can you describe the relationships between the different roles? 
- Can you share other success stories? 
- What prevented others from reaching success? 
- How do you respond to the criticisms about Balabag SSM? !
*     *     * !
OTHER MINE OWNERS 
- I have been told that you are one of the great success stories in Balabag, the people greatly respect you.  
Can you share your story? How has your life changed? 
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- Can you share other success stories? 
- What prevented others from reaching success? 
- Do you feel that you reached the full potential of success in Balabag? Why? 
- What prevented that/what obstacles existed? 
- If you were in charge of MOSSMA what would you have done differently? 
- How do you respond to the criticisms about Balabag SSM? !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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